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4
THE INFLUENCE
OP
SEA POWER UPON HISTORY
1660-1783
BY
CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN
UNITED STATES NAVY
BOSTON LITTLE, BROWN, AND COMPANY
1890
/
Copyright, 1890, By Captain A. T. Mahan.
John Wilson and Son, Cambridge.
9tecK
Annex
D
27
n27
PREFACE.
" I ^HE definite object proposed in this work is an ex- amination of the general history of Europe and America with particular reference to the effect of sea power upon the course of that history. Historians generally have been unfamiliar with the conditions of the sea, having as to it neither special interest nor special knowledge ; and the profound determining in- fluence of maritime strength upon great issues has con- sequently been overlooked. This is even more true of particular occasions than of the general tendency of sea power. It is easy to say in a general way, that the use and control of the sea is and has been a great factor in the history of the world ; it is more troublesome to seek out and show its exact bearing at a particular juncture. Yet, unless this be done, the acknowledgment of general importance remains vague and unsubstantial ; not resting, as it should, upon a collection of special instances in which the precise effect has been made clear, by an analysis of the conditions at the given moments.
A curious exemplification of this tendency to slight the bearing of maritime power upon events may be
863243
iv PREFACE.
drawn from two writers of that English nation which more than any other has owed its greatness to the sea. " Twice," says Arnold in his History of Eome, " Has there been witnessed the struggle of the highest indi- vidual genius against the resources and institutions of a great nation, and in both cases the nation was victo- rious. For seventeen years Hannibal strove against Rome, for sixteen years Napoleon strove against Eng- land ; the efforts of the first ended in Zama, those of the second in Waterloo." Sir Edward Creasy, quoting this, adds : " One point, however, of the similitude be- tween the two wars has scarcely been adequately dwelt on ; that is, the remarkable parallel between the Roman general who finally defeated the great Carthaginian, and the English general who gave the last deadly over- throw to the French emperor. Scipio and Wellington both held for many years commands of high importance, but distant from the main theatres of warfare. The same country was the scene of the principal military career of each. It was in Spain that Scipio, like Wel- lington, successively encountered and overthrew nearly all the subordinate generals of the enemy before being opposed to the chief champion and conqueror himself. Both Scipio and Wellington restored their countrymen's confidence in arms when shaken by a series of reverses, and each of them closed a long and perilous war by a complete and overwhelming defeat of the chosen leader and the chosen veterans of the foe."
Neither of these Englishmen mentions the yet more striking coincidence, that in both cases the mastery of the sea rested with the victor. The Roman control of
PRE FA CE. V
the water forced Hannibal to that long, perilous inarch throuQ-h Gaul in which more than half his veteran troops wasted away ; it enabled the elder Scipio, while sending his army from the Rhone on to Spain, to inter- cept Hannibal's communications, to return in person and face the invader at the Trebia. Throus!:hout the war the legions passed by water, unmolested and un- wearied, between Spain, wdiich was Hannibal's base, and Italy ; while the issue of the decisive battle of the Me- taurus, hinging as it did upon the interior position of the Roman armies with reference to the forces of Has- drubal and Hannibal, was ultimately due to the fact that the younger brother could not bring his succor- ing reinforcements by sea, but only by the land route through Gaul. Hence at the critical moment the two Carthaginian armies were separated by the length of Italy, and one was destroyed by the combined action of the Roman o-enerals.
On the other hand, naval historians have troubled themselves little about the connection between general history and their own particular topic, limiting them- selves generally to the duty of simple chroniclers of naval occurrences. This is less true of the French than of the English ; the genius and training of the former people leading them to more careful inquir}^ into the causes of particular results and the mutual relation of events.
There is not, however, within .the knowledge of the author any work that professes the particular object here sought : namely, an estimate of the effect of sea power upon the course of history and the prosperity of
vi PREFACE.
nations. As other histories deal with the wars, politics, social and economical conditions of countries, touching upon maritime matters only incidentall}'' and generally unsympathetically, so the present work aims at putting maritime interests in the foreground, without divorcing them, however, from their surroundings of cause and effect in general history, but seeking to show how they modified the latter, and were modified hy them.
The period embraced is from 1660, when the sailing- ship era, with its distinctive features, had fairly begun, to 1783, the end of the American Revolution. While the thread of general history upon which the successive maritime events is strung is intentionally slight, the effort has been to present a clear as well as accurate outline. "Writing as a naval officer in full sympath}'- with his profession, the author has not hesitated to di- gress freely on questions of naval policy, strategy, and tactics ; but as technical language has been avoided, it is hoped that these matters, simply presented, will be found of interest to the unprofessional reader.
A. T. MAHAX. December, 1889.
CONTENTS,
INTEODUCTORY.
Page History of Sea Power one of contest between nations, therefore
largely military 1
Pt rmanence of the teachings of history 2
U 'Settled condition of modern naval opinion 2
C' trasts between historical classes of war-ships 2
Essential distinction between weather and lee gage 5
Analogous to other offensive and defensive positions 6
Consequent effect upon naval policy 6
Lessons of history apply especially to strategy 7
Less obviously to tactics, but still applicable 9
Illustration's:
The battle of the Nile, a.d. 1798 10
Trafalgar, a.d. 1805 11
Siege of Gibraltar, a.d. 1779-1782 12
Actium, B.C. 31, and Lepanto, a.d. 1571 . 13
Second Punic War, B.C. 218-201 14
Xaval strategic combinations surer now than formerly 22
Wide scope of naval strategy 22
CHAPTER I.
Discussion of the Elements of Sea Power.
The sea a great common 25
Advantages of water-carriage over that by laud 25
Navies exist for the protection of commerce 26
Dependence of commerce upon secure seaports 27
Development of colonies and colonial posts 28
Links in the chain of Sea Power: production, shipping, colonies . . 28
viii CONTENTS.
Page General conditions affecting Sea Power :
I. Geographical position 29
II. Physical conformation 35
III. Extent of territory 42
IV, Number of population 44
V. National character 50
VI. Character and policy of governments 58
England 59
Holland 67
France 69
Influence of colonies on Sea Power 82
The United States :
Its weakness in Sea Power 83
Its chief interest in internal development 84
Danger from blockades 85
Dependence of the navy upon the shipping interest .... 87
Conclusion of the discussion of the elements of Sea Power ... 88
Purpose of the historical narrative 80
CHAPTER II.
State of Europe in 1660. — Second Anglo-Dutch "War, 1065- 1667. — Sea Battles of Lowestoft and of the Four Days,
Accession of Charles II. and Louis XIV 90
Followed shortly by general wars 91
French policy formulated by Henry IV. and Richelieu 92
Condition of France in 1G60 93
Condition of Spain 94
Condition of the Dutch United Provinces 96
Their commerce and colonies 97
Character of their government 98
Parties in the State 99
Condition of England in IGGO 99
Characteristics of French, English, and Dutch ships 101
Conditions of other European States 102
Louis XIV. the leading personality in Europe 103
His policy 10 i
Colbert's administrative acts 105
Second Anglo-Dutch War, 1665 107
Battle of Lowestoft, 1665 108
Fire-ships, compared with torpedo-cruisers 109
The group formation 112
CONTENTS. ix
Page
The order of battle for sailing-ships 115
The Four Days' Battle, 1066 117
Military inerits of the opposing fleets 120
Soldiers commanding fleets, discussion 127
Ruyter in the Thames, 1667 .... - 132
Peace of Breda, 1667 132
Military value of commerce-destroying 132
CHAPTER III.
War of Exglaxd and France ix Alliance against the United Provinces, 1672-1674. — Finally, of France against Com- bined Europe, 1674-1678. — Sea Battles of Solebay, the Texel, and Stromboli.
Aggressions of Louis XIV. on Spanish Netherlands 139
Policy of the United Provinces 139
Triple alliance between England, Holland, and Sweden .... 140
Anger of Louis XIV 140
Leibnitz proposes to Louis to seize Egypt 141
His memorial 142
Bargaining between Louis XIV. and Charles II 143
The two kings declare war against the United Provinces .... 144
Military character of this war 144
Naval strategy of the Dutch 144
Tactical combinations of De Ruyter 145
Inefficiency of Dutch naval administration 145
Battle of Solebay, 1672 14g
Tactical comments 147
Effect of the battle on the course of the war 148
Land campaign of the French in Holland 149
Murder of John De Witt. Grand Pensionary of Holland .... 150
Accession to power of William of Orange ......... 150
Uneasiness among European States loO
Naval battles off Schone veldt, 1673 154
Naval battle of the Texel, 1673 152
Effect upon the general war 154
Equivocal action of the French fleet 155
General ineffectiveness of maritime coalitions 156
Military character of De Ruyter 1.57
Coalition against France 158
X CONTENTS.
Page
Peace between England and the United Provinces 158
.Sicilian revolt against Spain 159
Battle of Stromboli, 107U • ... 161
Illustration of Clerk's naval tactics 163
De lluyter killed off Agosta 165
England becomes hostile to France 1G6
Sufferings of the United Provinces 167 i
Peace of Nimeguen, 1G78 168
Effects of the war on France and Holland 169
Notice of Comte d'Estrees 170
CHAPTER IV.
English Eeyolution. — War of the League of Augsburg, 1688- 1697. — Sea Battles of Beachy Head axd La Hougue.
Aggressive policy of Louis XTV 173
State of French, English, and Dutch navies 174
Accession of James II 175
Formation of the League of Augsburg 176
Louis declares war against the Emperor of Germany 177
Revolution in England 178
Louis declares war against the United Provinces 178
William and ]\Iary crowned . . . • 178
James II. lands in Ireland 179
ISIisdirection of French naval forces 180
"William III. lands in Ireland , 181
Naval battle of Beachy Head, 1690 182
Tourville's military character 184
Battle of the Boyne, 1690 186
End of the struggle in Ireland 186
Naval battle of La Hougue, 1692 189
Destruction of French ships 190
Jnfluefice of Sea Power in this war 191
Attack and defence of commerce 193
Peculiar ch.iracteristics of French privateering 195
Peace of Ryswick, 1697 197
Exhaustion of France : its causes 198
CONTENTS. xi
CHAPTER V.
War of the Spanish Successiox, 1702-1713. — Sea Battle of
Malaga.
Page
Failure of the Spanish line of the House of Austria 201
King of Spain wills the succession to the Duke of Anjou .... 202
Death of the King of Spain . 202
Louis XIV. accepts the bequests 203
He seizes towns in Spanish Netherlands 203
Offensive alliance between England, Holland, and Austria . . . 204
Declarations of war 205
The allies proclaim Carlos IIL King of Spain 206
Affair of the Vigo galleons 207
Portugal joins the allies 208
Character of the naval warfare 209
Capture of Gibraltar by the English 210
Naval battle of Malaga, 1704 211
Decay of the French navy 212
Progress of the land war 213
Allies seize Sardinia and Minorca 215
Disgrace of Marlborough 216
England offers terms of peace , . . 217
Peace of Utrecht, 1713 218
Terms of the peace 219
Results of the war to the different belligerents 219
Commanding position of Great Britain 224
Sea Power dependent upon both commerce and naval strength . . 225
Peculiar position of France as regards Sea Power 226
Depressed condition of France 227
Commercial prosperity of England 228
Ineffectiveness of commerce-destroying 229
Duguay-Trouin's expedition against Rio de Janeiro, 1711 .... 230
War between Russia and Sweden 231
xii CONTENTS.
CHAPTER VI.
The Regency in France. — Alberoni in Spain. — Policies of Walpole and Fleuri. — War of the Polish Succession. — English Contraband Trade in Spanish America. — Great Britain declares War against Spain. — 1715-1739.
Page
Death of Queen Anne and Louis XIV 232
Accession of George 1 232
Regency of Philip of Orleans 233
Administration of Alberoni in Spain 234
Spaniards invade Sardinia 235
Alliance of Austria, England, Holland, and France 235
Spaniards invade Sicily 236
Destruction of Spanish navy off Cape Papsaro, 1718 237
Failure and dismissal of Alberoni 239
Spain accepts terms 239
Great Britain interferes in the Baltic 239
Death of Philip of Orleans 241
Administration of Fleuri in France 241
Growth of French commerce 242
France in the East Indies 243
Troubles between England and Spain 244
English contraband trade in Spanish America 245
Illegal search of English ships 246
Walpole's struggles to preserve peace . . « 247
War of the Polish Succession 247
Creation of the Bourbon kingdom of the Two Sicilies 248
Bourbon family compact 248
France acquires Bar and Lorraine 249
England declares war against Spain 250
Morality of the English action toward Spain 250
Decay of the French navy 252
Death of Walpole and of Fleuri 253
CONTENTS. xiii
CHAPTER Vn.
War between Great Britain and Spain, 1739. — War of the Austrian Succession, 1740. — France joins Spain against Great Britain, 1744. — Sea Battles of Matthews, Anson, and Hawke. — Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748.
Pagb
Characteristics of the wars from 1739 to 1783 254
Neglect of the navy by French government 254
Colonial possessions of the French, English, and Spaniards . . . 255
Dupleix and La Bourdonnais in India 258
Condition of the contending navies 259
Expeditions of Vernon and Anson 261
Outbreak of the AVar of the Austrian Succession 262
England allies herself to Austria 262
Naval affairs in the Mediterranean 263
Influence of Sea Power on the war 264
Naval battle off Toulon, 1744 265
Causes of English failure 267
Courts-martial following the action 268
Inefficient action of English navy 269
Capture of Louisburg by New England colonists, 1745 .... 269
Causes which concurred to neutralize England's Sea Power . . . 269
France overruns Belgium and invades Holland 270
Naval actions of Anson and Hawke 271
Brilliant defence of Commodore I'Etenduere 272
Projects of Dupleix and La Bourdonnais in the East Indies . . . 273
Influence of Sea Power in Indian affairs 275
La Bourdonnais reduces Madras 276
Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748 277
^Madras exchanged for Louisburg 277
Results of the war 278
Effect of Sea Power on the issue 279
xiv ' CONTENTS.
CHAPTER VIII.
Seven Years' War, 1756-1763. — England's Overwhelming Power and Conquests on the Seas, in North America, Eltiope, and East and West Indies. — Sea Battles : Byng off Minorca ; Ha"vvke and Coxflans ; Pocock and D'Ache IN East Indies- page
Peace of Aix-ia-Chapelle leaves many questions unsettled . , . 281
Dupleix pursues his aggressive policy 281
He is recalled from India 282
His policy abandoned by the French 282
Agitation in North America 283
Braddock's expedition, 1755 284
Seizure of French ships by the English, while at peace .... 285
French expedition against Port Mahou, 1756 285
Byng sails to relieve the place 286
Byng's action off Port Mahon, 175G 286
Characteristics of the French naval policy 287
Byng returns to Gibraltar • 290
He is relieved, tried by com-t-martial, and shot 290
Formal declarations of war by England and France 291
England's ajipreciation of the maritime character of the war . . . 291
France is drawn into a continental struggle 292
The Seven Years' War (1756-1763) begins 293
Pitt becomes Prime Minister of England 293
Operations in North America 293
Fall of Louisburg, 1758 294
Fall of Quebec, 1759, and of Montreal, 1760 294
Influence of Sea Power on the continental w'ar 295
English plans for the general naval operations 296
Choiseul becomes Minister in France 297
He plans an invasion of England 297
Sailing of the Toulon fleet, 1759 298
Its disastrous encounter with Boscawen 299
Consequent frustration of the invasion of England 300
Project to invade Scotland 300
Sailing of the Brest fleet 300
Hawke falls in with it and disperses it, 1759 302
Accession of Charles HI. to Spanish throne 304
Death of George II 304
CONTENTS. XV
Paoe
Clive in India 305
Battle of Plassey, 1757 306
Decisive influence of Sea Power upon the issues in India .... 307
Naval actions between Focock and D'Ache, 1758, 1759 307
Destitute condition of French naval stations in India 309
The French fleet abandons the struggle 310
Final fall of the French power in India 310
liuined condition of the French navy 311
Alliance between France and Spain 313
England declares war against Spain 313
Rapid conquest of French and Spanish colonies 314
French and Spaniards invade Portugal 316
The invasion repelled by England 316
Severe reverses of the Spaniards in all quarters 316
Spain sues for peace 317
Losses of British mercantile shipping 317
Increase of British commerce 318
Commanding position of Great Britain „ . . . 319
Relations of England and Portugal 320
Terms of the Treaty of Paris 321
Opposition to the treaty in Great Britain 322
Results of the maritime war 323
Results of the continental war 324
Influence of Sea Power in countries politically unstable .... 321
Interest of the United States in the Central American Isthmus . . 325
Effects of the Seven Years' War on the later history of Great Britain 326
Subsequent acquisitions of Great Britain 327
British success due to maritime superiority 328
Mutual dependence of seaports and fleets 329
CHAPTER IX.
Course of Events from the Peace of Paris to 1778. — Mari- time War Consequent upon the American Revolution. — Sea Battle off Ushant.
French discontent with the Treaty of Paris 330
Revival of the French tiavy 331
Discipline among French naval officers of the time 332
Choiseul's foreign policy 333
Domestic troubles in Great Britain 334
Controversies with the North American colonies 334
xvi CONTENTS.
Page
Genoa cedes Corsica to France 33i
Dispute between England and Spain about the Falkland Islands . 335
Choiseul dismissed 336
Death of Louis XV 336
Naval policy of Louis XVI 337
Characteristics of the maritime war of 1778 338
Instructions of Louis XVI. to the French admirals 339
Strength of English navy 341
Characteristics of the military situation in America 311
The line of the Hudson 342
Burgoyne's expedition from Canada 343
Howe carries his army fi-om New York to the Chesapeake . . . 343
Surrender of Burgoyne, 1777 343
American privateering 344
Clandestine support of the Americans by France 345
Treaty between Fiance and the Americans 346
Vital importance of the French fleet to the Americans 347
The military situation in the different quarters of the globe . . . 347
Breach between France and England 350
Sailing of the British and French fleets 350
Battle of Ushant, 1778 351
Position of a naval commander-in-chief in battle ....,,, 353
CHAPTER X.
Maritime "War in North America and West Indies, 1778-1781. — Its Influence upon the Course of the American Revo- lution. — Fleet Actions off Grenada. Dominica, and Chesa- peake Bay.
D'Estaing sails from Toulon for Delaware Bay, 1778 359
British ordered to evacuate Philadelphia 359
Rapidity of Lord Howe's movements 360
D'Estaing arrives too late 360
Follows Howe to New York 360
Fails to attack there and sails for Newport 361
Howe follows him there 362
Both fleets dispersed by a storm 362
D'Estaing takes his fleet to Boston 363
Howe's activity foils D'Estaing at all points 363
D'Estaing sails for the West Indies 365
The English seize Sta. Lucia 365
COXTENTS. xvii
Pagb
Ineffectual attempts of D'Estaing to dislodge them 3G6
D'Estaing captures Grenada 367
Xaval battle of Grenada, 1779 ; English ships crippled .... 307
D'Estaing fails to improve his advantages 370
Reasons for his neglect 371
French naval policy 372
English operations in the Southern States 375
D'Estaing takes his fleet to Savannah 375
His fruitless assault on Savannah 376
D'Estaing returns to France 376
Fall of Charleston 376
De Guichen takes command in the West Indies 376
Rodney arrives to command English fleet 377
His military character 377
First action between Rodney and De Guichen, 1780 378
Breaking the line 380
Subsequent movements of Rodney and De Guichen 381
Rodney divides his fleet 381
Goes in person to New York 381
De Guichen returns to France 381
Arrival of French forces in Newport 382
Rodney returns to the West Indies 382
War between England and Holland 382
Disasters to the United States in 1780 ' 382
De Grasse sails from Brest for the West Indies, 1781 383
Engagement with English fleet off Martinique 383
Cornwallis overruns the Southern States 384
He retires upon AVilmington, N. C, and thence to Virginia . . . 385
Arnold on the James River 385
The French fleet leaves Newport to intercept Arnold 385
Meets the English fleet off the Chesapeake, 1781 386
French fleet returns to Newport 387
Cornwallis occupies Yorktown 387
De Grasss sails from Hayti for the Chesapeake 388
Action with the British fleet, 1781 389
Surrender of Cornwallis, 1781 390
Criticism of the British naval operations 390
Energy and address shown by De Grasse 392
Difficulties of Great Britain's position in the war of 1778 .... 392
The military policy best fitted to cope with them 393
Position of the French squadron in Newport, R. I.. 1780 .... 394
Great Britain's defensive position and inferior numbers .... 396
Consequent necessity for a vigorous initiative 396
Washington's opinions as to the influence of Sea Power on the
American contest 397
b
xviii CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XI. Maritime War in Europe, 1779-1782.
