I!
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.\n.
~ OF THE
Theological Seminary,
PRINCETON, N.J.
Case, "■^^.^r"^^. D.i.visj.o n ,
Shelf, JL<^^1 Section ,
Booh, .::..:.:: No,.,.
A DONATION
FROM
Beceiued
i^P^Wilj^-Nw-
\^1
A N
S S A Y
O N T H E
ORIGIN oi EVIL,
By Dr. William King, late Lord Archbifhop oi DUBLIN.
Tranilated from the Latiny with large Notes,
To which are added two Sermons by the fame Au-' thor, the former concerning Divine Prefciencey the latter on the Fall of Man.
The Third Edition corrected.
By EDMVND LAW. M. A. Fellow of Chrifi College.
w^^
i.KS^f5i.;^>«ri :
CAMBRIDGE:
Printed for WILLIAM THURLBOURN.
And Sold by J. and P. Knapton, W. Innys and R. Mavhy, S. Birt znd. C. RivtJigtoTi, Booicfellers in London. Mdccxxxix,
TO THE
REVEPvEND Dr. Waterland
Mailer of Magdalen CoIIese in Camhridie^ &€, &c.
SIR,
IT is a common obfervation that the ge- nerality of fuch Freethinkers as are feri- rious and have reafon'd them.lelves out of the Chriftian RelisT^ion, have at the fame time rejected the beKef of a Deity. This muft arife either from their entertaining fome Principles that lead equally to both thefe abfurdities; or, which is more proba- ble,' from their having no Principles at all : from mere Sceptic! fm and a habit of rai- iing Objedions without ever attending to the anfwers ; without proceeding on any fettled grounds of enquiry, or endeavour-
A ing
Dedication.
ing to eftablifli any thing: a temper of mind which may eafily bring a Man to disbeHeve any thing. But whatever be the Caufe of this, the Obferv^ation is remarkably verify'd in the prelent Age. Moft of our modern Unbehevers have fo far perplex'd themfelves with Difficulties about the Law of Nature and right Reafon, Liberty Divine and Human, Prefcience, Providence, and the like, that they feem to be in univerlal Confufion The chief defign of the follow- ing Book is to clear up fome of thefe Diffi- culties, to eftablifli true and proper Notions, as well as to refute falfc and unworthy ones, concerning the Exiftence and Attributes of God, and his Government of the World ; concerning the Nature and Condition of Man, the Obligations he Hes under, the Rule and End of his actions; and to build the whole upon fuch Principles of Pvcafon as are perfectly confiftcnt with Revelation. This, 'tis hoped, will not be without its ufc at prefent, in flopping the growth of Ltc- ligion by ftriking at the Root of it ; it may have fome influence toward fettling the minds of the unlearned and unflablc^ and be
fufficient
Dedtcatiom.
fufflcient tlio' not to reduce them to a hearty profeiiion of the true Faith, yet at leaft to hinder them from falling into downright In • fidelity; efpecially if coiintenanc'd by a Perfon eminent fjr a tlioroiigh knov/ledge of thefe Subjedlsj confefledlyan able Judge, an upright Defender, a bright Example of Religion both reveafd and natural ; v/ho is zealous to aflert the truth and enforce the neceffity of the Principal Dodrines and In- ftitutions of the one, as v/ell as to eftaWifh the true ground and fundamental Principle, and fix the proper Limits of the other : and above all, who has always the Courage to maintain thefe great Truths, howfoever un- fafiiionable or unpopular they may be fome- times made.
Thefe, Sir, are very obvious reafons for my being ambitious to prefix your Name to the foUcwino; ¥/ork, and endeavouring to recommend it to the favour of one to whom its Author wou'd liave been defirous to ap- prove himfelf
'Tis with pleafure alfo that I take this op- portunity of declaring as well my fenfe of the great benefits that attend the perufal of
A 2 your
Dedication.
your Writings, which muft giv^e equal warmth and convidlion to all who have the leaft concern for Religion ; as my experience of that candid condefcention and commu- nicative temper, which is ready to encou- rage and inftrud: every young enquirer after Truth.
To thefe more general Motives to an Ad- drels of this kind give me leave to add the many private Obligations which in a parti- cular manner demand an acknowledgment from
S I Ry
Tour tnojl obliged humble Servanty
Edmund L a w^
THE
Tranflator's PREFACE.
IH A V E always look'd upon an Enquiry into the Caufe and Origin of Evil, as one of the nobleil: and mod important Subje(fts in Natural Religion. It leads us into the moft exalted Spe- culations concerning the Exillence and Attributes of God, and the Original of Things. ^It firft endea- vours to difcover the true intent of the Deity in creating Beings at all, and then purfues that Intent thro' the feveral Works of his Creation : it (hews how this is fully anfwer'd at prefent by the Inani- mate and Brute Part, and how it might and fliould be, and why, and in what refped, it is not by the Rational. It contemplates the Oeconomy in the Government of the Univerfe, fearches into the va- rious Schemes of Providence, and takes in the whole Compafs of Nature.
Neither is its Ufefubiefs inferior to its Extent. It concerns every Man who pretends to adt upon any ferious Views here, or to entertain any folid Hopes of Futurity. The Knowledge of it, in fome degree, is abfolutely neceffary in order to the fettling in our Minds right Notions of the Nature and Will of God, and the Duties we owe him ; in order to the due Apprehenfion of his Defign in creating, preferving, and directing us ; and to the regular Coadud: of our
A3 Live^
vlii P R E FA C E.
Lives, and Enjoyment of ourfelves in that State and Condition wherein he has placed us. Nay, while we are ignorant of this one Point, what rational Plea- fure can we take in knowino; any other? When I enquire how I got into this World, and came to be what I am, I'm told that an ablblutely perfed Being produced me out of Nothing, and placed me here on purpofe to communicate fome Part of his Hap- pinefs to me, and to make me, in fome meafure,
like himfelf ^ This End is not obtain'd ; •
the diredt contrary appears ;■ I find myfelf fur- rounded with nothing but Perplexity, Want and
Miferys By whofe fault I know not, How
to better myfelf I cannot