Page
Objectives of the allied operations in Europe 401
Spain declares war against England 401
Allied fleets enter the English Channel, 1779 402
Abortive issue of the cruise 403
Rodney sails with supplies for Gibraltar 403
Defeats the Spanish squadron of Langara and relieves the place . 404
The allies capture a great British convoy 404
The armed neutrality of the Baltic powers, 1780 405
England declares war against Holland 406
Gibraltar is revictualled by Admiral Derby 407
The allied fleets again in the Channel, 1781 408
They retire without effecting any damage to England 408
Destruction of a French convoy for the West Indies 408
Fall of Port Mahon, 1782 409
The allied fleets assemble at Algesiras 409
Grand attack of the allies on Gibraltar, which fails, 1782 .... 410
Lord Howe succeeds in revictualling Gibraltar 412
Action between his fleet and that of the allies 412
Conduct of the war of 1778 by the English government .... 412
Influence of Sea Power 416
Proper use of the naval forces 416
CHAPTER XII.
Events in the East Indies, 1778-1781. — Suffren sails from Brest for India, 1781. — His Brilliant Naval Campaign in the Indian Seas, 1782, 1783.
Neglect of India by the French government 419
England at war with Mysore and with the INIahrattas 420
Arrival of the French squadron under Comte d'Orves 420
It effects nothing and returns to the Isle of France 420
Suffren sails from Brest with five ships-of-the-line, 1781 . . . , , 421
Attacks an English squadron in the Cape Verde Islands, 1781 . . 422
Conduct and results of this attack 424
Distinguishing merits of Suffren as a naval leader 425
Suffren saves the Cape Colony from the English 427
CONTENTS. xix
Page
He readies the Isle of France 427
Succeeds to the chief coininaiid of the French fleet 427
Meets the British squadron under Hughes at Madras 427
Analysis of the naval strategic situation in India 428
The first battle between Suffren and Hughes, Feb. 17, 1782 . . . 430
Suffren's views of the naval situation in India 433
Tactical oversights made by Suffren 431
Inadequate support received by him from his captains 435
Suffren goes to Pondicherry, Hughes to Trincomalee 436
The second battle between Suffren and Hughes, April 12, 1782 . . 437
Suffren's tactics in the action 439
Relative injuries received by the opposing fleets 441
Contemporaneous English criticisms upon Hughes's conduct . . 442
Destitute condition of Suffren's fleet 443
His activity and success in supplying wants 443
He communicates with Hyder Ali, Sultan of Mysore 443
Firmness and insight shown by Suffren 445
His refusal to obey orders from home to leave the Indian Coast . 44(3
The third battle between Suffren and Hughes, July G, 1782 . . . 447
Qualities shown by Hughes 449
Stubborn fighting by the British admiral and captains 449
Suffren deprives three captains of their commands 449
Dilatory conduct of Admiral Hughes 450
Suffren attacks and takes Trincomalee 450
Strategic importance of this success 451
Comparative condition of the two fleets in material for repairs . . 451
The English government despatches powerful reinforcements . . 452
The French court fails to support Suffren 452
The fourth battle between Suffren and Hughes, Sept. 3, 1782 . . 453
Mismanagement and injuries of the French 455
Contrast between the captains in the opposing fleets 456
Two ships of Suffren's fleet grounded and lost 457
Arrival of British reinforcements under Admiral Bickerton . . . 458
Approach of bad-weather season ; Hughes goes to Bombay . . . 458
Military situation of French and English in India 459
Delays of the French reinforcements under Bussy 460
Suffren takes his fleet to Achem, in Sumatra 460
He returns to the Indian coast 461
Arrival of Bussy 461
Decline of the French power on shore 461
The English besiege Bussy in Cuddalore by land and sea .... 462
Suffren relieves the place 462
The fifth battle between Suffren and Hughes, June 20, 1783 . . . 463
Decisive character of Suffren's action 463
XX CONTENTS.
Page
News of the peace received at Madras 463
Suffren sails for France 464
His flattering reception everywhere 464
His distinguishing military qualities 465
His later career and death 466
CHAPTER Xlir.
Events in the West Indies after the Surrender of York-
TO'^VN. ENCOrNTERS OF De GraSSE WITH HOCD. ThE SeA
Battle of the Saints. — 1781-1782.
Maritinae struggle transferred from the continent to West Indies . 468
De Grasse sails for the islands 469
French expedition against the island of St. Christopher, January,
1782 469
Hood attempts to relieve the garrison 470
Manoeuvres of the two fleets 471
Action between De Grasse and Hood 472
Hood seizes the anchorage left by De Grasse 473
De Grasse attacks Hood at his anchorage 474
Hood maintains his position 475
Surrender of the garrison and island 475
Merits of Hood's action . 476
Criticism upon De Grasse's conduct 477
Rodney arrives in West Indies from England 479
Junction of Rodney and Hood at Antigua 479
De Grasse returns to Martinique 479
Allied plans to capture Jamaica 479
Rodney takes his station at Sta. Lucia 480
The French fleet sails and is pursued by Rodney 480
Action of April 9, 1782 481
Criticism upon the action 483
The chase continued ; accidents to French ships 484
The naval battle of the Saints, April 12, 1782 485
Rodney breaks the French line 488
Capture of the French commander-in-chief and five ships-of-the-line 489
Details of the action 489
Analysis of the effects of Rodney's manoeuvre 491
Tactical bearing of improvements in naval equipment 493
Lessons of this short naval campaign 495
Rodney's failure to pursue the French fleet 496
CONTENTS. XX i
Page
Exainiiiation of Lis reasons and of the actual conditions .... 497
Probable effect of this failure upon the conditions of peace . . . 498
Rodney's opinions upon the battle of April 12 499
Successes achieved by Rodney during his command 500
He is recalled by a new ministry 500
Exaggerated view of the effects of this battle upon the war . . . 500
Subsequent career of De Grasse 501
Court-martial ordered upon the officers of the French fleet .... 502
Findings of the court 502
De Grasse appeals against the finding 503
He is severely rebuked by the king 503
Deaths of De Grasse, Rodney, and Hood 504
CHAPTER XIV.
Critical Discussion of the Maritime "War of 1778.
The war of 1778 purely maritime 505
Peculiar interest therefore attaching to it 506
Successive steps in the critical study of a war 507
Distinction between "object " and " objective" 507
Parties to the war of 1778 507
Objects of the different belligerents 508
Foundations of the British Empire of the seas 510
Threatened by the revolt of the colonies 510
The British fleet inferior in numbers to the allies 511
Choice of objectives 511
The fleets indicated as the keys of the situation everywhere . . . 513
Elements essential to an active naval war 514
The bases of operations in the war of 1778 : —
In Europe 515
On the American continent 515
In the West Indies 516
In the East Indies 518
Strategic bearing of the trade-winds and monsoons 518
The bases abroad generally deficient in resources 519
Consequent increased importance of the communications .... 519
The navies the guardians of the communications 520
Need of intermediate ports between Europe and India . . , . . 520
Inquiry into the disposition of the naval forces 521
Difficulty of obtaining information at sea 521
Perplexity as to the destination of a naval expedition 522
Disadvantages .of the defensive 523
xxii CONTENTS.
Page
England upon the defensive in 1778 523
Consequent necessity for wise and vigorous action 521
The key of the situation 525
British naval policy in the Napoleonic wars 525
British naval policy in the Seven Years' War 527
Difficulties attending this policy 527
Disposition of the British navy in the war of 1778 528
Resulting inferiority on many critical occasions 528
Effect on the navy of the failure to fortify naval bases 529
The distribution of the British navy exposes it to being out- numbered at many points 531
The British naval policy in 1778 and in other wars compared . . . 532
Naval policy of the allies 535
Divergent counsels of the coalition 536
" Ulterior objects " 537
The allied navies systematically assume a defensive attitude . . . 538
Dangers of this line of action 538
Glamour of commerce-destroying 539
The conditions of peace, 1783 540
Index 54.3
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
LIST OF MAPS.
Page
I. Mediterranean Sea 15
II English Channel and Xorth Sea 107
III Indian Peninsula and Ceylon 257
IV. North Atlantic Ocean 532
PLANS OF NAVAL BATTLES.
In these plans, tchen the capital letters A, B, C, and D are used, all positions marked by the same capital are simultaneous.
I. Four Days' Battle, 1G66 119
II. Four Days' Battle, 1666 124
III. Battle of Solebay, 1672 148
IV. Battle of the Texel, 1673 153
V. Battle of Stromboli, 1676 161
Va. Pocock and D'Ache, 1758 161
VI. Battle of Beachy Head, 1690 183
VI a. Battle of La Hougue, 1692 183
VII. Matthews's Action off Toulon, 1744 265
VII a. Byng's Action oflf Minorca, 1756 265
VIII. Hawke and Conflans, 1759 303
IX. Battle of Ushant, 1778 351
X. D'Estaing and Byron, 1779 368
XT. Rodney and De Guichen, April 17, 1780 378
XII. Arbuthnot and Destouches, 1781 386
XTII. Suffren at Porto Praya, 1781 423
xxiv LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
Page
XIV. Suffreii and Hughes, February 17, 1782 431
XV. Suffren and Hughes, April 12, 1782 438
XVI. Suffren and Hughes, July 6, 1782 447
XVII. Suffren and Hughes, September 3, 1782 454
XVIII. Hood and De Grasse, January, 1782 470
XIX. Hood and De Grasse, January, 1782 472
XX. Rodney and De Grasse, April 9, 1782 482
XXI. Rodney's Victory, April 12, 1782 486
INFLUENCE
SEA POWER UPON HISTORY.
INTRODUCTORY.
nnHE history of Sea Power is largely, though by no means -^ solely, a narrative of contests between nations, of mu- tual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating in war. The profound influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and strength of countries was clearly seen long before the true principles which governed its growth and prosperity were detected. To secure to one's own people a disproportionate share of such benefits, every effort was made to exclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of mo- nopoly or prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence. The clash of interests, the angry feelings roused by conflicting attempts thus to appropriate the larger share, if not the whole, of the advantages of commerce, and of distant unsettled commercial regions, led to wars. On the other hand, wars arising from other causes have been greatly modified in their conduct and issue by the control of the sea. Therefore the history of sea power, while embracing in its broad sweep all that tends to make a people great upon the sea or by the sea, is largely a military history ; and it is in this aspect that it will be mainly, though not exclusively, regarded in the following pages.
A study of the military history of the past, such as this, is enjoined by great military leaders as essential to correct ideas
1
2 INTRODUCTOllY.
and to the skilful conduct of war in the future. Napoleon names among the campaigns to be studied by the aspiring soldier, those of Alexander, Hannibal, and Caesar, to whom gunpowder was unknown ; and there is a substantial agree- ment among professional writers that, while many of the con- ditions of war vary from age to age with the progress of weapons, there are certain teachings in the school of history which remain constant, and being, therefore, of universal ap- plication, can be elevated to the rank of general principles. For the same reason the study of the sea historj'' of the past will be found instructive, by its illustration of the general principles of maritime war, notwithstanding the great chances that have been brought about in naval weapons by the scien- tific advances of the past half century, and by the introduction of steam as the motive power.
It is doubly necessary thus to study critically the history and experience of naval warfare in the days of sailing-ships, because while these will be found to afford lessons of present application and value, steam navies have as yet made no his- tory which can be quoted as decisive in its teaching. Of the one we liave much experimental knowledge ; of the other, practically none. Hence theories about the naval warfare of the future are almost wholly presumptive ; and although the attempt has been made to give them a more solid basis by dwelling upon the resemblance between fleets of steamsliips and fleets of galleys moved by oars, which have a long and well-known history, it will be well not to be carried away by this analogy until it has been thoroughly tested. The resem- blance is indeed far from superficial.. The feature which the steamer and the galley have in common is the ability to move in any direction independent of the wind. Such a power makes a radical distinction between those classes of vessels and the sailing-ship ; for the latter can follow only a limited number of courses when the wind blows, and must remain motionless when it fails. But while it is wise to observe things that are alike, it is also wise to look for things that differ ; for when the imagination is carried away by the de~
INTRODUCTORY. 3
tection of points of resemblance, — one of the most pleasing of mental pursuits, — it is apt to be impatient of any divergence in its new-found parallels, and so may overlook or refuse to recognize such. Thus the galley and the steamship have in common, though unequally developed, the important charac- teristic mentioned, but in at least two points tliey differ ; and in an appeal to the history of the galley for lessons as to fighting steamships, the differences as well as the likeness must be kept steadily in view, or false deductions may be made. The motive power of the galley when in use neces- sarily and rapidly declined, because human strength could not long maintain such exhausting efforts, and consequently tactical movements could continue but for a limited time ; ^ and again, during the galley period offensive weapons were not only of short range, but were almost wholly confined to hand-to-hand encounter. These two conditions led almost necessarily to a rush upon each other, not, ho\vever, without some dexterous attempts to turn or double on the enemy, fol- lowed by a hand-to-hand melee. In such a rush and such a meUe a great consensus of respectable, even eminent, naval opinion of the present day finds the necessary outcome of modern naval weapons, — a kind of Donnybrook Fair, in which, as the history of melees shows, it will be hard to know friend from foe. Whatever may prove to be the worth of this opin- ion, it cannot claim an historical basis in the sole fact that galley and steamship can move at any moment directly upon the enemy, and carry a beak upon their prow, regardless of the points in which galley and steamship differ. As yet this opinion is only a presumption, upon which final judgment may well be deferred until the trial of battle has given fur- ther light. Until that time there is room for the opposite
^ Thus Hermocrates of S3-r.'icuse, advocating the policy of thwarting the Atlienian expedition against his city (b.c. 413) by going bohlly to meet it, and keeping on the flank of its h'ne of advance, said : "As their advance must be slow, we shall have a thousand opportunities to attack them ; but if they clear their ships for action and in a body bear down expeditiously upon us, they must ply hard at their oars, and when spent icith toil we can fall upon them."
4 INTRODUCTORY.
view, — that a melee between numerically equal fleets, in which skill is reduced to a minimum, is not the best that can be done with the elaborate and mighty weapons of this age. The surer of himself an admiral is, the finer the tactical develop- ment of his fleet, the better his captains, the more reluctant must he necessarily be to enter into a melee with equal forces, in which all these advantages will be thrown away, chance reign supreme, and his fleet he placed on terms of equality with an assemblage of ships which have never before acted together.! History has lessons as to when melees are, or are not, in order.
The galley, then, has one striking resemblance to the steamer, but differs in other important features which are not so im- mediately apparent and are therefore less accounted of. In the sailing-ship, on the contrary, the striking feature is the difference between it and the more modern vessel ; the points of resemblance, though existing and easy to find, are not so obvious, and therefore are less heeded. ■ This impression is enhanced by the sense of utter weakness in the sailing-ship as compared with the steamer, owing to its dependence upon the wind ; forgetting that, as the former fought with its equals, the tactical lessons are valid. The galley was never reduced to impotence by a calm, and hence receives more respect in our day than the sailing-ship ; yet the latter dis- placed it and remained supreme until the utilization of steam. The powers to injure an enemy from a great distance, to manoeuvre for an unlimited length of time without wearing out the men, to devote the greater part of the crew to the offensive weapons instead of to the oar, are common to the sailing vessel and the steamer, and are at least as important, tactically considered, as the power of the galley to move in a calm or against the wind.
1 The writer must guard himself from appearing to advocate elaborate tactical movements issuing in barren demonstrations. He believes that a fleet seeking a decisive result must close with its enemy, but not until some advantage has been obtained for the collision, wliich will usually be gained by manoeuvring, and will fall to the best drilled and managed fleet. In truth, barren results have as often followed upon headlong, close encounters as upon the most timid tactical trifling.
INTRODUCTORY. 5
In tracing resemblances there is a tendency not only to overlook points of difference, but to exaggerate points of like- ness,— to be fanciful. It may be so considered to point out that as the sailing-ship had guns of long range, with compar- atively great penetrative power, and carronades, which were of shorter range but great smashing effect, so the modern steamer has its batteries of long-range guns and of torpedoes, the latter being effective only within a limited distance and then injuring by smashing, while the gun, as of old, aims at penetration. Yet these are distinctly tactical considerations, which must affect the plans of admirals and captains ; and the analogy is real, not forced. So also both the sailing-ship and the steamer contemplate direct contact with an enemy's vessel, — the former to carry her by boarding, the latter to sink her by ramming ; and to both this is the most difficult of their tasks, for to effect it tlie ship must be carried to a single point of the field of action, whereas projectile weapons may be used from many points of a wide area.
The relative positions of two sailing-ships, or fleets, with reference to the direction of the wind involved most important tactical questions, and were perhaps the chief care of the seamen of that age. To a superficial glance it may appear that since this has become a matter of such indifference to the steamer, no analogies to it are to be found in present con- ditions, and the lessons of history in this respect are value- less. A more careful consideration of the distinguishing characteristics of the lee and the weather " gage," ^ directed to their essential features and disregarding secondary details, will show that this is a mistake. The distinguishing feature of the weather-gage was that it conferred the power of giving
1 A ship was said to have the weather-gage, or " the advantage of the wind," or "to be to windward," when the wind allowed her to steer for her opponent, and did not let the latter head straight for her. The extreme case was when the wind blew direct from one to the other ; but there was a large space on either side of this line to which the term " weather-gage " applied. If the lee ship be taken as the centre of a circle, there were nearly three eighths of its area in which the other might be and still keep the advantage of the wind to a greater or less degree. Lee is the opposite of weatlier.
6 INTRODUCTORY.
or refusing battle at will, which in turn carries the usual advantage of an offensive attitude in the choice of the method of attack. This advantage was accompanied by certain drawbacks, such as irregularity introduced into the order, exposure to raking or enfilading cannonade, and the sacrifice of part or all of the artillery-fire of the assailant, — all which were incurred in approaching the enemy. The ship, or fleet, with the lee-gage could not attack ; if it did not wish to re- treat, its action was confined to the defensive, and to receiv- ing battle on the enemy's terms. This disadvantage was compensated by the comparative ease of maintaining the order of battle undisturbed, and by a sustained artillery-fire to which the enemy for a time was unable to reply. Histori- cally, these favorable and unfavorable characteristics have their counterpart and analogy in the offensive and defensive operations of all ages. The offence undertakes certain risks and disadvantages in order to reach and destroy the enemy ; the defence, so long as it remains such, refuses the risks of advance, holds on to a careful, well-ordered position, and avails itself of the exposure to which the assailant submits himself. These radical differences between the weather and the lee gage were so clearly recognized, through the cloud of lesser details accompanying them, that the former was ordi- narily chosen by the English, because their steady policy was to assail and destroy their enemy ; whereas the French sought the lee-gage, because by so doing they were usually able to cripple the enemy as he approached, and thus evade decisive encounters and preserve their ships. The French, with rare exceptions, subordinated the action of the navy to other military considerations, grudged the money spent upon it, and therefore sought to economize their fleet by assuming a de- fensive position and limiting its efforts to the repelling of assaults. For this course the lee-gage, skilfully used, was admirably adapted so long as an enemy displayed more cour- age than conduct ; but when Rodney showed an intention to use the advantage of the wind, not merely to attack, but to make a formidable concentration on a part of the enemy's
INTRODUCTORY. 7
line, his wary opponent, De Guichen, changed his tactics. In the first of tlieir three actions the Frenchman took the lee- gage ; hut after recognizing Rodney's purpose he manoeuvred for the advantage of the wind, not to attack, but to refuse action except on his own terms. The power to assume the offensive, or to refuse battle, rests no longer with the wind, but with the party which has the greater speed ; which in a fleet will depend not only upon the speed of the individual ships, but also upon their tactical uniformity of action. Henceforth the ships which have the greatest speed will have the weather-gage.
It is not therefore a vain expectation, as many think, to look for useful lessons in the history of sailing-ships as well as in that of galleys. Both have their points of resemblance to the modern ship ; both have also points of essential differ- ence, which make it impossible to cite their experiences or modes of action as tactical precedents to be followed. But a precedent is different from and less valuable than a principle. The former may be originally faulty, or may cease to apply through change of circumstances ; the latter has its root in the essential nature of things, and, however various its application as conditions change, remains a standard to which action must conform to attain success. War has such prin- ciples ; their existence is detected by the study of the past, which reveals them in successes and in failures, the same from age to age. Conditions and weapons change ; but to cope with the one or successfully wield the others, respect must be had to these constant teachings of history in the tactics of the battlefield, or in those wider operations of war which are comprised under the name of strategy.
It is however in these wider operations, which embrace a whole theatre of war, and in a maritime contest may cover a large portion of the globe, that the teachings of history have a more evident and permanent value, because the conditions remain more permanent. The theatre of war may be larger or smaller, its difficulties more or less pronounced, the con- tending armies more or less great, the necessary movements
8 INTRODUCTORY.
more or less easy, but these are simply differences of scale, of degree, not of kind. As a wilderness gives place to civilization, as means of communication multiply, as roads are opened, rivers bridged, food- resources increased, the operations of war become easier, more rapid, more exten- sive ; but the principles to which they must be conformed remain the same. When the march on foot was replaced by carrying troops in coaches, when the latter in turn gave place to railroads, the scale of distances was increased, or, if you will, the scale of time diminished ; but the principles which dictated the point at which the army should be concentrated, the direction in which it should move, the part of the enemy's position which it should assail, the protection of communi- cations, were not altered. So, on the sea, the advance from the galley timidly creeping from port to port to the sailing- ship launching out boldly to the ends of the earth, and from the latter to the steamship of our own time, has increased the scope and the rapidity of naval operations without neces- sarily changing the principles which should direct them ; and the speech of Hermocrates twenty-three hundred years ago, before quoted, contained a correct strategic plan, which is as applicable in its principles now as it was then. Before hos- tile armies or fleets arc brought into contact (a word which perhaps better than any other indicates the dividing line between tactics and strategy), there are a number of ques- tions to be decided, covering the whole plan of operations throughout the theatre of war. Among these are the proper function of the navy in the war ; its true objective ; the point or points upon which it should be conceiitrated ; the establishment of depots of coal and supplies ; the main- tenance of communications between these depots and the home base ; the military value of commerce-destroying as a decisive or a secondary operation of war ; the system upon which commerce-destroying can be most efficiently conducted, whether by scattered cruisers or by holding in force some vital centre through which commercial shipping must pass. All these are strategic questions, and upon all these history
INTRODUCTORY. 9
has a great deal to say. There has been of late a valuable discussion in English naval circles as to the comparative merits of the policies of two great English admirals, Lord Howe and Lord St. Vincent, in the disposition of the English navy when at war with France. The question is purely strategic, and is not of mere historical interest ; it is of vital importance now, and the principles upon which its decision rests are the same now as then. St. Vincent's policy saved England from invasion, and in the hands of Nelson and his brother admirals led straight up to Trafalgar.
It is then particularly in the field of naval strategy that the teachings of the past have a value which is in no degree lessened. They are there useful not only as illustrative of principles, but also as precedents, owhig to the comparative permanence of the conditions. This is less obviously true as to tactics, when the fleets come 'into collision at the point to which strategic considerations have brought them. The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the weapons ; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting, — in the handling and disposition of troops or ships on the battlefield. Hence arises a tendency on the part of many connected with maritime matters to think that no advantage is to be gained from the study of former experiences ; tliat time so used is wasted. This view, though natural, not only leaves wholly out of sight those broad strate- gic considerations which lead nations to put fleets afloat, which direct the sphere of their action, and so have modified and will continue to modify the history of the world, but is one- sided and narrow even as to tactics. The battles of the past succeeded or failed according as they were fought in con- formity with the principles of war ; and the seaman who care- fully studies the causes of success or failure will not only detect and gradually assimilate these principles, but will also acquire increased aptitude in applying them to the tactical use of the ships and weapons of his own day. He will observe also that changes of tactics have not only taken place after changes in weapons, wdiich necessarily is the case, but that the
10 INTR OD UC TOR Y.
interval between such changes has been unduly long. This doubtless arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the energy of one or two men, while changes in tac- tics have to overcome the inertia of a conservative class ; but it is a great evil. It can be remedied only by a candid recog- nition of each change, by careful study of the powers and limitations of the new ship or weapon, and by a consequent adaptation of the method of using it to the qualities it pos- sesses, which will constitute its tactics. History shows that it is vain to hope that military men generally will be at the pains to do this, but that the one who does will go into battle with a great advantage, — a lesson in itself of no mean value.
We may therefore accept now the words of a French tacti- cian, Morogues, who wrote a century and a quarter ago: " Naval tactics are based upon conditions the chief causes of which, namely the arms, may change ; which in turn causes necessarily a change in the construction of ships, in the man- ner of handling them, and so finally in the disposition and handling of fleets." His further statement, that " it is not a science founded upon principles absolutely invariable," is more open to criticism. It M^ould be more correct to say that the application of its principles varies as the weapons change. The application of the principles doubtless varies also in strategy from time to time, but the variation is far less ; and hence the recognition of the underlying principle is easier. This statement is of sufficient importance to our subject to receive some illustrations from historical events.
The battle of the Nile, in 1798, was not only an overwhelm- ing victory for the English over the French fleet, but had also the decisive effect of destroying the communications between France and Napoleon's army in Egypt. In the battle itself the English admiral. Nelson, gave a most brilliant example of grand tactics, if that be, as has been defined, " the art of making good combinations preliminary to battles as well as during their progress." The particular tactical combination depended upon a condition now passed away, which was the inability of the lee ships of a fleet at anchor to come to the
IN Til OD UCTOR Y. 1 1
help of the weather ones before the latter were destroyed ; but the principles which underlay the combination, namely, to choose that part of the enemy's order which can least easily be helped, and to attack it with superior forces, has not passed away. The action of Admiral Jervis at Cape St. Vincent, when with fifteen ships he won a victory over twenty-seven, was dictated by the same principle, though in this case the enemy was not at anchor, but under way. Yet men's minds are so constituted that they seem more impressed by the transiency of the conditions than by the undying principle which coped with them. In the strategic effect of Nelson's victory upon the course of the war, on the contrary, the prin- ciple involved is not only more easily recognized, but it is at once seen to be applicable to our own day. The issue of the enterprise in Egypt depended upon keeping open the com- munications with France. The victory of the Nile destroyed the naval force, by which alone the communications could be assured, and determined the final failure ; and it is at once seen, not only that the blow was struck in accordance with the principle of striking at the enemy's line of communication, but also that the same principle is valid now, and would be equally so in the days of the galley as of the sailing-ship or steamer.
Nevertheless, a vague feeling of contempt for the past, sup- posed to be obsolete, combines with natural indolence to blind men even to those permanent strategic lessons which lie close to the surface of naval history. For instance, how many look upon the battle of Trafalgar, the crown of Nelson's glory and the seal of his genius, as other than an isolated event of exceptional grandeur ? How many ask themselves the stra- tegic question, "How did the ships come to be just there ?" How many realize it to be the final act in a great strategic drama, extending over a year or more, in which two of the greatest leaders that ever lived. Napoleon and Nelson, were pitted against each other ? At Trafalgar it was not Villeneuve that failed, but Napoleon that was vanquished ; not Nelson that won, but England that was saved ; and why ? Because
1 2 IN TR OB UCTOR Y.
Napoleon's combinations failed, and Nelson's intuitions and activity kept the English fleet ever on the track of the enemy, and brought it up in time at the decisive moment.^ The tac- tics at Trafalgar, while open to criticism in detail, were in their main features conformable to the principles of war, and their audacity was justified as well by the urgency of the case as by the results ; but the great lessons of efficiency in prepa- ration, of activity and energy in execution, and of thought and insight on the part of the English leader during the previous months, are strategic lessons, and as such they still remain good.
In these two cases events were worked out to their natural and decisive end. A third may be cited, in which, as no such definite end was reached, an opinion as to what should have been done may be open to dispute. In the war of the Ameri- can Revolution, France and Spain became allies against Eng- land in 1779. The united fleets thrice appeared in the English Channel, once to the number of sixty-six sail of the line, driving the English fleet to seek refuge in its ports be- cause far inferior in numbers. Now, the great aim of Spain was to recover Gibraltar and Jamaica ; and to the former end immense efforts both by land and sea were put forth by the allies against that nearly impregnable fortress. They . were fruitless. The question suggested — ■ and it is purely one of naval strategy — is this: Would not Gibraltar have been more surely recovered by controlling the English Channel, attacking the British fleet even in its harbors, and threatening England with annihilation of commerce and invasion at home, than by far greater efforts directed against a distant and very strong outpost of her empire ?, The English people, from long im- munity, were particulai'ly sensitive to fears of invasion, and their great confidence in their fleets, if- rudely shaken, would have left them proportionately disheartened. However de- cided, the question as a point of strategy is fair ; and it is proposed in another form by a French officer of the period, who favored directing the great effort on a West India island
1 See note at end of Introductory Chapter, page 23.
INTRODUCTORY. 13
which might be exchanged against Gibraltar. It is not, how- ever, likely that England would have given up the key of the Mediterranean for any other foreign possession, though she might have yielded it to save her firesides and her capital. Napoleon once said that he would reconquer Pondicherry on the banks of the Vistula. Could he have controlled the Eng- lish Channel, as the allied fleet did for a moment in 1779, can it be doubted that he would have conquered Gibraltar on the shores of England ?
To impress more strongly the truth that history both sug- gests strategic study and illustrates the principles of war by the facts which it transmits, two more instances will be taken, which are more remote in time than the period specially con- sidered in this work. How did it happen that, in two great / contests between the powers of the East and of the West in the Mediterranean, in one of which the empire of the known world was at stake, the opposing fleets met on spots so near each other as Actium and Lepanto ? Was this a mere coin- cidence, or was it due to conditions that recurred, and may recur again ? ^ If the latter, it is worth while to study out the reason ; for if there should again arise a great eastern power of the sea like that of Antony or of Turkey, the strategic questions would be similar. At present, indeed, it seems that the centre of sea power, resting mainly with England and France, is overwhelmingly in the West ; but should any chance add to the control of tlie Black Sea basin, which Rus- sia now has, the possession of the entrance to the Mediterra- nean, the existing strategic conditions affecting sea power would all be modified. Now, were the West arrayed against the East, England and France would go at once unopposed to the Levant, as they did in 1854, and as England alone went in 1878 ; in case of the change suggested, the East, as twice before, would meet the West half-way.
At a very conspicuous and momentous period of the world's history. Sea Power had a strategic bearing and weight which
^ The battle of Navarino (1827) between Turkey and the Western Powers was foutjht in tliis neighborhood.
14 INTRODUCTORY.
lias received scant recognition. There cannot now be had the full knowledge necessary for tracing in detail its influence upon the issue of the second Punic War ; but the indications which remain are sufficient to warrant the assertion that it was a determining factor. An accurate judgment upon this point cannot be formed by mastering only such facts of the particular contest as have been clearly transmitted, for as usual the naval transactions have been slightingly passed over ; there is needed also familiarity with the details of gen- eral naval history in order to draw, from slight indications, correct inferences based upon a knowledge of what has been possible at periods whose history is well known. The con- trol of the sea, however real, does not imply that an enemy's single ships or small squadrons cannot steal out of port, cannot cross more or less frequented tracts of ocean, make harassing descents upon unprotected points of a long coast- line, enter blockaded harbors. On the contrarj', history has shown that such evasions are always possible, to some ex- tent, to the weaker party, however great the inequality of naval strength. It is not therefore inconsistent with the gen- eral control of the sea, or of a decisive part of it, by the Roman fleets, that the Carthaginian admiral Bomilcar in the fourth year of the war, after the stunning defeat of Cannse, landed four thousand men and a body of elephants in south Italy ; nor that in the seventh year, flying from the Roman fleet off Syracuse, he again appeared at Tarentum, then in Hannibal's hands ; nor that Hannibal sent despatch vessels to Carthage ; nor even that, at last, he withdrew in safety to Africa with his wasted army. None of these things prove that the govern- ment in Carthage could, if it wished, have sent Hannibal the constant support which, as a matter of fact, he did not receive ; but they do tend to create a natural impression that such help could have been given. Therefore the statement, that the Roman preponderance at sea had a decisive effect upon the course of the war, needs to be made good by an ex- amination of ascertained facts. Thus the kind and degree of its influence mav be fairly estimated.
INTRODUCTORY. 15
At the beginning of the war, Moramsen says, Rome con- trolled the seas. To whatever cause, or combination of causes, it be attributed, this essentially non-maritime state had in the first Punic War established over its sea-faring rival a naval supremacy, which still lasted. In the second war there was no naval battle of importance, — a circumstance which in itself, and still more in connection with otlier well- ascertained facts, indicates a superiority analogous to that which at other epochs has been marked by the same feature.
As Hannibal left no memoirs, the motives are unknown which determined him to the perilous and almost ruinous march through Gaul and across the Alps. It is certain, how- ever, that his fleet on the coast of Spain was not strong enough to contend with that of Rome. Had it been, he might still have followed the road he actually did, for reasons that weiglicd with him ; but had he gone by the sea, he would not have lost thirty-three thousand out of the sixty thousand veteran soldiers with whom he started.
While Hannibal was making this dangerous march, the Romans were sending to Spain, under the two elder Scipios, one part of their fleet, carrying a consular army. This made the voyage without serious loss, and the army established itself successfully north of the Ebro, on Hannibal's line of communications. At the same time another squadron, with an army commanded by the other consul, was sent to Sicily. The two together numbered two hundred and twenty ships. On its station each met and defeated a Carthaginian squad- ron with an ease which may be inferred from the slight mention made of the actions, and which indicates the actual superiority of the Roman fleet.
After the second year the war assumed the following shape : Hannibal, having entered Italy by the north, after a series of successes had passed southward around Rome and fixed himself in southern Italy, living off the country, — a condition which tended to alienate the people, and was es- pecially precarious when in contact Avith the mighty politi- cal and military system of control which Rome had there
16 INTRODUCTOR Y. '
established. It was therefore from tlie first urgently neces- sary that he sliould establish, between himself and some reliable base, that stream of supplies and reinforcements which in terms of modern war is called " communications." There were three friendly regions which might, each or all, serve as such a base, — Carthage itself, Macedonia, and Spain. With the first two, communication could be had only by sea. From Spain, where his firmest support was found, he could be reached by both land and sea, unless an enemy barred the passage ; but the sea route was the shorter and easier.
In the first years of the war, Rome, by her sea power, con- trolled absolutely the basin between Italy, Sicily, and Spain, known as the Tyrrhenian and Sardinian Seas. The sea- coast from the Ebro to the Tiber was mostly friendly to her. In the fourth year, after tlie battle of Cannse, Syracuse for- sook the Roman alliance, the revolt spread through Sicily, and Macedonia also entered into an offensive league with Hannibal. These changes extended the necessary operations of tlie Ro- man fleet, and taxed its strength. What disposition was made of it, and how did it thereafter influence the struggle ?
The indications are clear that Rome at no time ceased to control the Tyrrhenian Sea, for her squadrons passed un- molested from Italy to Spain. On the Spanish coast also she had full sway till the younger Scipio saw fit to lay up the fleet. In the Adriatic, a squadron and naval station were established at Brindisi to check Macedonia, which per- formed their task so well that not a soldier of the phalanxes ever set foot in Italy. " The want of a war fleet," says Mommsen, " paralyzed Philip in all his movements." Here the effect of Sea Power is not even a matter of inference.
In Sicily, the struggle centred about Syracuse. The fleets of Carthage and Rome met there, but the superiority evi- dently lay with the latter ; for though the Carthaginians at times succeeded in throwing supplies into the city, they avoided meeting the Roman fleet in battle. With Lilybaeum, Palermo, and Messina in its liands, the latter was well based in the north coast of the island. Access bv the south was
INTRODUCTORY. I7
left open to the Carthaginians, and they were thus able to maintain the insurrection.
Putting these facts together, it is a reasonable inference, and supported by the whole tenor of the history, that the Roman sea power controlled the sea north of a line drawn from Tarragona in Spain to Lilybaeum (the modern Mar- sala), at the west end of Sicily, thence round by the north side of the island through the straits of Messina down to Syracuse, and from there to Brindisi in the Adriatic. This control lasted, unshaken, throughout the war. It did not exclude maritime raids, large or small, such as have been spoken of ; but it did forbid the sustained and secure com- munications of which Hannibal was in deadly need.
On the other hand, it seems equally plain that for the first ten years of the war the Roman fleet was not strong enough for sustained operations in the sea between Sicily and Car- thage, nor indeed much to the south of the line indicated. When Hannibal started, he assigned such ships as he had to maintaining the communications between Spain and Africa, which the Romans did not then attempt to disturb.
The Roman sea power, therefore, threw Macedonia wholly out of the war. It did not keep Carthage from maintaining a useful and most harassing diversion in Sicily ; but it did pre- vent her sending troops, when they would have been most use- ful, to her great general in Italy. How was it as to Spain ?
Spain was the region upon which the father of Hannibal and Hannibal himself had based their intended invasion of Italy. For eighteen years before this began they had occu- pied the country, extending and consolidating their power, both political and military, with rare sagacity. They had raised, and trained in local wars, a large and now veteran army. Upon his own departure, Hannibal intrusted the government to his younger brother, Hasdrubal, who pre- served toward him to the end a loyalty and devotion which he had no reason to hope from the faction-cursed mother-city in Africa.
At the time of his starting, the Carthaginian power in
2
18 INTRODUCTORY.
Spain was secured from Cadiz to the river Ebro. The re- gion between this river and the Pyrenees was inhabited by tribes friendly to the Romans, but unable, in the absence of the latter, to oppose a successful resistance to Hannibal. He put them down, leaving eleven thousand soldiers under Hanno to keep military possession of the country, lest the Romans should establish themselves there, and thus disturb his communications with his base.
Cnasus Scipio, however, arrived on the spot by sea the same year with twenty thousand men, defeated Hanno, and occupied both the coast and interior north of the Ebro. The Romans thus held ground by which they entirely closed the road between Hannibal and reinforcements from Hasdrubal, and whence they could attack the Carthaginian power in Spain ; while their own communications with Italy, being by water, were secured by their naval supremacy. They made a naval base at Tarragona, confronting that of Hasdrubal at Cartagena, and then invaded the Carthaginian dominions. The war in Spain went on under the elder Scipios, seem- ingly a side issue, with varying fortune for seven years ; at the end of which time Hasdrubal inflicted upon them a crushing defeat, the two brothers were killed, and the Car- thaginians nearly succeeded in breaking through to the Pyrenees with reinforcements for Hannibal. The attempt, however, was checked for the moment ; and before it could be renewed, the fall of Capua released twelve thousand veteran Romans, who were sent to Spain under Claudius Nero, a man of exceptional ability, to whom was due later the most decisive military movement made by any Roman general during the Second Punic War. This seasonable reinforcement, which again assured the shaken grip on Hasdrubal's line of march, came by sea, — a way which, though most rapid and easy, was closed to the Carthaginians by the Roman navy.
Two years later the younger Publius Scipio, celebrated afterward as Africanus, received the command in Spain, and captured Cartagena by a combined military and naval attack ;
INTRODUCTORY. 19
after which he took the most extraordinary step of breaking up his fleet and transferring the seamen to the army. Not contented to act merely as the " containing " ^ force against Hasdrubal by closing the passes of the Pyrenees, Scipio pushed forward into southern Spain, and fought a severe but indecisive battle on the Guadalquivir ; after which Hasdrubal slipped away from him, hurried north, crossed the Pyrenees at their extreme west, and pressed on to Italy, where liannibal's position was daily growing weaker, the natural waste of his array not being replaced.
The war had lasted ten years, when Hasdrubal, having met little loss on the way, entered Italy at the north. The troops he brought, could they be safely united with those under the command of the unrivalled Hannibal, might give a decisive turn to the war, for Rome herself was nearly exhausted ; the iron links which bound her own colonies and the allied States to her were strained to the utmost, and some had already snapped. But the military position of the two brothers was also perilous in the extreme. One being at the river Metaurus, the other in Apulia, two hundred miles apart, each was confronted by a superior enemy, and both these Roman armies were between their separated opponents. This false situation, as well as the long delay of Hasdrubal's coming, was due to the Roman control of the sea, which throughout the war limited the mutual support of the Carthaginian brothers to the route through Gaul. At the very time that Hasdrubal was making his long and dangerous circuit by land, Scipio had sent eleven thousand men from Spain by sea to reinforce the army opposed to him. The upshot was that messengers from Hasdrubal to Hannibal, having to pass over so wide a belt of hostile country, fell into the hands of Clau- dius Nero, commanding the southern Roman array, who thus learned the route which Hasdrubal intended to take. Nero correctly appreciated the situation, and, escaping the vigilance
1 A " containing " force is one to which, in a military combination, is assigned the duty of stopping, or delaying the advance of a portion of the enemy, while the main effort of the army or armies is being exerted in a different quarter.
2 0 INTR OD UC TOR Y.
of Hannibal, made a rapid march with eight thousand of his best troops to join the forces in the north. The junction being effected, the two consuls fell upon Hasdrubal in over- whelming numbers and destroyed his army ; the Carthaginian leader himself falling in the battle. Hannibal's first news of the disaster was by the head of his brother being thrown into his camp. He is said to have exclaimed that Rome would now be mistress of the world ; and the battle of Metaurus is generally accepted as decisive of the struggle between the two States.
The military situation which finally resulted in the battle of the Metaurus and the triumph of Rome may be summed up as follows : To overthrow Rome it was necessary to attack her in Italy at the heart of her power, and shatter the strongly linked confederacy of which she was the head. This was the objective. To reach it, the Carthaginians needed a solid base of operations and a secure line of communications. The for- mer was established in Spain by the genius of the great Barca family ; the latter was never achieved. There were two lines possible, — the one direct by sea, the other circuitous through ^aul. The first was blocked by the Roman sea power, the second imperilled and finally intercepted through the occupa- tion of northern Spain by the Roman army. This occupation was made possible through the control of the sea, which the Carthaginians never endangered. With respect to Hannibal and his base, therefore, Rome occupied two central positions, Rome itself and northern Spain, joined by an easy interior line of communications, the sea ; by which mutual support was continually given.
Had the Mediterranean been a level desert of land, in which the Romans held strong mountain ranges in Corsica and Sardinia, fortified posts at Tarragona, Lilybasum, and JMcssina, the Italian coast-line nearly to Genoa, and allied fortresses in Marseilles and other points ; had they also possessed an armed force capable by its character of traversing that desert at will, but in which their opponents were very inferior and therefore compelled to a great circuit in order to concentrate their
INTRODUCTORY. 21
troops, the military situation would have been at once recog- nized, and no words would have been too strong to express the value and effect of that peculiar force. It would have been perceived, also, that the enemy's force of the same kind might, however inferior in strength, make an inroad, or raid, upon the territory thus held, might burn a village or waste a few miles of borderland, might even cut off a convoy at times, without, in a military sense, endangering the communications. Such predatory operations have been carried on in all ages by the weaker maritime belligerent, but they by no means warrant the inference, irreconcilable with the known facts, " that neither Rome nor Carthage could be said to have undisputed mastery of the sea," because " Roman fleets sometimes visited the coasts of Africa, and Carthaginian fleets in the same way appeared off the coast of Italy." In the case under consideration, the navy played the part of such a force upon the supposed desert ; but as it acts on an element strange to most writers, as its members have been from time immemorial a sti'ange race apart, without prophets of their own, neither themselves nor their calling understood, its immense determining influence upon the history of that era, and consequently upon the history of the world, has been overlooked. If the preceding argument is sound, it is as defective to omit sea power from the list of principal factors in the result, as it would be absurd to claim for it an exclusive influence.
Instances such as have been cited, drawn from widely separated periods of time, both before and after that specially treated in this work, serve to illustrate the intrinsic interest of the subject, and the character of the lessons which history has to teach. As before observed, these come more often under the head of strategy than of tactics ; they bear rather upon the conduct of campaigns than of battles, and hence are fraught with more lasting value. To quote a great authority in this connection, Jomini says : " Happening to be in Paris near the end of 1851, a distinguished person did me the honor to ask my opinion as to whether recent improvements in lire-
22 INTRODUCTORY.
arms would cause any great modifications in the way of mak- ing war. I replied that they would probably have an influence upon the details of tactics, but that in great strategic operations and the grand combinations of battles, victory would, now as ever, result from the application of the principles which had led to the success of great generals in all ages ; of Alexander and Caesar, as well as of Frederick and Napoleon." This study has become more than ever important now to navies, because of the great and steady power of movement possessed by the mod- ern steamer. The best-planned schemes might fail through stress of weather in the days of the galley and the sailing-ship ; but this difficulty has almost disappeared. The principles which should direct great naval combinations have been applicable to all ages, and are deducible from history ; but the power to carry them out with little regard to the weather is a recent gain.
The definitions usually given of the word " strategy " con- fine it to military combinations embracing one or more fields of operations, either wholly distinct or mutually dependent, but always regarded as actual or immediate scenes of war. How- ever this may be on shore, a recent French author is quite right in pointing out that such a definition is too narrow for naval strategy. " This," he says, " differs from military strategy in that it is as necessary in peace as in war. Indeed, in peace it may gain its most decisive victories by occupying in a country, either by purchase or treaty, excellent positions which would perhaps hardly be got by war. It learns to profit by all opportunities of settling on some chosen point of a coast, and to render definitive an occupation which at first was only transient." A generation that has seen England within ten years occupy successively Cyprus and Egypt, under terms and conditions on their face transient, but which have not yet led to the abandonment of the positions taken, can readily agree with this remark ; which indeed receives con- stant illustration from the quiet persistency with which all the great sea powers are seeking position after position, less noted and less noteworthy than Cyprus and Egypt, in the different seas to which their people and their ships penetrate.
INTRODUCTORY. 23
" Naval strategy has indeed for its end to found, support, and increase, as well in peace as in war, the sea i)ower of a country;" and therefore its study has an interest and value for all citizens of a free country, but especially for those who are charged with its foreign and military relations.
The general conditions that either are essential to or powerfully affect the greatness of a nation upon the sea will now be examined ; after which a more particular considera- tion of the various maritime nations of Europe at the middle of tiie seventeenth century, where the historical survey begins, will serve at once to illustrate and give precision to the conclusions upon the general subject.
XoTE. — The brilliancy of Xelson's fame, dimmint; as it does that of all his contemporaries, and the implicit trust felt by England in him as the one man able to save her from the schemes of Xapoleon, should not of course obscure the fact that only one portion of the field was, or could be, oc- cupied by him. Napoleon's aim, in the campaign which ended at Trafal- gar, was to unite in the West Indies the French fleets of Brest, Toulon, and Rochefort, together with a strong body of Spanish ships, thus forming an overwhelming force which he intended should return together to the English Channel and cover the crossing of the French army. He naturally ex- pected that, Tv-ith England's interests scattered all over the world, confusion and distraction would arise from ignorance of the destination of the French squadrons, and the English navy be drawn away from his objective point. The portion of the field committed to Nelson was the Mediterranean, where he watched the great arsenal of Toulon and the highways alike to the East and to the Atlantic. This was inferior in consetj^uence to no other, and as- sumed additional importance in the eyes of Nelson from his conviction that the former attempts on Egypt would be renewed. Owing to this persuasion he took at first a false step, which delayed his pursuit of the Toulon fleet when it sailed under the command of A'illeneuve ; and the latter was further favored by a long continuance of fair winds, while the English had head winds. But while all this is true, while the failure of Napoleon's combinations must be attributed to the tenacious grip of the English blockade off Brest, as well as to Nelson's energetic pursuit of the Toulon fleet when it escaped to the West Indies and again on its hasty returti to Europe, the latter is fairly entitled to- the eminent distinction which history has accorded it, and which is asserted in the text. Nelson did not, indeed, fathom the intentions of N;ipoleon. This may have been owing, as some have said, to lack of insight; but it may be more simply laid to the usual disadvantage under which the
24 INTRODUCTORY.
defence lies before the blow has fallen, of ignorance as to the point threat- ened by the offence. It is insight enough to fasten on the key of a situation ; and this Xelson rightly saw was the fleet, not the station. Consequently, his action has afforded a striking instance of how tenacity of purpose and untiring energy in execution can repair a first mistake and baffle deeply laid plans. His Mediterranean command embraced many duties and cares ; but amid and dominating them all, he saw clearly the Toulon fleet as the controlling factor there, and an important factor in any naval combination of the Emperor. Hence his attention was unwaveringly fixed upon it ; so much so that he called it " his fleet," a phrase which has somewhat vexed the sensibilities of French critics. This simple and accurate view of the military situation strengthened him in taking the fearless resolution and bearing the immense responsibility of abandoning his station in order to follow "his fleet." Determined thus on a pursuit the undeniable wisdom of which should not obscure the greatness of mind that undertook it, he followed so vigorously as to reach Cadiz on his return a week before Villeneuve entered Ferrol, despite unavoidable delays arising from false in- formation and uncertainty as to the enemy's movements. The same untir- ing ardor enabled him to bring up his own ships from Cadiz to Brest in time to make the fleet there superior to Yilleneuve's, had the latter persisted in his attempt to reach the neighborhood. The English, very inferior in aggregate number of vessels to the allied fleets, were by this seasonable re- inforcement of eight veteran ships put into the best possible position strate- gically, as will be pointed out in dealing with similar conditions in the war of the American Revolution. Their forces were united in one great fleet in the Bay of Biscay, interposed between the two divisions of the enemy in Brest and Ferrol, superior in number to either singly, and with a strong probability of being able to deal with one before the other could come up. This was due to able action all round on the part of the English authori- ties ; but above all other factors in the result stands Nelson's single-minded pursuit of " his fleet."
This interesting series of strategic movements ended on the 14th of August, when Villeneuve, in despair of reaching Brest, headed for Cadiz, where he anchored on the 20th. As soon as Napoleon heard of this, after an outburst of rage against the admiral, he at once dictated the series of movements which resulted in Ulm and Austerlitz, abandoning his purposes against England. The battle of Trafalgar, fought October 21, was there- fore separated by a space of two months from the extensive movements of which it was nevertheless the outcome. Isolated from them in point of time, it was none the less the seal of Nelson's genius, affixed later to the record he had made in the near past. With equal truth it is said that England was saved at Trafalgar, though the Emperor had then given up his intended invasion ; the destruction there emphasized and sealed the strategic triumph which had noiselessly foiled Napoleon's plans.
CHAPTER I.
Discussion of the Elements of Sea Power.
"^ I ^HE first and most obvious light in which the sea presents itself from the political and social point of view is that of a great highway ; or better, perhaps, of a wide common, over which men may pass in all directions, but on which some well-worn paths show that controlling reasons have led them to choose certain lines of travel rather than others. These lines of travel are called trade routes ; and the reasons which have determined them are to be sought in the history of the world.
Notwithstanding all the familiar and unfamiliar dangers of the sea, both travel and traffic by water have always been easier and cheaper than by land. The commercial greatness of Holland was due not only to her shipping at sea, but also to the numerous tranquil water-ways which gave such cheap and easy access to her own interior and to that of Germany. This advantage of carriage by water over that by land was yet more marked in a period when roads were few and very bad, wars frequent and society unsettled, as was the case two hundred years ago. Sea traffic then went in peril of robbers, but was nevertheless safer and quicker than that by land. A Dutch writer of that time, estimating the chances of his coun- try in a war with England, notices among other things that the water-ways of England failed to penetrate the country suf- ficiently ; therefore, the roads being bad, goods from one part of the kingdom to the other must go by sea, and be exposed to capture by the way. As regards purely internal trade, this danger has generally disappeareil at the present day. In most civilized countries, now, the destruction or disappearance of
26 DlSCUSSIOy OF THE
the coasting trade would only be an inconvenience, although water transit is still the cheaper. Nevertheless, as late as the wars of the French Republic and the First Empire, those who are familiar with the history of the period, and the light naval literature that has grown up around it, know how constant is the mention of convoys stealing from point to point along the French coast, although the sea swarmed with English cruisers and there were good inland roads.
Under modern conditions, however, home trade is but a part of the business of a country bordering on the sea. For- eign necessaries or luxuries must be brought to its ports, either in its own or in foreign ships, which will return, bearing in exchange the products of the country, whether they be the fruits of the earth or the works of men's hands ; and it is the wish of every nation that this shipping business should be done by its own vessels. The ships that thus sail to and fro must have secure ports to which to return, and must, as far as possible, be followed by the protection of their country throughout the voyage.
This protection in time of war must be extended liy armed shipping. The necessity of a navy, in the restricted sense of tlie word, springs, therefore, from the existence of a peaceful shipping, and disappears with it, except in the case of a nation which has aggressive tendencies, and keeps up a navy merely as a branch of the military establishment. As the United States has at present no aggressive purposes, and as its mer- chant service has disappeared, the dwindling of the armed fleet and general lack of interest in it are strictly logical con- sequences. When for any reason sea trade is again found to pay, a large enough shipping interest will reappear to compel tlie revival of the war fleet. It is possible that when a canal route through the Central-American Isthmus is seen to be a near certainty, the aggressive impulse may be strong enough to lead to the same result. This is doubtful, however, be- cause a peaceful, gain-loving nation is not far-sighted, and far-sightedness is needed for adequate military preparation, especially in these days.
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 27
Asa nation, with its unarmed and armed shipping, launches fortli from its own shores, the need is soon felt of points upon which the ships can rely for peaceful trading, for refuge and supplies. In the present day friendly, though foreign, ports are to be found all over the world ; and their shelter is enough while peace prevails. It was not always so, nor does peace always endure, though the United States have been favored by so long a continuance of it. In earlier times the merchant seaman, seeking for trade in new and unexplored regions, made his gains at risk of life and liberty from suspicious or hostile nations, and was under great delays in collecting a full and profitable freight. He therefore intuitively sought at the far end of his trade route one or more stations, to be given to him by force or favor, where he could fix himself or his agents in reasonable security, where his ships could lie in safety, and where the merchantable products of the land could be con- tinually collecting, awaiting the arrival of the home fleet, which should carry them to the mother-country. As there was im- mense gain, as well as much risk, in these early voyages, such establishments naturally multiplied and grew until they became colonies ; whose ultimate development and success depended upon the genius and policy of the nation from which they sprang, and form a very great part of the history, and particu- larly of the sea history, of the world. All colonies had not the simple and natural birth and growth above described. Many were more formal, and purely political, in their concep- tion and founding, the act of the rulers of the people rather than of private individuals ; but the trading-station with its after expansion, the work simply of the adventurer seeking gain, was in its reasons and essence the same as the elabo- rately organized and chartered colony. In both cases the mother-country had won a foothold in a foreign land, seeking a new outlet for what it had to sell, a new sphere for its ship- ping, more employment for its people, more comfort and wealth for itself.
The needs of commerce, however, were not all provided for when safety had been secured at the far end of the road.
28 DISCUSSION OF THE
The voyages were long and dangerous, the seas often beset with enemies. In the most active days of colonizing there prevailed on the sea a lawlessness the very memory of which is now almost lost, and the days of settled peace between maritime nations were few and far between. Thus arose the demand for stations along the road, like the Cape of Good Hope, St. Helena, and Mauritius, not primarily for trade, but for defence and war ; the demand for the possession of posts like Gibral- tar, Malta, Louisburg, at the entrance of the Gulf of St. Law- rence, — posts whose value was chiefly strategic, though not necessarily wholly so. Colonies and colonial posts were sometimes commercial, sometimes military in their character ; and it was exceptional that the same position was equally important in both points of view, as New York was.
Ill these three thhjj^s — production, with the necessity of ex- changing products, shipping, whereby the exchange is carried on, and colonies, which facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping and tend to protect it by multiplying points of safety — is to be found the key to much of the historvj^as^well as of the policy, of nations bordering u_pon the sea. The policy has varied botlirwith the spirit of the age and with the char- acter and clear-sightedness of the rulers ; but the history of the seaboard nations has been less determined by the shrewd- ness and foresight of governments than by conditions of posi- tion, extent, configuration, number and character of their people, — by what are called, in a word, natural conditions. It must however be admitted, and will be seen, that the wise or unwise action of individual men has at certain periods had a great modifying influence u])on the growth of sea power in the broad sense, which includes not only the military strength afloat, that rules the sea or any part of it by force of arms, but also the peaceful commerce and shipping from which alone a military fleet naturally and healthfully springs, and on which it securely rests.
The principal conditions affecting the sea power of nations may be enumerated as follows : I. Geographical Position. II. Physical Conformation, including, as connected therewith,
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 29
natural productions and climate. III. Extent of Territory. IV. Number of Population. V. Character of the People. VI. Character of the Government, including therein the national institutions.
I. Geographical Position. — It may be pointed out, in the first place, that if a nation be so situated that it is neither forced to defend itself by land nor induced to seek extension of its territory by way of the land, it has, by the very unity of its aim directed upon the sea, au advantage as compared with a people one of whose boundaries is continental. Tliis has been a great advantage to England over both France and Holland as a sea power. The strength of the latter was early exhausted by the necessity of keeping up a large army and carrying on expensive wars to preserve her independence; while the policy of France was constantly diverted, sometimes wisely and sometimes most foolishly, from the sea to projects of continental extension. These military efforts expended wealth ; whereas a wiser and consistent use of her geographical position would have added to it.
The geographical position may be such as of itself to pro- mote a concentration, or to necessitate a dispersion, of the naval forces. Here again the British Islands have an advan- tage over France. The position of the latter, touching the Mediterranean as well as the ocean, while it has its advan- tages, is on the whole a source of military weakness at sea. The eastern and western French fleets have only been able to unite after passing through the Straits of Gibraltar, in at- tempting which tliey have often risked and sometimes suffered loss. The position of the United States upon the two oceans would be either a source of great weakness or a cause of enor- mous expense, had it a large sea commerce on both coasts.
England, by her immense colonial empire, has sacrificed much of this advantage of concentration of force around her own shores ; but the sacrifice was wisely made, for the gain was greater than the loss, as the event proved. With the growth of her colonial system her war fleets also grew, but
30 DISCUSSION OF THE
her merchant shipping and wealth grew yet faster. Still, in the wars of the American Revolution, and of the French Re- public and Empire, to use the strong expression of a French author, " England, despite the immense development of her navy, seemed ever, in the midst of riches, to feel all the em- barrassment of poverty." Tlie might of England was suffi- cient to keep alive the heart and the members ; whereas the equally extensive colonial empire of Spain, through her maritime weakness, but offered so many points for insult and injury.
The geographical position of a country may not only favor the concentration of its forces, but give the further strategic advantage of a central position and a good base for hostile operations against its probable enemies. This again is the case with England ; on the one hand she faces Holland and the northern powers, on the other France and the Atlantic. When threatened with a coalition between France and the naval powers of the North Sea and the Baltic, as she at times was, her fleets in the Downs and in the Channel, and even that off Brest, occupied interior positions, and thus were readily able to interpose their united force against either one of the enemies which should seek to pass through the Channel to effect a junction with its ally. On either side, also, Nature gave her better ports and a safer coast to approach. Formerly this was a very serious element in the passage through the Channel ; but of late, steam and the improvement of her har- bors have lessened the disadvantage under which France once labored. In the days of sailing-ships, the English fleet operated against Brest making its base at Torbay and Ply- mouth. The plan was simply this : in easterly or moderate weather the blockading fleet kept its position without diffi- culty ; but in westerly gales, when too severe, they bore up for English ports, knowing that the French fleet could not get out till the wind shifted, which equally served to bring them back to their station.
The advantage of geographical nearness to an enemy, or to the object of attack, is nowhere more apparent than in that
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 31
form of warfare which has lately received the name of com- merce-destroying, which the French call guerre de course. This operation of war, being directed against peaceful mer- chant vessels which are usually defenceless, calls for ships of small military force. Such ships, having little power to defend themselves, need a refuge or point of support near at hand ; which will be found either in certain parts of the sea controlled by the fighting ships of their country, or in friendly harbors. The latter give the strongest support, because they are always in the same place, and the approaches to them are more familiar to the commerce-destroyer than to his enemy. The nearness of France to England has thus greatly facilitated her guerre de course directed against the latter. Having ports on the North Sea, on the Channel, and on the Atlantic, her cruisers started from points near the focus of English trade, both coming and going. The distance of these ports from each other, disadvantageous for regular military combinations, is an advantage for this irregular secondary operation ; for the essence of the one is concentra- tion of effort, Avhereaa for commerce-destroying diffusion of effort is the rule. Commerce-destroyers scatter, that they may see and seize more prey. These truths receive illustra- tion from the history of the great French privateers, whose bases and scenes of action were largely on the Channel and North Sea, or else were found in distant colonial regions, where islands like Guadaloupe and Martinique afforded simi- lar near refuge. The necessity of renewing coal makes the cruiser of the present day even more dependent than of old on his port. Public opinion in the United States has great faith in war directed against an enemy's commerce ; but it must be remembered that the Republic has no ports very near the great centres of trade abroad. Her geographical position is therefore singularly disadvantageous for carrying on suc- cessful commerce-destroying, unless she find bases in the ports of an ally.
If, in addition to facility for offence. Nature has so placed a country that it has easy access to the high sea itself, while at
32 DISCUSSION OF THE
the same time it controls one of the great thoroughfares of the world's traffic, it is evident that the strategic value of its position is very high. Such again is, and to a greater degree was, the position of England. The trade of Holland, Sweden, Russia, Denmark, and that which went up the great rivers to the interior of Germany, had to pass through the Channel close by her doors ; for sailing-ships hugged the English coast. This northern trade had, moreover, a peculiar bearing upon sea power ; for naval stores, as they are commonly called, were mainly drawn from the Baltic countries.
But for the loss of Gibraltar, the position of Spain would have been closely analogous to that of England. Looking at once upon the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, with Cadiz on the one side and Cartagena on the other, the trade to the Levant must have passed under her hands, and that round the Cape of Good Hope not far from her doors. But Gibraltar not only deprived her of the control of the Straits, it also imposed an obstacle to the easy junction of the two divisions of her fleet.
At the present day, looking only at the geographical posi- tion of Italy, and not at the other conditions affecting her sea power, it would seem that with her extensive sea-coast and good ports she is very well placed for exerting a decisive influence on the trade route to the Levant and by the Isthmus of Suez. This is true in a degree, and would be much more so did Italy now hold all the islands naturally Italian ; but with Malta in the hands of England, and Corsica in those of France, the advantages of her geographical position are largely neutralized. From race affinities and situation those two islands are as legitimately objects of desire to Italy as Gibral- tar is to Spain. If the Adriatic were a great highway of com- merce, Italy's position would be still more influential. These defects in her geographical completeness, combined with other causes injurious to a full and secure development of sea power, make it more than doubtful whether Italy can for some time be in the front rank among the sea nations.
As the aim here is not an exhaustive discussion, but merely
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 33
Tm attempt to show, by illustration, how vitally the situation of a country may aft'ect its career ui)on the sea, this division of the subject may be dismissed for the present ; the more so as instances which will further bring out its importance will continually recur in the historical treatment. Two remarks, however, are here appropriate.
Circumstances have caused the Mediterranean Sea to play a greater part in the history of the world, both in a com- mercial and a military point of view, than any other sheet of water of the same size. Nation after nation has striven to control it, and the strife still goes on. Therefore a study of the conditions upon which preponderance in its waters has rested, and now rests, and of the relative military values of different points upon its coasts, will be more instructive than the same amount of effort expended in another field. Fur- thermore, it has at the present time a very marked analogy in many respects to the Caribbean Sea, — an analogy which will be still closer if a Panama canal-route ever be completed. A study of the strategic conditions of the Mediterranean, which have received ample illustration, will be an excellent prelude to a similar study of the Caribbean, which has comparatively little history.
The second remark bears upon the geographical position of the United States relatively to a Central- American canal. If one be made, and fulfil the hopes of its builders, the Carib- bean will be changed from a terminus, and place of local traffic, or at best a broken and imperfect line of travel, as it now is, into one of the great highways of the world. Along this path a great commerce will travel, bringing the interests of the other great nations, the European nations, close along our shores, as they have never been before. With this it will not be so easy as heretofore to stand aloof from international complications. The position of the United States with refer- ence to this route will resemble that of England to the Chan- nel, and of the Mediterranean countries to the Suez route. As regards influence and control over it, depending upon geograph- ical position, it is of course plain that the centre of the national
34 DTSCUSSTON OF THE
power, the permanent base,^ is much nearer than that of other great nations. The positions now or hereafter occupied by them on island or mainland, however strong, will be but out- posts of their power ; while in all the raw materials of mili- tary strength no nation is superior to the United States. She is, however, weak in a confessed unpreparedncss for war ; and her geographical nearness to the point of contention loses some of its value by the character of the Gulf coast, which is deficient in ports combining security from an enemy with facility for repairing war-ships of the first class, without which ships no country can pretend to control any part of the sea. In case of a contest for supremacy in the Caribbean, it seems evident from the depth of the South Pass of the Mississippi, the nearness of New Orleans, and the advantages of the Mis- sissippi Valley for water transit, that the main effort of the country must pour down that valley, and its permanent base of operations be found there. The defence of the entrance to the Mississippi, however, presents peculiar difficulties ; while the only two rival ports. Key West and Pensacola, have too little depth of water, and are much less advantageously placed with reference to the resources of the country. To get the full benefit of superior geographical position, these defects must be overcome. Furthermore, as her distance from the Isthmus, though relatively less, is still considerable, the United States will have to obtain in tlie Caribbean stations fit for contingent, or secondary, bases of operations ; which by their natural advantages, susceptil)ility of defence, and nearness to the central strategic issue, will enable her fleets to remain as near the scene as any opponent. With ingress and egress from the Mississippi sufficiently protected, with such outposts in her hands, and with the communications between them and the home base secured, in short, with proper military preparation, for which she has all necessary means, the preponderance of the United States on this field
^ By a base of permanent operations " is understood a country whence come all the resources, where are united the great lines of communication by land and water, where are the arsenals and armed posts."
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 35
follows, from her geographical position and her power, with mathematical certainty.
II. Physical Conformation. — The peculiar features of the Gulf coast, just alluded to, come properly under the head of Physical Conformation of a country, which is placed second for discussion among the conditions which affect the develop- ment of sea power.
The seaboard of a country is one of its frontiers ; and the easier the access offered by the frontier to the region beyond, in this case the sea, the greater will be the tendency of a people toward intercourse with the rest of the world by it. If a country be imagined having a long seaboard, but entirely without a harbor, such a country can have no sea trade of its own, no shipping, no navy. This was practically the case with Belgium when it was a Spanish and an Austrian province. The Dutch, in 1648, as a condition of peace after a successful war, exacted that the Scheldt should be closed to sea com- merce. This closed the harbor of Antwerp and transferred the sea trade of Belgium to Holland. The Spanish Nether- lands ceased to be a sea power.
Numerous and deep harbors are a source of strength and wealth, and doubly so if they are the outlets of navigable streams, which facilitate the concentration in them of a coun- try's internal trade ; but by their very accessibility they be- come a source of weakness in war, if not properly defended. The Dutch in 1667 found little difficulty in ascending the Thames and burning a large fraction of the English navy within sight of London ; whereas a few years later the com- bined fleets of England and France, when attempting a land- ing in Holland, were foiled by the difficulties of the coast as much as by the valor of the Dutch fleet. In 1778 the harbor of New York, and with it undisputed control of the Hudson River, would have been lost to the English, who were caught at disadvantage, but for the hesitancy of the French admiral. With that control, New Eugland would have been restored to close and safe communication with New York, New Jersey,
36 DISCUSSION OF THE
and Pennsylvania ; and this blow, following so closely on Burgoyne's disaster of the year before, would probably have led the English to make an earlier peace. The Mississippi is a mighty source of wealth and strength to the United States ; but the feeble defences of its mouth and the number of its subsidiary streams penetrating the country made it a weak- ness and source of disaster to the Southern Confederacy. And lastly, in 1814, the occupation of the Chesapeake and the destruction of Washington gave a sharp lesson of the dangers incurred through the noblest water-ways, if their approaches be undefended ; a lesson recent enough to be easily recalled, but which, from the present appearance of the coast defences, seems to be yet more easily forgotten. Nor should it be thought that conditions have changed ; circumstances and de- tails of offence and defence have been modified, in these days as before, but the great conditions remain the same.
Before and during the great Napoleonic wars, France had no port for ships-of-the-line east of Brest. How great the advantage to England, which in the same stretch has two great arsenals, at Plymouth and at Portsmouth, besides other harbors of refuge and supply. This defect of conformation has since been remedied by the works at Cherbourg.
Besides the contour of the coast, involving easy access to the sea, there are other physical conditions which lead people to the sea or turn them from it. Although France was deficient in military ports on the Channel, she had both there and on the ocean, as well as in the Mediterranean, excellent harbors, favorably situated for trade abroad, and at the outlet of large rivers, which would foster internal traffic. But when Richelieu had put an end to civil war. Frenchmen did not take to the sea with the eagerness and success of the English and Dutch. A principal reason for this has been plausibly found in the physical conditions which have made France a pleasant land, with a delightful climate, producing within itself more than its people needed. England, on the other hand, received from Nature but little, and, until her manufactures were developed, had little to export. Their
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 37
many wants, combined with their restless activity and other conditions that favored maritime enterprise, led lier people abroad ; and they there found lands more pleasant and richer than their own. Their needs and genius made them merchants and colonists, then manufacturers and producers ; and between products and colonies shipping is the inevitable link. So their sea power grew. But if England was drawn to the sea, Hol- land was driven to it ; without the sea England languished, but Holland died. In the height of her greatness, when she was one of the chief factors in European politics, a competent native authority estimated that the soil of Holland could not support more than one eighth of her inliabitants. The manu- factures of the country were then numerous and important, but they had been much later in their growth than the ship- ping interest. The poverty of the soil and the exposed nature of the coast drove the Dutch first to fishing. Then the dis- covery of the process of curing the fish gave them material for export as avcU as home consumption, and so laid the corner-stone of their wealth. Thus they had become traders at the time that the Italian republics, under the pressure of Turkish power and the discovery of the passage round the Cape of Good Hope, were beginning to decline, and they fell heirs to the great Italian trade of the Levant. Further favored by their geographical position, intermediate between the Baltic, France, and the Mediterranean, and at the mouth of the German rivers, they quickly absorbed nearly all the carrying-trade of Europe. The wheat and naval stores of the Baltic, the trade of Spain with her colonies in the New World, the wines of France, and the French coasting-trade were, little more than two hundred years ago, transported in Dutch shipping. Much of the carrying-trade of England, even, was then done in Dutch bottoms. It will not be pretended that all this prosperity proceeded only from the poverty of Hol- land's natural resources. Something does not grow from nothing. What is true, is, that by the necessitous condition of her people they were driven to the sea, and were, from their mastery of the shipping business and the size of their
38 DISCUSSION OF THE
fleets, in a position to profit by the sudden expansion of com- merce and the spirit of exploration which followed on the dis- covery of America and of the passage round the Cape. Other causes concurred, but their whole prosperity stood on the sea power to which their poverty gave birth. Their food, their clothing, the raw material for their manufactures, the very timber and hemp with which they built and rigged their ships (and they built nearly as many as all Europe besides), were imported ; and when a disastrous war with England in 1653 and 1654 had lasted eighteen months, and their shipping business was stopped, it is said •' the sources of revenue which had always maintained the riches of the State, such as fisheries and commerce, were almost dry. Work- shops were closed, work was suspended. The Zuyder Zee became a forest of masts ; the country was full of beggars ; grass grew in the streets, and in Amsterdam fifteen hundred houses were untenanted." A humiliating peace alone saved them from ruin.
This sorrowful result shows the weakness of a country de- pending wholly upon sources external to itself for the part it is playing in the world. With large deductions, owing to differences of conditions which need not here be spoken of, the case of Holland then has strong points of resemblance to that of Great Britain now ; and they are true prophets, though they seem to be having small honor in their own country, who warn her that the continuance of her prosperity at home depends primarily upon maintaining her power abroad. Men may be discontented at the lack of political privilege ; they will be yet more uneasy if they come to lack bread. It is of more interest to Americans to note that the result to France, regarded as a power of the sea, caused by the extent, delightfulness, and richness of the land, has been reproduced in the United States. In the beginning, their forefathers held a narrow strip of land upon the sea, fertile in parts though little developed, abounding in harbors and near rich fishing-grounds. These physical conditions com- bined with an inborn love of the sea, the pulse of that English
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 39
blood which still beat in their veins, to keep alive all those tendencies and pursuits upon -which a healthy sea power depends. Almost every one of the original colonies was on the sea or on one of its great tributaries. All export and import tended toward one coast. Interest in the sea and an intelligent appreciation of the part it played in the public welfare were easily and widely spread ; and a motive more influential than care for the })ublic interest was also active, for the abundance of ship-building materials and a relative fewness of other investments made shipping a prolitable private interest. How changed the present condition is, all know. The centre of power is no longer on the seaboard. Books and newspapers vie with one another in describing the wonderful growth, and the still undeveloped riches, of the interior. Capital there finds its best investments, labor its largest opportunities. The frontiers are neglected and politi- cally weak ; the Gulf and Pacific coasts actually so, the At- lantic coast relatively to the central Mississippi Valley. When the day comes that shipping again pays, when the three sea frontiers find that they are not only militarily weak, but poorer for lack of national shipping, their united efforts may avail to lay again the foundations of our sea power. Till then, those who follow the limitations which lack of sea power placed upon the career of France may mourn that their own country is being led, by a like redundancy of home wealth, into the same neglect of that great instrument.
Among modifying physical conditions may be noted a form like that of Italy, — a long peninsula, with a central range of mountains dividing it into two narrow strips, along which the roads connecting the different ports necessarily run. Only an absolute control of the sea can wholly secure such commu- nications, since it is impossible to know at what point an enemy coming from beyond the visible horizon may strike ; but still, with an adequate naval force centrally posted, there will be good hope of attacking his fleet, which is at once his base and line of communications, before serious damage has been done. The long, narrow peninsula of Florida, with Key
40 DISCUSSION OF THE
West at its extremity, though flat and thinly populated, pre- sents at first sight conditions like those of Italy. The resem- blance may be only superficial, but it seems probable that if the chief scene of a naval war were the Gulf of Mexico, the communications by land to the end of the peninsula might be a matter of consequence, and open to attack.
When the sea not only borders, or surrounds, but also sepa- rates a country into two or more parts, the control of it becomes not only desirable, but vitally necessary. Such a physical condition either gives birth and strength to sea power, or makes the country powerless. Such is the condi- tion of the present kingdom of Italy, witli its islands of Sar- dinia and Sicily ; and hence in its youth and still existing financial weakness it is seen to put forth such vigorous and intelligent efforts to create a military navy. It has even been argued that, with a navy decidedly superior to her enemy's, Italy could better base her power upon her islands than upon her mainland ; for the insecurity of the lines of commu- nication in the peninsula, already pointed out, would most seriously embarrass an invading army surrounded by a hostile people and threatened from the sea.
The Irish Sea, separating the British Islands, rather resem- bles an estuary than an actual division ; but history has shown the danger from it to the United Kingdom. In the days of Louis XIY., when the French navy nearly equalled the -com- bined English and Dutch, the gravest complications existed in Ireland, which passed almost wholly under the control of the natives and the French. Nevertheless, the Irish Sea was rather a danger to the English — a weak point in their com- munications — than an advantage to the French. The latter did not venture their ships-of-the-line in its narrow waters, and expeditions intending to land were directed upon the ocean ports in the south and west. At the supreme moment the great French fleet was sent upon the south coast of Eng- land, wdiere it decisively defeated the allies, and at the same time twenty-five frigates were sent to St. George's Channel, against the English communications. In the midst of a hos-
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 41
tile people, the English army in Ireland was seriously imper- illed, bat was saved by the battle of the Boyne and the flight of James II. This movement against the enemy's communi- cations was strictly strategic, and would be just as dangerous to England now as in 1690.
Spain, in the same century, afforded an impressive lesson of the weakness caused by such separation when the parts are not knit together by a strong sea power. She then still retained, as remnants of her past greatness, the Netherlands (now Belgium), Sicily, and other Italian possessions, not to speak of her vast colonies in the New World. Yet so low had the Spanish sea power fallen, that a well-informed and sober- minded Hollander of the day could claim that " in Spain all the coast is navigated by a few Dutch ships ; and since the peace of 1648 their ships and seamen are so few that they have publicly begun to hire our ships to sail to the Indies, whereas they were formerly careful to exclude all foreigners from there. ... It is manifest," he goes on, " that the West Indies, being as the stomach to Spain (for from it nearly all the revenue is drawn), must be joined to the Spanish head by a sea force ; and that Naples and the Netherlands, being like two arms, they cannot lay out their strength for Spain, nor receive anything thence but by shipping, — all which may easily be done by our shipping in peace, and by it obstructed in war." Half a century before. Sully, the great minister of Henry lY., had characterized Spain " as one of those States whose legs and arms are strong and powerful, but the heart infinitely weak and feeble." Since his day the Spanish navy had suffered not only disaster, but annihilation ; not only humiliation, but degradation. The consequences briefly were that shipping was destroyed ; manufactures perished with it. The government depended for its support, not upon a wide- spread healthy commerce and industry that could survive many a staggering blow, but upon a narrow stream of silver trickling through a few treasure-ships from America, easily and frequently intercepted by an enemy's cruisers. The loss of half a dozen galleons more than once paralyzed its move-
42 DISCUSSION OF THE
ments for a year. While the war in the Netherlands lasted, the Dutch control of the sea forced Spain to send her troops by a long and costly journey overland instead of by sea ; and the same cause reduced her to such straits for necessaries that, by a mutual arrangement which seems very odd to mod- ern ideas, her wants were supplied by Dutch ships, which thus maintained the enemies of their country, but received in return specie which was welcome in the Amsterdam ex- change. In America, the Spanish protected themselves as best they might behind masonry, unaided from home ; while in the Mediterranean they escaped insult and injury mainly through the indifference of the Dutch, for the French and English had not yet begun to contend for mastery there. In the course of history tlie Netherlands, Naples, Sicily, Minorca, Havana, Manila, and Jamaica were wrenched away, at one time or another, from this empire without a shipping. In short, while Spain's maritime impotence may have been pri- marily a symptom of her general decay, it became a marked factor in precipitating her into the abyss from which she has not yet wholly emerged.
Except Alaska, the United States has no outlying posses- sion,— no foot of ground inaccessible by land. Its contour is such as to present few points specially weak from their sa- liency, and all important parts of the frontiers can be readily attained, — cheaply by water, rapidly by rail. The weakest frontier, the Pacific, is far removed from the most dangerous of possible enemies. The internal resources are boundless as compared with present needs ; we can live off ourselves indefi- nitely in " our little corner," to use the expression of a French officer to the author. Yet should that little corner be invaded by a new commercial route through the Isthmus, the United States in her turn may have the rude awakening of those who have abandoned their share in the common birthright of all people, the sea.
III. Extent of Territory. — The last of the conditions affecting the development of a nation as a sea power, and
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 43
touching the country itself as distinguished from the people who dwell there, is Extent of Territory. This may be dismissed with comparatively few words.
As regards the development of sea power, it is not the total number of square miles which a country contains, but the length of its coast-line and the character of its harbors that are to be considered. As to tiiese it is to be said that, the geographical and physical conditions being the same, extent of sea-coast is a source of strength or weakness according as the population is large or small. A country is in this like a fortress ; the garrison must be proportioned to the enceinte. A recent familiar instance is found in the American War of Secession. Had the South had a people as numerous as it was warlike, and a navy commensurate to its other resources as a sea power, the great extent of its sea-coast and its nu- merous inlets would have been elements of great strength. The people of the United States and the Government of that day justly prided themselves on the effectiveness of the block- ade of the whole Southern coast. It was a great feat, a very great feat ; but it would have been an impossible feat had the Southerners been more numerous, and a nation of seamen. What was there shown was not, as has been said, how such a blockade can be maintained, but that such a blockade is possible in the face of a population not only unused to the sea, but also scanty in numbers. Those who recall how the blockade was maintained, and the class of ships that block- aded during great part of the war, know that the plan, correct under the circumstances, could not have been carried out in the face of a real navy. Scattered unsupported along the coast, the United States ships kept their places, singly or in small detachments, in face of an extensive network of inland water communications which favored secret concentration of the enemy. Behind tiie first line of water communications were long estuaries, and here and there strong fortresses, upon either of which the enemy's ships could always fall back to elude pursuit or to receive protection. Had there been a Southern navy to profit by such advantages, or by the
44 DISCUSSION OF THE
scattered condition of the United States ships, the latter could not have been distributed as they were ; and being forced to concentrate for mutual support, many small but useful approaches would have been left open to commerce. But as the Southern coast, from its extent and many inlets, might have been a source of strength, so, from those very characteristics, it became a fruitful source of injury. Tlie great story of the opening of the Mississippi is but the most striking illustration of an action that was going on inces- santly all over the South. At every breach of tlie sea fron- tier, war-ships were entering. The streams that had carried the wealth and supported the trade of the seceding States turned against them, and admitted their enemies to their hearts. Dismay, insecurity, paralysis, prevailed in regions that might, under happier auspices, have kept a nation alive through the most exhausting war. Never did sea power play a greater or a more decisive part than in the contest which determined that the course of the world's history would be modified by the existence of one great nation, instead of several rival States, in the North xVmerican continent. But while just pride is felt in the well-earned glory of those days, and the greatness of the results due to naval preponderance is admitted, Americans who understand the facts should never fail to remind the over-confidence of their countrymen that the South not only had no navy, not only was not a seafaring people, but that also its population was not proportioned to the extent of the sea-coast which it had to defend.
IV. Numher of Population. — After the consideration of the natural conditions of a country should follow an exami- nation of the characteristics of its population as affecting the development of sea power ; and first among these will be taken, because of its relations to the extent of the territorj", which has just been discussed, the number of the people who live in it. It has been said that in respect of dimensions it is not merely the number of square miles, but the extent and character of the sea-coast that is to be considered with refer-
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 45-
ence to sea power ; and so, in point of population, it is not only the grand total, but the number following the sea, or at least readily available for employment on ship-board and for the creation of naval material, that must be counted.
For example, formerly and up to the end of the great wars following the French Revolution, the population of France was much greater than that of England ; but in respect of sea power in general, peaceful commerce as well as military efficiency, France was much inferior to England. In the matter of military efficiency this fact is the more remarkable because at times, in point of military preparation at the out- break of war, France had the advantage; but she was not able to keep it. Thus in 1778, when war broke out, France, through her maritime inscription, was able to man at once fifty ships-of-the-line. England, on the contrary, by reason of the dispersal over the globe of that very shipping on which her naval strength so securely rested, had much trouble in manning forty at home ; but in 1782 she had one hun- dred and twenty in commission or ready for commission, while France had never been able to exceed seventy-one. Again, as late as 1840, when the two nations were on the verge of war in the Levant, a most accomplished French offi- cer of the day, while extolling the high state of efficiency of the French fleet and tlie eminent qualities of its admiral, and expressing confidence in the results of an encounter with an equal enemy, goes on to say : " Behind the squadron of twenty-one ships-of-the-line which we could then assemble, there was no reserve ; not another ship could have been com- missioned within six montlis." And this was due not only to lack of ships and of proper equipments, though both were wanting. " Our maritime inscription," he continues, " was so exhausted by what we had done [in manning twenty-one ships], that the permanent levy established in all quarters did not supply reliefs for the men, who were already more than three years on cruise."
A cojitrast such as this shows a difference in what is called staying power, or reserve force, which is even greater than
46 DISCUSSION OF THE
appears on the surface ; for a great shipping afloat neces- sarily employs, besides the crews, a large ninnber of people engaged in the various handicrafts which facilitate the mak- ing and repairing of naval material, or following other callings more or less closely connected with the water and with craft of all kinds. Such kindred callings give an undoubted aptitude for the sea from the outset. There is an anecdote showing curious insight into this matter on the part of one of Eng- land's distinguished seamen, Sir Edward Pellew. When the Avar broke out in 1793, the usual scarceness of seamen was met. Eager to get to sea and unable to fill his complement otherwise than with landsmen, he instructed his officers to seek for Cornish miners ; reasoning from the conditions and dangers of their calling, of which he had personal knowledge, that they would quickly fit into the demands of sea life. The result showed his sagacity, for, thus escaping an otherwise unavoidable delay, he was fortunate enough to capture the first frigate taken in the war in single combat ; and what is especially instructive is, that although but a few weeks in commission, while his opponent had been over a year, the losses, heavy on both sides, were nearly equal.
It may be urged that such reserve strength has now nearly lost the importance it once had, because modern ships and weapons take so long to make, and because modern States aim at developing the whole power of their armed force, on the outbreak of war, with such rapidity as to strike a dis- abling blow before the enemy can organize an equal effort. To use a familiar phrase, there will not be time for the whole resistance of the national fabric to come into play ; the blow will fall on the organized military fleet, and if that yield, the solidity of the rest of the structure will avail nothing. To a certain extent this is true; but then it has always been true, though to a less extent formerly than now. Granted the meeting of two fleets which represent practically tlie whole present strength of their two nations, if one of them be de- stroyed, while the other remains fit for action, there will be much less hope now than formerly that the vanquished can
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 47
restore his navy for that war ; and the result will be disas- trous just in proportion to the dependence of the nation upon her sea power. A Trafalgar would have been a much more fatal blow to England than it was to France, had the English fleet then represented, as the allied fleet did, the bulk of the nation's power. Trafalgar in such a case would have been to England what Austerlitz was to Austria, and Jena to Prus- sia ; an empire would have been laid prostrate by the destruc- tion or disorganization of its military forces, which, it is said, were the favorite objective of Napoleon.
But does the consideration of such exceptional disasters in the past justify the putting a low value upon that reserve strength, based upon the number of inhabitants fitted for a certain kind of military life, which is here being considered ? The blows just mentioned were dealt by men of exceptional genius, at the head of armed bodies of exceptional training, eaprit-de-corps, and prestige, and were, besides, inflicted upon opponents more or less demoralized by conscious inferiority and previous defeat. Austerlitz had been closely preceded by Ulm, where thirty thousand Austrians laid down their arms without a battle ; and the history of the previous years had been one long record of Austrian reverse and French success, Trafalgar followed closely upon a cruise, justly called a cam- paign, of almost constant failure ; and farther back, but still recent, were the memories of St. Vincent for the Spaniards, and of the Nile for the French, in the allied fleet. Except the case of Jena, these crushing overthrows were not single disasters, but final blows ; and in the Jena campaign there was a disparity in numbers, equipment, and general prepara- tion for war, which makes it less applicable in considering what may result from a single victory.
England is at the present time the greatest maritime nation in the world ; in steam and iron she has kept the superiority she had in the days of sail and wood. France and England are the two powers that have the largest military navies ; and it is so far an open question which of the two is the more powerful, that they may be regarded as practically of equal
48 DISCUSSION OF THE
strength in material for a sea war. In the case of a collision can there be assumed sucli a difference of jjersonnel, or of preparation, as to make it probable that a decisive inequality will result from one battle or one campaign ? If not, the reserve strength will begin to tell ; organized reserve first, then reserve of seafaring population, reserve of mechanical skill, reserve of wealth. It seems to have been somewhat forgotten that England's leadership in mechanical arts gives her a reserve of mechanics, who can easily familiarize them- selves with the appliances of modern iron-clads ; and as her commerce and industries feel the burden of the war, the sur- plus of seamen and mechanics will go to the armed sliipping.
The whole question of the value of a reserve, developed or undeveloped, amounts now to this : Have modern conditions of warfare made it probable that, of two nearly equal adver- saries, one will be so prostrated in a single campaign that a decisive result will be reached in that time ? Sea warfare has given no answer. The crushing successes of Prussia against Austria, and of Germany against France, appear to have been those of a stronger over a much weaker nation, whether the weakness were due to natural causes, or to offi- cial incompetency. How would a delay like that of Plevna have affected the fortune of war, had Turkey had any reserve of national power upon which to call ?
If time be, as is everywhere admitted, a supreme factor in war, it behooves countries whose genius is essentially not military, whose people, like all free people, object to pay for large military establishments, to see to it that they are at least strong enough to gain the time necessary to turn the spirit and capacity of their subjects into the new activities which war calls for. If the existing force by land or sea is strong enough so to hold out, even though at a disadvantage, the country may rely upon its natural resources and strength coming into play for whatever they are worth, — its numbers, its wealth, its capacities of every kind. If, on the other hand, what force it has can be overthrown and crushed quickly, the most magnificent possibilities of natural power will not save
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 49
it from humiliating conditions, nor, if its foe be wise, from guarantees which will postpone revenge to a distant future. The story is constantly repeated on the smaller fields of war : " If so-and-so can hold out a little longer, this can be saved or that can be done ; " as in sickness it is often said : " If the patient can only hold out so long, the strength of his constitution may pull him through."
England to some extent is now such a country. Holland was such a country ; she would not pay, and if she escaped, it was but by the skin of her teeth. " Never in time of peace and from fear of a rupture," wrote their great states- man, De Witt, " will they take resolutions strong enough to lead them to pecuniary sacrifices beforehand. The character of the Dutch is such that, unless danger stares them in the face, they are indisposed to lay out money for their own de- fence. I have to do with a people who, liberal to profusion where they ought to economize, are often sparing to avarice where they ought to spend."
That our own country is open to the same reproach, is pa- tent to all the world. The United States has not that shield of defensive power behind which time can be gained to develop its reserve of strength. As for a seafaring population ade- quate to her possible needs, where is it ? Such a resource, proportionate to her coast-line and population, is to be found only in a national merchant shipping and its related industries, which at present scarcely exist. It will matter little whether the crews of such ships are native or foreign born, provided they are attached to the flag, and her power at sea is sufficient to enable the most of them to get back in case of war. "When foreigners by thousands are admitted to the ballot, it is of little moment that they are given fighting-room on board ship.
Though the treatment of the subject has been somewhat discursive, it may be admitted that a great population follow- ing callings related to the sea is, now as formerly, a great element of sea power ; that the United States is deficient in that element ; , and that its foundations can be laid only in a large commerce under her own flag.
4
50 DISCUSSION OF THE
Y. National Character. — The effect of national character and aptitudes upon the development of sea power will next be considered.
If sea power be really based upon a peaceful and extensive commerce, aptitude for commercial pursuits must be a dis- tinguishing feature of the nations that have at one time or another been great upon the sea. History almost without exception affirms that this is true. Save the Romans, there is no marked instance to the contrary.
All men seek gain and, more or less, love money ; but the way in which gain is sought will have a marked effect upon the commercial fortunes and the history of the people inhabit- ing a country.
If history may be believed, the way in which tlie Spaniards and their kindred nation, the Portuguese, sought wealth, not only brought a blot upon the national character, but was also fatal to the growth of a healthy commerce ; and so to the industries upon which commerce lives, and ultimately to that national wealth which was sought by mistaken paths. The desire for gain rose in them to fierce avarice ; so they sought in tlie new-found worlds which gave such an impetus to the commercial and maritime devejopment of the countries of Europe, not new fields of industry, not even the healthy excitement of exploration and adventure, but gold and silver. They had many great qualities ; they were bold, enterprising, temperate, patient of suffering, enthusiastic, and gifted with intense national feeling. When to these qualities are added the advantages of Spain's position and well-situated ports, the fact that she was first to occupy large and rich portions of the new worlds and long remained without a competitor, and that for a hundred years after the discovery of America she was the leading State in Europe, she might have been ex- pected to take the foremost place among the sea powers. Exactly the contrary was the result, as all know. Since the battle of Lepanto in 1571, though engaged in many wars, no sea victory of any consequence shines on the pages of Spanish history ; and the decay of her commerce sufficiently accounts
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 51
for the painful and sometimes ludicrous inaptness shown on the decks of her ships of war. Doirbtless such a result is not to be attributed to one cause only. Doubtless the govern- ment of Spain was in many ways such as to cramp and blight a free and healthy development of private enterprise ; but the character of a great people breaks through or shapes the character of its government, and it can hardly be doubted that had the bent of the people been toward trade, the action of government would have been drawn into the same current. The great field of the colonies, also, was remote from the centre of that despotism which blighted the growth of old Spain. As it was, thousands of Spaniards, of the working as well as the upper classes, left Spain ; and the occupa- tions in which they engaged abroad sent home little but specie, or merchandise of small bulk, requiring but small tonnage. The mother-country herself produced little but wool, fruit, and iron ; her manufactures were naught ; her industries suffered ; her population steadily decreased. Both she and her colonies depended upon the Dutch for so many of the necessaries of life, that the products of their scanty in- dustries could not suffice to pay for them. "So that Holland merchants," writes a contemporary, " who carry money to most parts of the world to buy commodities, must out of this single country of Europe carry home money, which they receive in payment of their goods." Thus their eagerly sought emblem of wealth passed quickly from their hands. Tt has already been pointed out how weak, from a military point of view, Spain was from this decay of her shipping. Ilcr wealth being in small bulk on a few ships, following more or less regular routes, was easily seized by an enemy, and the sinews of war paralyzed ; whereas the wealth of England and Holland, scattered over thousands of ships in all parts of the world, received many bitter blows in many exhausting wars, without checking a growth wdiich, though painful, was steady. The fortunes of Portugal, united to Spain during a most critical period of her history, followed the same downward path ; although foremost in the begin-
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ning of the race for development by sea, she fell utterly behind. " The mhies of Brazil were the ruin of Portugal, as those of Mexico and Peru had been of Spain ; all manufac- tures fell into insane contempt ; ere long the English sup- plied the Portuguese not only with clothes, but with all mer- chandise, all commodities, even to salt-fish and grain. After their gold, the Portuguese abandoned their very soil ; the vineyards of Oporto were finally bought by the English with Brazilian gold, which had only passed through Portugal to be spread throughout England." We are assured that in fifty years, five hundred millions of dollars were extracted from " the mines of Brazil, and that at the end of the time Portugal had but twenty -five millions in specie," — a striking example of the difference between real and fictitious wealth.
The Englisli and Dutch were no less desirous of gain than the southern nations. Each in turn has been called " a na- tion of shopkeepers ; " but the jeer, in so far as it is just, is to the credit of their wisdom and uprightness. They were no less bold, no less enterprising, no less patient. Indeed, they were more patient, in that they sought riches not by the sword but by labor, which is the reproach meant to be implied by the epithet ; for thus they took the longest, instead of what seemed the shortest, road to wealth. But these two peoples, radically of the same race, had other qualities, no less impor- tant than those just named, which combined with their sur- roundings to favor their development by sea. They were by nature business-men, traders, producers, negotiators. There- fore both in their native country and abroad, whether settled in the ports of civilized nations, or of barbarous eastern rulers, or in colonies of their own foundation, they every- where strove to draw out all the resources of the land, to develop and increase them. The quick instinct of the born trader, shopkeeper if you will, sought continually new articles to exchange ; and this search, combined with the industrious character evolved through generations of labor, made them necessarily producers. At home they became great as manu- facturers ; abroad, where they controlled, the land grew richer
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 53
continually, products multiplied, and the necessary exchange between home and the settlements called for more ships. Their shipping therefore increased with these demands of trade, and nations with less aptitude for maritime enterprise, even France herself, great as she has been, called for their products and for the service of their ships. Thus in many ways they advanced to power at sea. This natural tendency and growth were indeed modified and seriously checked at times by the interference of other governments, jealous of a prosperity which their own people could invade only by the aid of artificial support, — a support which will be considered under the head of governmental action as affecting sea power.
The tendency to trade, involving of necessity the produc- tion of something to trade with, is the national characteristic most important to the development of sea power. Granting it and a good seaboard, it is not likely that the dangers of the sea, or any aversion to it, will deter a people from seeking wealth by the paths of ocean commerce. Where wealth is sought by other means, it may be found; but it will not ne- cessarily lead to sea power. Take France. France has a fine country, an industrious people, an admirable position. The French navy has known periods of great glory, and in its lowest estate has never dishonored the military reputation so dear to the nation. Yet as a maritime State, securely resting upon a broad basis of sea commerce, France, as compared with other historical sea-peoples, has never held more than a respectable position. The chief, reason for this, so far as national character goes, is the way in which wealth is sought. As Spain and Portugal sought it by digging gold out of the ground, the temper of the French people leads them to seek it by thrift, economy, hoarding. It is said to be harder to keep than to make a fortune. Possibly ; but the adventurous temper, which risks what it has to gain more, has much in common with the adventurous spirit that conquers worlds for commerce. The tendency to save and put aside, to venture timidly and on a small scale, may lead to a general diffusion
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of wealth on a like small scale, but not to the risks and de- velopment of external trade and shipping interests. To illus- trate,— and the incident is given only for what it is worth, — a French officer, speaking to the author about the Panama Canal, said : " I have two shares in it. In France we don't do as you, where a few people take a great many shares each. With us a large number of people take one share or a very few. When these were in the market my wife said to me, ' You take two shares, one for you and one for me.' " As regards the stability of a man's personal fortunes this kind of prudence is doubtless wise ; but when excessive prudence or financial timidity becomes a national trait, it must tend to hamper the expansion of commerce and of the nation's ship- ping. The same caution in money matters, appearing in an- other relation of life, has checked the production of children, and keeps the population of France nearly stationary.
The noble classes of Europe inherited from tlie Middle Ages a supercilious contempt for peaceful trade, which has exer- cised a modifying influence upon its growth, according to the national character of different countries. The pride of the Spaniards fell easily in with this spirit of contempt, and co- operated with that disastrous unwillingness to work and wait for wealth which turned them away from commerce. In France, the vanity which is conceded even by Frenchmen to be a national trait led in the same direction. The numbers and brilliancy of the nobility, and the consideration enjoyed by them, set a seal of inferiority upon an occupation which they despised. Rich mercliants and manufacturers sighed for the honors of nobility, and upon obtaining them, abandoned their lucrative professions. Tlierefore, while the industry of the people and the fruitfulness of the soil saved commerce from total decay, it was pursued under a sense of humiliation which caused its best representatives to escape from it as soon as they could. Louis XIV., under the influence of Colbert, put forth an ordinance " authorizing all noblemen to take an interest in merchant ships, goods and merchandise, without being considered as having derogated from nobility,
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 55
provided they did not sell at retail ; " and the reason given for this action was, " that it imports the good of our subjects and our own satisfaction, to efface the relic of a public opin- ion, universally prevalent, that maritime commerce is incom- patible with nobility." But a prejudice involving conscious and open superiority is not readily effaced by ordinances, especially when vanity is a conspicuous trait in national char- acter ; and many years later Montesquieu taught that it is contrary to the spirit of monarchy that the nobility should engage in trade.
In Holland there was a nobility ; but the State was repub- lican in name, allowed large scope to personal freedom and enterprise, and the centres of power were in the great cities. The foundation of the national greatness was money — or rather wealth. Wealth, as a source of civic distinction, car- ried with it also power in the State ; and with power there went social position and consideration. In England the same result obtained. The nobility were proud ; but in a repre- sentative government the power of wealth could be neither put down nor overshadowed. It was patent to the eyes of all, it was honored by all ; and in England, as well as Holland, the occupations which were the source of wealth shared in the honor given to wealth itself. Thus, in all the countries named, social sentiment, the outcome of national character- istics, had a marked influence upon the national attitude toward trade.
In yet another way does the national genius affect the growth of sea power in its broadest sense ; and that is in so far as it possesses the capacity for planting healthy colonies. Of colonization, as of all other growtlis, it is true that it is most healthy when it is most natural. Therefore colonies that spring from the felt wants and natural impulses of a whole people will have the most solid foundations ; and their sub- sequent growth will be surest when they are least trammelled from home, if the people have the genius for independent action. Men of the past three centuries have keenly felt the value to the mother-country of colonies as outlets for the
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home products and as a nursery for commerce and shipping ; but efforts at colonization have not had tlie same general origin, nor have different systems all had the same success. The efforts of statesmen, however far-seeing and careful, liave not been able to supply the lack of strong natural im- pulse ; nor can the most minute regulation from home pro- duce as good results as a happier neglect, when the germ of self-development is found in the national character. There has been no greater display of wisdom in the national ad- ministration of successful colonies than in that of unsuc- cessful. Perhaps there has been even less. If elaborate system and supervision, careful adaptation of means to ends, diligent nursing, could avail for colonial growth, the genius of England has less of this systematizing faculty than the genius of France ; but England, not France, has been the great colonizer of the world. Successful colonization, with its consequent effect upon commerce and sea power, depends essentially upon national character ; because colonies grow best when they grow of themselves, naturally. The char- acter of the colonist, not the care of the home government, is the principle of the colony's growth.
This truth stands out the clearer because the general atti- tude of all the home governments toward their colonies was entirely selfish. However founded, as soon as it was recog- nized to be of consequence, the colony became to the home country a cow to be milked ; to be cared for, of course, but chiefly as a piece of property valued for the returns it gave. Legislation was directed toward a monopoly of its external trade ; the places in its government afforded posts of value for occupants from the mother-country ; and the colony was looked upon, as the sea still so often is, as a fit place for those who were ungovernable or useless at home. The mili- tary administration, however, so long as it remains a colony, is the proper and necessary attribute of the home government.
The fact of England's unique and wonderful success as a great colonizing nation is too evident to be dwelt upon ; and the reason for it appears to lie chiefly in two traits of the
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 57
national character. The English colonist naturally and readily settles down in his new country, identifies his interest with it, and though keeping an affectionate remembrance of the home from which he came, has no restless eagerness to re- turn. In the second place, the Englishman at once and in- stinctively seeks to develop the resources of the new country in the broadest sense. In the former particular he differs from the French, who were ever longingly looking back to the delights of their pleasant land ; in the latter, from the Spaniards, whose range of interest and ambition was too narrow for the full evolution of the possibilities of a new country.
The character and the necessities of the Dutch led them naturally to plant colonies ; and by the year 1650 they had in the East Indies, in Africa, and in America a large number, only to name which would be tedious. They were then far ahead of England in this matter. But though the origin of tliese colonies, purely commercial in its character, was natural, there seems to have been lacking to them a principle of growth. " In planting them they never sought an extension of empire, but merely an acquisition of trade and commerce. They attempted conquest only when forced by the pressure of circumstances. Generally they were content to trade under the protection of the sovereign of the country." This placid satisfaction with gain alone, unaccompanied by political ambi- tion, tended, like the despotism of Fr .k 3 and Spain, to keep the colonies mere commercial dependencies upon the mother- country, and so killed the natural principle of growth.
Before quitting this head of tlie inquiry, it is well to ask how far the national character of Americans is fitted to de- velop a great sea power, should other circumstances become favorable.
It seems scarcely necessary, however, to do more than appeal to a not very distant past to prove that, if legislative hindrances be removed, and more remunerative fields of enterprise filled up, the sea power will not long delay its appearance. The instinct for commerce, bold enterprise in
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the pursuit of gain, and a keen scent for the trails that lead to it, all exist ; and if there be in the future any fields calling for colonization, it cannot be doubted that Americans will carry to them all their inherited aptitude for self-government and independent growth.
VL Character of the Government. — In discussing the ef- fects upon the development of a nation's sea power exerted by its government and institutions, it will be necessary to avoid a tendency to over-philosophizing, to confine attention to obvious and immediate causes and their plain results, without prying too far beneath the surface for remote and ultimate influences.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that particular forms of government with their accompanying institutions, and the character of rulers at one time or another, have exercised a very marked influence upon the development of sea power. The various traits of a country and its people which have so far been considered constitute the natural characteristics with which a nation, like a man, begins its career ; the con- duct of the government in turn corresponds to the exercise of the intelligent will-power, which, according as it is wise, energetic and persevering, or the reverse, causes success or failure in a man's life or a nation's history.
It would seem probable that a government in full accord with the natural bias of its people would most successfully advance its growth icl every respect ; and, in the matter of sea power, the most brilliant successes have followed where there has been intelligent direction by a government f«lly imbued with the spirit of the people and conscious of its true general bent. Such a government is most certainly secured when the will of the people, or of their best natural exponents, has some large share in making it ; but such free govern- ments have sometimes fallen short, while on the other hand despotic power, wielded with judgment and consistency, has created at times a great sea commerce and a brilliant navy with greater directness than can be reached by the slower processes of a free people. The difficulty in the latter case
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is to insure perseverance after the death of a particular despot.
England having undoubtedly reached the greatest height of sea power of any modern nation, the action of her government first claims attention. In general direction this action has been consistent, though often far from praiseworthy. It has aimed steadily at the control of the sea. One of its most arrogant expressions dates back as far as the reign of James I., when she had scarce any possessions outside her own islands ; before Vii-ginia or Massachusetts was settled. Here is Richelieu's account of it : —
" The Duke of Sully, minister of Henry IV. [one of the most chivalrous princes that ever lived], having embarked at Calais in a French ship wearing the French Hag at the main, was no sooner in the Channel than, meeting an English despatch-boat which was there to receive him, the commander of the latter ordered the French ship to lower her flag. The Duke, considering that his quality fi-eed him from such an affront, boldly refused ; but this refusal was followed by three cannon-shot, which, piercing his ship, pierced the heart like- wise of all good Frenchmen. Might forced him to yield what right forbade, and for all the complaints he made he could get no better reply from the English captain than this : ' That just as his duty obliged him to honor the ambassador's rank, it also obliged him to exact the honor due to the flag of his master as sovereign of the sea.' If the words of King James himself were more polite, they neverthe- less had no other effect than to compel the Duke to take counsel of his prudence, feigning to be satisfied, while his wound was all the time smarting and incurable. Henry the Great had to practise mod- eration on this occasion ; but with the resolve another time to sustain the rights of his crown by the force that, with the aid of time, he should be able to put upon the sea."
This act of unpardonable insolence, according to modern ideas, was not so much out of accord with the spirit of nations in that day. It is chiefly noteworthy as the most striking, as well as one of the earliest indications of the purpose of Eng- land to assert herself at all risks upon the sea ; and the insult was offered under one of her most timid kinffs to an ambassa-
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dor immediately representing the bravest and ablest of French sovereigns. This empty honor of the flag, a claim insignifi- cant except as the outward manifestation of the purpose of a government, was as rigidly exacted under Cromwell as under the kings. It was one of the conditions of peace yielded by the Dutch after tlieir disastrous war of 1654. Cromwell, a despot in everything but name, was keenly alive to all that concerned England's honor and strength, and did not stop at barren salutes to promote them. Hardly yet possessed of power, the English navy sprang rapidly into a new life and vigor under his stern rule. England's rights, or reparation for her wrongs, were demanded by her fleets throughout the world, — in the Baltic, in the Mediterranean, against tlie Bar- bary States, in the West Indies ; and under liim the conquest of Jamaica began that extension of her empire, by force of arms, which has gone on to our own days. Nor were equally strong peaceful measures for the growth of English trade and shipping forgotten. Cromwell's celebrated Navigation Act de- clared that all imports into England or her colonics must be conveyed exclusively in vessels belonging to England herself, or to the country in which the products carried were grown or manufactured. This decree, aimed specially at the Dutch, the common carriers of Europe, was resented throughout the com- mercial world ; but the benefit to England, in those days of national strife and animosity, was so apparent that it lasted long under the monarchy. A century and a quarter later we find Nelson, before his famous career had begun, showing his zeal for the welfare of England's shipping by enforcing this same act in the West Indies against American merchant-ships. When Cromwell was dead, and Charles II. sat on the throne of his father, this king, false to the English people, was yet true to England's greatness and to the traditional policy of her government on the sea. In his treacherous intrigues with Louis XIV., by which he aimed to make himself independent of Parliament and people, he wrote to Louis : " There are two impediments to a perfect union. The first is the great care France is now taking to create a commerce and to be an im-
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 61
posing maritime power. This is so great a cause of suspicion with us, who can possess importance only by our commerce and our naval force, that every step which France takes in this direction will perpetuate the jealousy between the two nations." In the midst of the negotiations which preceded the detestable attack of the two kings upon the Dutch repub- lic, a warm dispute arose as to who should command the united fleets of France and England. Charles was inflexible on this point. " It is the custom of the English," said he, " to command at sea ; " and he told the French ambassador plainly that, were he to yield, his subjects would not obey him. In the projected partition of the United Provinces he reserved for England the maritime plunder in positions tliat controlled the mouths of the rivers Scheldt and Meuse. The navy under Charles preserved for some time the spirit and discipline impressed on it by Cromwell's iron rule; thougli later it shared in the general decay of morale which marked this evil reign. Monk, having by a great strategic blunder sent off a fourth of his fleet, found himself in 1666 in pres- ence of a greatly superior Dutch force. Disregarding the odds, he attacked without hesitation, and for three days main- tained the fight with honor, though with loss. Such conduct is not war ; but in the single eye that looked to England's naval prestige and dictated his action, common as it was to England's people as well as to her government, has lain the secret of final success following many blunders through the centuries. Charles's successor, James IL, was himself a seaman, and had commanded in two great sea-fights. When William III. came to the throne, the governments of England and Holland were under one hand, and continued united in one purpose against Louis XIV. until the Peace of Utrecht in 1713 ; that is, for a quarter of a century. The English government more and more steadily, and with con- scious purpose, pushed on the extension of her sea dominion and fostered the growth of her sea power. While as an open enemy she struck at France upon the sea, so as an artful friend, many at least believed, she sapped the power of Hoi-
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land afloat. The treaty between the two countries provided that of the sea forces Holland should furnish three eighths, England five eighths, or nearly double. Such a provision, coupled with a further one which made Holland keep up an army of 102,000 against England's 40,000, virtually threw the land war on one and the sea war on the other. The tendency, whether designed or not, is evident ; and at the peace, while Holland received compensation by land, Eng- land obtained, besides commercial privileges in France, Spain, and the Spanish West Indies, the important maritime concessions of Gibraltar and Port Mahon in the Mediterra- nean ; of Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and Hudson's Bay in North America. The naval power of France and Spain had disappeared ; that of Holland thenceforth steadily declined. Posted thus in America, the West Indies, and the Medi- terranean, the English government thenceforth moved firmly forward on the path which made of the English kingdom the British Empire. For the twenty-five years following the Peace of Utrecht, peace was the chief aim of the ministers who directed the policy of the two great seaboard nations, France and England ; but amid all the fluctuations of conti- nental politics in a most unsettled period, abounding in petty wars and shifty treaties, the eye of England was steadily fixed on the maintenance of her sea power. In the Baltic, her fleets checked the attempts of Peter the Great upon Sweden, and so maintained a balance of power in that sea, from which she drew not only a great trade but the chief part of her naval stores, and which the Czar aimed to make a Russian lake. Denmark endeavored to establish an East India company aided by foreign capital ; England and Holland not only forbade their subjects to join it, but threatened Denmark, and thus stopped an enterprise they thought adverse to their sea interests. In the Netherlands, which by the Utrecht Treaty had passed to Austria, a similar East India company, having Ostend for its port, was formed, with the emperor's sanction. This step, meant to restore to the Low Countries the trade lost to them through their natural outlet of the Scheldt, was opposed by
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the sea powers England and Holland ; and their greediness for the monopoly of trade, helped in this instance by France, stifled this company also after a few years of struggling life. In the Mediterranean, the Utrecht settlement was disturbed by the emperor of Austria, England's natural ally in the then existing state of European politics. Backed by England, he, having already Naples, claimed also Sicily in exchange for Sardinia. Spain resisted ; and her navy, just beginning to revive under a vigorous minister, Alberoni, was cruslied and annihilated by the English fleet off Cape Passaro in 1718 ; while the following year a French army, at the bidding of England, crossed the Pyrenees and completed the work by destroying the Spanish dock-yards. Thus England, in addi- tion to Gibraltar and Mahon in her own hands, saw Naples and Sicily in those of a friend, while an enemy was struck down. In Spanish America, the limited privileges to English trade, wrung from the necessities of Spain, were abused by an extensive and scarcely disguised smuggling system ; and when the exasperated Spanish government gave way to excesses in the mode of suppression, both the minister who counselled peace and the opposition which urged war defended their opinions by alleging the effects of either upon England's sea power and honor. While England's policy thus steadily aimed at widening and strengthening the bases of her sway upon the ocean, the other governments of Europe seemed blind to the dangers to be feared from her sea growth. The miseries re- sulting from the overweening power of Spain in days long gone by seemed to be forgotten ; forgotten also the more re- cent lesson of the bloody and costly wars provoked by the ambition and exaggerated power of Louis XIV. Under the eyes of the statesmen of Europe there was steadily and visibly being built up a third overwhelming power, destined to be used as selfishly, as aggressively, though not as cruelly, and much more successfully than any that had preceded it. This was the power of the sea, whose workings, because more silent than the clash of arms, are less often noted, though lying clearly enough on the surface. It can scarcely be denied
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that England's uncontrolled dominion of the seas, during almost the whole period chosen for our subject, was by long odds the chief among the military factors that determined the final issue. ^ So far, however, was this influence from being foreseen after Utrecht, that France for twelve years, moved by personal exigencies of her rulers, sided with England against Spain ; and when Pleuri came into power in 1726, though this policy was reversed, the navy of France received no attention, and the only blow at England was the establish- ment of a Bourbon prince, a natural enemy to her, upon the throne of the two Sicilies in 1736. When war broke out with Spain in 1739, the navy of England was in numbers more than equal to the combined navies of Spain and France ; and during the quarter of a century of nearly uninterrupted war that followed, this numerical disproportion increased. In these wars England, at first instinctively, afterward with con- scious purpose under a government that recognized her oppor- tunity and the possibilities of her great sea power, rapidly built up that mighty colonial empire whose foundations were already securely laid in the characteristics of her colonists and the strength of her fleets. In strictly European affairs her wealth, the outcome of her sea power, made her play a conspicuous part during the same period. The system of subsidies, which began half a century before in the wars of Marlborough and received its most extensive development half a century later in the Napoleonic wars, maintained the efforts of her allies, which would have been crippled, if not paralyzed, without them. Who can deny that the government which with one hand strengthened its fainting allies on the continent with the life-blood of money, and with the other drove its own enemies off the sea and out of their chief possessions, Canada, Martinique, Guadeloupe, Havana, Manila, gave to its country
1 An interesting proof of the weight attributed to the naval power of Great Britain by a great military authority will be found in the opening chapter of Joniini's " History of the Wars of the French Kevolution." He lays down, as a fundamental principle of European policy, that an unlimited expansion of naval force should not be permitted to any nation which cannot be approached by laud, — a description which can apply only to Great Britain.
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the foremost role in European politics ; and who can fail to see that the power which dwelt in that government, with a land narrow in extent and poor in resources, sprang directly from the sea ? The policy in which the English government carried on the war is shown by a speech of Pitt, the master- spirit during its course, though he lost office before bringing it to an end. Condemning the Peace of 1763, made by his political opponent, he said : " France is chiefly, if not exclu- sively, formidable to us as a maritime and commercial power. What we gain in this respect is valuable to us, above all, through the injury to her which results from it. You have left to France the possibility of reviving her navy." Yet Eng- land's gains were enormous ; her rule in India was assured, and all North America east of the Mississippi in her hands. By this time the onward path of her government was clearly marked out, had assumed the force of a tradition, and was consistently followed. The war of the American Revolution was, it is true, a great mistake, looked at from the point of view of sea power ; but the government was led into it in- sensibly by a series of natural blunders. Putting aside polit- ical and constitutional considerations, and looking at the question as purely military or naval, the case was this : The American colonies were large and growing communities at a great distance from England. So long as they remained at- tached to the mother-country, as they tlien were enthusiasti- cally, they formed a solid base for her sea power in that part of the world ; but theii'' extent and population were too great, when coupled with the distance from England, to afford any hope of holding them by force, if any powerful nations were willing to help them. This " if," however, involved a noto- rious probability ; the humiliation of France and Spain was so bitter and so recent that they were sure to seek revenge, and it was well known that France in particular had been care- fully and rapidly building up her navy. Had the colonies been thirteen islands, the sea power of England would quickly have settled the question ; but instead of such a physical bar- rier they were separated only by local jealousies which a com-
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mon danger sufficiently overcame. To enter deliberately on such a contest, to try to hold by force so extensive a territory, with a large hostile population, so far from home, was to renew the Seven Years' War with France and Spain, and with the Americans, against, instead of for, England. The Seven Years' War had been so heavy a burden that a wise govern- ment would have known that the added weight could not be borne, and have seen it was necessary to conciliate the colo- nists. The government of the day was not wise, and a large element of England's sea power was sacrificed ; but by mis- take, not wilfully ; through arrogance, not through weakness. This steady keeping to a general line of policy was doubt- less made specially easy for successive English governments by the clear indications of the country's conditions. Single- ness of purpose was to some extent imposed. The firm main- tenance of her sea power, the haughty determination to make it felt, the wise state of preparation in which its military ele- ment was kept, were yet more due to that feature of her political institutions which practically gave the government, during the period in question, into the hands of a class, — a landed aristocracy. Such a class, whatever its defects other- wise, readily takes up and carries on a sound political tradition, is naturally proud of its country's glory, and comparatively insensible to the sufferings of the community by which that glory is maintained. It readily lays on the pecuniary burden necessary for preparation and for endurance of war. Being as a body rich, it feels those burdens less. Not being com- mercial, the sources of its own wealth are not so immediately endangered, and it does not share that political timidity which characterizes those whose property is exposed and business threatened, — the proverbial timidity of capital. Yet in Eng- land this class was not insensible to anything that touched her trade for good or ill. Both houses of Parliament vied in careful watclifulness over its extension and protection, and to the frequency of their inquiries a naval historian attributes the increased efficiency of the executive power in its manage- ment of the navy. Such a class also naturally imbibes and
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 67
keeps up a spirit of military honor, which is of the first im- portance in ages when mihtary institutions have not yet pro- vided the sufficient substitute in what is called esprit-de-corps. But although full of class feeling and class prejudice, which made themselves felt in the navy as well as elsewhere, their practical sense left open the way of promotion to its highest honors to the more humbly born ; and every age saw admirals who had sprung from the lowest of the people. In this the temper of the English upper class differed markedly from that of the French. As late as 1789, at the outbreak of the Revo- lution, the French Navy List still bore the name of an official whose duty was to verify the proofs of noble birth on the part of those intending to enter the naval school.
Since 1815, and especially in our own day, the government of England has passed very much more into the hands of the people at large. Whether her sea power will suffer there- from remains to be seen. Its broad basis still remains in a great trade, large mechanical industries, and an extensive colonial system. Whether a democratic government will have the foresight, the keen sensitiveness to national position and credit, the willingness to insure its prosperity by adequate outpouring of money in times of peace, all which are necessary for military preparation, is yet an open question. Popular governments are not generally favorable to military expendi- ture, however necessary, and there are signs that England tends to drop behind.
It has already been seen that the Dutch Republic, even more than the English nation, drew its prosperity and its very life from the sea. The character and policy of its gov- ernment were far less favorable to a consistent support of sea power. Composed of seven provinces, with the political name of the United Provinces, the actual distribution of power may be roughly described to Americans as an exaggerated example of States Rights. Each of the maritim.e provinces had its own fleet and its own admiralty, with consequent jealousies. This disorganizing tendency was partly counteracted by the great preponderance of the Province of Holland, which alone con-
68 DISCUSSION OF THE
tributed five sixths of the fleet and fifty-eight per cent of the taxes, and consequently had a proportionate share in directing the national policy. Although intensely patriotic, and capa- ble of making the last sacrifices for freedom, the commercial spirit of the people penetrated the government, which indeed might be called a commercial aristocracy, and made it averse to war, and to the expenditures which are necessary in prepar- ing for war. As has before been said, it was not until danger stared them in the face that the burgomasters were willing to pay for their defences. While the republican government lasted, however, this economy was practised least of all upon the fleet ; and until the death of John De Witt, in 1672, and the peace with England in 1674, the Dutch navy was in point of numbers and equipment able to make a fair show against the combined navies of England and France. Its efficiency at this time undoubtedly saved the country from the destruction planned by the two kings. With De Witt's death the repub- lic passed away, and was followed by the practically monarchi- cal government of William of Orange. The life-long policy of this prince, then only eighteen, was resistance to Louis XIY. and to the extension of French power. This resistance took shape upon the land rather than the sea, — a tendency pro- moted by England's withdrawal from the war. As early as 1676, Admiral De Ruyter found the force given him unequal to cope with the French alone. With the eyes of the govern- ment fixed on the land frontier, the navy rapidly declined. In 1688, when William of Orange needed a fleet to convoy him to England, the burgomasters of Amsterdam objected that the navy was incalculably decreased in strength, as well as deprived of its ablest commanders. When king of Eng- land, William still kept his position as stadtholder, and with it his general European policy. He found in England the sea power he needed, and used the resources of Holland for the land war. This Dutch prince consented that in the allied fleets, in councils of war, the Dutch admirals should sit below the junior English captain; and Dutch interests at sea were sacrificed as readily as Dutch pride to the demands of Eng-
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. Q'J
laud. When William died, his policy was still followed by the government which succeeded him. Its aims were wholly centred upon the land, and at the Peace of Utrecht, which closed a series of wars extending over forty years, Holland, having established no sea claim, gained nothing in the way of sea resources, of colonial extension, or of commerce.
Of the last of these wars an English historian says : " The economy of the Dutch greatly hurt their reputation and their trade. Their men-of-war in the Mediterranean were always victualled short, and their convoys were so weak and ill- provided that for one ship that we lost, they lost five, which begat a general notion that we were the safer carriers, which certainly had a good effect. Hence it was that our trade rather increased than diminished in this war."
From that time Holland ceased to have a great sea power, and rapidly lost the leading position among the nations which that power had built up. It is only just to say that no pol- icy could have saved from decline this small, though deter- mined, nation, in face of the persistent enmity of Louis XIV. The friendship of France, insuring peace on her landward frontier, would have enabled her, at least for a longer time, to dispute with England the dominion of the seas ; and as allies the navies of the two continental States might have checked the growth of the enormous sea power which has just been considered. Sea peace between England and Holland was only possible by the virtual subjection of one or the other, for both aimed at the same object. Between France and Holland it was otherwise ; and the fall of Holland proceeded, not necessarily from her inferior size and numbers, but from faulty policy on the part of the two governments. It does not concern us to decide which was the more to blame.
France, admirably situated for the possession of sea power, received a definite policy for the guidance of her government from two great rulers, Henry lY. and Richelieu. With cer- tain well-defined projects of extension eastward upon the land were combined a steady resistance to the House of Austria, which then ruled in both Austria and Spain, and an equal
70 DISCUSSION OF THE
purpose of resistance to England upon the sea. To further this latter end, as well as for other reasons, Holland was to be courted as an ally. Commerce and fisheries as the basis of sea power were to be encouraged, and a military navy was to be built up. Richelieu left what he called his political will, in which he pointed out the opportunities of France for achieving sea power, based upon her position and resources ; and Frencli writers consider him the virtual founder of tlie navy, not merely because he equipped ships, but from the breadth of his views and his measures to insure sound in- stitutions and steady growth. After his death, Mazarin inher- ited his views and general policy, but not his lofty and martial spirit, and during his rule the newly formed navy disappeared. When Louis XIV. took the government into his own hands, in 1661, there were but thirty ships of war, of which only three had as many as sixty guns. Then began a most as- tonishing manifestation of the work which can be done by absolute government ably and systematically wielded. That part of the administration which dealt with trade, manufac- tures, shipping, and colonies, was given to a man of great practical genius, Colbert, who had served with Richelieu and had drunk in fully his ideas and policy. He pursued his aims in a spirit thoroughly French. Everything was to be organ- ized, the spring of everything was in the minister's cabinet. " To organize producers and merchants as a powerful army, subjected to an active and intelligent guidance, so as to secure an industrial victory for France by order and unity of efforts, and to obtain the best products by imposing on all workmen the processes recognized as best by competent men. ... To organize seamen and distant commerce in large bodies like the manufactures and internal commerce, and to give as a support to the commercial power of France a navy established on a firm basis and of dimensions hitherto unknown," — such, we are told, were the aims of Colbert as regards two of the three links in the chain of sea power. For the third, the col- onies at the far end of the line, the same governmental direction and organization were evidently purposed ; for the
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 71
government began by buying back Canada, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the French West India Islands from the parties who then owned them. Here, then, is seen pure, ab- solute, uncontrolled power gathering up into its liands all the reins for the guidance of a nation's course, and proposing so to direct it as to make, among other things, a great sea power.
To enter into the details of Colbert's action is beyond our purpose. It is enough to note the chief part played by the government in building up the sea power of the State, and that this very great man looked not to any one of the bases on "which it rests to the exclusion of the others, but embraced them all in his wise and provident administration. Agricul- ture, which increases the products of the earth, and manufac- tures, which multiply the products of man's industry ; internal trade routes and regulations, by wliich the exchange of prod- ucts from the interior to the exterior is made easier ; ship- ping and customs regulations tending to throw the carrying- trade into French hands, and so to encourage the building of French shipping, by which the home and colonial products should be carried back and forth ; colonial administration and development, by which a far-off market might be continually growing up to be monopolized by the home trade ; treaties with foreign States favoring French trade, and imposts on foreign ships and products tending to break down that of rival nations, — all these means, embracing countless details, were employed to build up for France (1) Production ; (2) Shipping; (3) Colonies and Markets, — in a word, sea power. The study of such a work is simpler and easier when thus done by one man, sketched out by a kind of logical process, than when slowly wrought by conflicting interests in a more com- plex government. In the few years of Colbert's administra- tion is seen the whole theory of sea power put into practice in the systematic, centralizing French waj' ; w'hile the illus- tration of the same theory in English and Dutch history is spread over generations. Such growth, however, w^as forced, and depended upon the endurance of the absolute power which watched over it ; and as Colbert was not king, his con-
72 DISCUSSION OF THE
trol lasted only till lie lost the king's favor. It is, however, most interesting to note the results of his labors in the proper field for governmental action — in the navy. It has been said that in 1661, when he took office, there were but thirty armed ships, of which three only had over sixty guns. In 1666 there were seventy, of which fifty were ships of the line and twenty were fire-ships ; in 1671, from seventy the number had increased to one hundred and ninety-six. In 1683 there were one hundred and seven ships of from twenty-four to one hun- dred and twenty guns, twelve of which carried over seventy- six guns, besides many smaller vessels. The order and system introduced into the dock-yards made them vastly more efficient than the English. An English captain, a pris- oner in France while the effect of Colbert's work still lasted in the hands of his son, writes : —
" When I was first brought prisoner thither, I lay four months in a hospital at Brest for care of my wounds. While there I was aston- ished at the expedition used in manning and fitting out their ships, which till then I thought could be done nowhere sooner than in Eng- land, •where we have ten times the shipping, and consequently ten times the seamen, they have in France ; but there I saw twenty sail of ships, of about sixty guns each, got ready in twenty days' time ; they were brought in and the men were discharged ; and upon an order from Paris they were careened, keeled up, rigged, victualled, manned, and out again in the said time with the greatest ease imagi- nable. I likewise saw a ship of one hundred guns that had all her guns taken out in four or five hours' time ; which I never saw done in England in twenty-four hours, and this with the greatest ease and less hazarcT than at home. This I saw under my hospital window."
A French naval historian cites certain performances which are simply incredible, such as that the keel of a galley was laid at four o'clock, and that at nine she left port, fully armed. These traditions may be accepted as pointing, with the more serious statements of the English officer, to a remarkable de- gree of system and order, and abundant facilities for work.
Yet all this wonderful growth, forced by the action of the government, withered away like Jonah's gourd when the gov-
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 73
ernment's favor was withdrawn. Time was not allowed for its roots to strike down deep into the life of the nation. Col- bert's work was in the direct line of Richelieu's policy, and for a time it seemed there would continue the course of action which would make France great upon the sea as well as pre- dominant upon the land. For reasons which it is not yet necessary to give, Louis came to have feelings of bitter enmity against Holland ; and as these feelings were shared by Charles II., the two kings determined on the destruction of the United Provinces. This war, which broke out in 1672, though more contrary to natural feeling on the part of Eng- land, was less of a political mistake for her than for France, and especially as regards sea power. France was helping to destroy a probable, and certainly an indispensable, ally ; England was assisting in the ruin of her greatest rival on the sea, at this time, indeed, still her commercial superior. France, staggering under debt and utter confusion in her finances when Louis mounted tlie throne, was just seeing her way clear in 1672, under Colbert's reforms and their happy results. The war, lasting sis years, undid the greater part of his work. Tiie agricultural classes, manufactures, commerce, and the colonies, all were smitten by it ; the establishments of Colbert languished, and the order he had established in the finances was overthrown. Thus the action of Louis — and he alone was the directing government of France — struck at tlie roots of her sea power, and alienated her best sea ally. The territory and the military power of France were increased, but the springs of commerce and of a peaceful shipping had been exhausted in the process ; and although the military * navy was for some years kept up with splendor and effi- ciency, it soon began to dwindle, and by the end of the reign had practically disappeared. The same false policy, as re- gards the sea, marked the rest of this reign of fifty-four years. Louis steadily turned his back upon the sea interests of France, except the fighting-ships, and either could not or would not see that the latter were of little use and uncertain life, if the peaceful shipping and the industries, by which they
74 DISCUSSION OF THE
were supported, perished. His policy, aiming at supreme power ill Europe by military strength and territorial exten- sion, forced England and Holland into an alliance, which, as has before been said, directly drove France off the sea, and indirectly swamped Holland's power thereon. Colbert's navy . perished, and for the last ten years of Louis' life no great French fleet put to sea, though there was constant war. The simplicity of form in an absolute monarchy thus brought out strongly how great the influence of government can be upon both the growth and the decay of sea power.
The latter part of Louis' life thus witnessed that power fail- ing by the weakening of its foundations, of commerce, and of the wealth that commerce brings. The government that fol- lowed, likewise absolute, of set purpose and at the demand of England, gave up all pretence of maintaining an effective navy. The reason for this was that the new king was a minor ; and the regent, being bitterly at enmity with the king of Spain, to injure him and preserve his own power, entered into alliance with England. He aided her to estab- lish Austria, the hereditary enemy of France, in Naples and Sicily to the detriment of Spain, and in union with her de- stroyed the Spanish navy and dock-yards. Here again is found a personal ruler disregarding the sea interests of France, ruining a natural ally, and directly aiding, as Louis XIV. indirectly and unintentionally aided, the growth of a mistress of the seas. This transient phase of policy passed away with the death of the regent in 1726 ; but from that time until 1760 the government of France continued to dis- regard her maritime interests. It is said, indeed, that owing to some wise modifications of her fiscal regulations, mainly in the direction of free trade (and due to Law, a minister of Scotch birth), commerce with the East and West Indies won- derfully increased, and that the islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique became very rich and thriving ; but both com- merce and colonies lay at the mercy of England when war came, for the navy fell into decay. In 1756, when things were no longer at their worst, France had but forty-five ships-
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 75
of-the4ine, England nearly one hundred and thirty ; and when the forty-five were to be armed and equipped, there was found to be neither material nor rigging nor supplies ; not even enough artillery. Nor was this all.
" Lack of system in the government," says a French writer, " brought about indifference, and opened the door to disorder and lack of discipline. Never had unjust promotions been so frequent ; so also never had more universal discontent been seen. Money and intrigue took the place of all else, and brought in their train commands and power. Nobles and upstarts, with influence at the capital and self- sufficiency in the seaports, thought themselves dispensed with merit. Waste of the revenues of the State and of the dock-yards knew no bounds. Honor and modesty were turned into ridicule. As if the evils were not thus great enough, the ministry took pains to efface the heroic traditions of the past which had escaped the general wreck. To the energetic fights of the great reign succeeded, by order of the court, 'affairs of circumspection.' To preserve to the wasted material a few armed ships, increased opportunity was given to the enemy. From this unhappy principle we were bound to a defensive as advan- tageous to the enemy as it was foreign to the genius of our people. This circumspection before the enemy, laid down for us by orders, betrayed in the long run the national temper ; and the abuse of the system led to acts of indiscipline and defection under fire, of which a single instance would vainly be sought in the previous century."
A false policy of continental extension swallowed up the resources of the country, and was doubly injurious because, by leaving defenceless its colonies and commerce, it exposed the greatest source of wealth to be cut off, as in fact hap- pened. The small squadrons that got to sea were destroyed by vastly superior force ; the merchant shipping was swept away, and the colonies, Canada, Martinique, Guadeloupe, India, fell into England's hands. If it did not take too much space, interesting extracts might be made, showing the woful misery of France, the country that had abandoned the sea, and the growing wealth of England amid all her sacrifices and exertions. A contemporaiy writer has thus expressed his view of the policy of France at this period : —
7G DISCUSSION OF THE
" France, by engaging so heartily as she has done in the German war, has drawn away so much of her attention and her revenue from her navy that it enabled us to give such a blow to her maritime strength as possibly she may never be able to recover. Her engage- ment in the German war has likewise drawn her from the defence of her colonies, by which means we have conquered some of the most considerable she possessed. It has withdrawn her from the protec- tion of her trade, by which it is entirely destroyed, while that of England has never, in the profoundest peace, been in so flourishing a condition. So that, by embarking in this German war, France has suffered herself to be undone, so far as regards her particular and immediate quarrel with England."
In the Seven Years' War France lost thirty-seven ships-of- the-lino and fifty-six frigates, — a force three times as numer- ous as the whole navy of the United States at any time in the days of sailing-ships. " For the first time since the Middle Ages," says a French historian, speaking of the same war, " England had conquered France single-handed, almost with- out allies, France having powerful auxiliaries. She had con- quered solely by the superiority of her government." Yes ; but it was by the superiority of her government using the tremen- dous weapon of her sea power, — the reward of a consistent policy perseveringly directed to one aim.
The profound Immiliation of France, which reached its depths between 1760 and 1763, at which latter date she made peace, has an instructive lesson for the United States in this our period of commercial and naval decadence. We have been spared her humiliation ; let us hope to profit by her subsequent example. Between the same years (1760 and 1763) the French people rose, as afterward in 1793, and declared they would have a navy. " Popular feeling, skilfully directed by the government, took up the cry from one end of France to the other, 'The navy must be restored.' Gifts of ships were made by cities, by corporations, and by private subscriptions. A prodigious activity sprang up in the lately silent ports ; everywhere ships were building or repairing." This activity was sustained ; the arsenals were replenished, the material
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 77
of every kind was put on a satisfactory footing, the artillery reorganized, and ten thousand trained gunners drilled and maintained.
The tone and action of the naval officers of the day in- stantly felt the popular impulse, for which indeed some lof- tier spirits among them had been not only waiting but working. At no time was greater mental and professional activity found among French naval officers than just then, when their ships had been suffered to rot away by governmental inaction. Thus a prominent French officer of our own day writes : —
" The sad condition of the navy in the reign of Louis XV., by closing to officers the brilliant career of bold enterprises and success- ful battles, forced them to fall back upon themselves. They drew from study the knowledge they were to put to the proof some years later, thus putting into practice that fine saying of Montesquieu, ' Adversity is our mother. Prosperity our step-mother.' . . . By the year 17G9 was seen in all its splendor that brilliant galaxy of officers whose activity stretched to the ends of the earth, and who embraced in their works and in their investigations all the branches of human knowledge. The Academie de Marine, founded in 1752, was re- organized." ^
The Academic's first director, a post-captain named Bigot de Morogues, wrote an elaborate treatise on naval tactics, the first original work on the subject since Paul Hoste's, which it was designed to supersede. Morogues must have been study- ing and formulating his problems in tactics in days when France had no fleet, and was unable so much as to raise her head at sea under the blows of her enemy. At the same time England had no similar book ; and an English lieutenant, in 1762, was just translating a part of Hoste's great work, omit- ting by far the larger part. It was not until nearly twenty years later that Clerk, a Scotch private gentleman, published an ingenious study of naval tactics, in which he pointed out to English admirals the system by which the French had thwarted their thoughtless and ill-combined attacks.^ " The
' Gougeard: La Marine de Guerre; Eichelieu et Colbert. 2 ^Yhateve^ may be thought of Clerk's claim to originality in constructing a system of naval tactics, and it has been seriously impugned, there can be no doubt
78 DISCUSSION OF THE
researches of the Acaclemie de Marine, and the energetic im- pulse which it gave to the labors of officers, were not, as we hope to show later, without influence upon the relatively prosperous condition in which the navy was at the beginning of the American war."
It has already been pointed out that the American War of Independence involved a departure from England's traditional and true policy, by committing her to a distant land war, while powerful enemies were waiting for an opportunity to attack her at sea. Like France in the then recent German wars, like Napoleon later in the Spanish war, England, through undue self-confidence, was about to turn a friend into an enemy, and so expose the real basis of her power to a rude proof. The French government, on the other hand, avoided the snare into which it had so often fallen. Turning her back on the European continent, having the probability of neutrality there, and the certainty of alliance with Spain by her side, France advanced to the contest with a fine navy and a brilliant, though perhaps relatively inexperienced, body of officers. On the other side of the Atlantic she had the sup- port of a friendly people, and of her own or allied ports, both in the West Indies and on the continent. The wisdom of this policy, the happy influence of this action of the government upon her sea power, is evident ; but the details of the war do not belong to this part of the subject. To Americans, the -^p-"^ chief interest of that war is found upon the land ; but to naval
/ officers upon the sea, for it was essentially a sea war. The
intelligent and systematic efforts of twenty years bore their due fruit ; for though the warfare afloat ended with a great disaster, the combined efforts of the French and Spanish fleets undoubtedly bore down England's strength alid robbed her of her colonies. In the various naval undertakings and battles the honor of France was upon the whole maintained ; though it is difficult, upon consideration of the general
that his criticisms on the past were sound. So far as the author knows, he in this respect deserves credit for an originality remarkable in one who had the training neither of a seaman nor of a military man.
ELEMENTS OF SEA POWER. 79
subject, to avoid the conclusion that the inexperience of French seamen as compared with English, the narrow spirit of jealousy shown by the noble corps of officers toward those of different antecedents, and above all, the miserable tradi- tions of three quarters of a century already alluded to, the miserable policy of a government which taught them first to save their ships, to economize the material, prevented French admirals from reaping, not the mere glory, but the positive advantages that more than once were within their grasp. When Monk said the nation that would rule upon the sea must always attack, he set the key-note to England's naval policy ; and had the instructions of the French government consistently breathed tlie same spirit, the war of 1778 might have ended sooner and better than it did. It seems ungra- cious to criticise the conduct of a service to which, under God, our nation owes tliat its birth was not a miscarriage ; but writers of its own country abundantly reflect the spirit of the remark. A French officer who served afloat during this war, in a work of calm and judicial tone, says: —
" What must the young officers have thought who were at Sandy Hook with D'Estaing, at St. Christopher with De Grasse, even those who arrived at Rhode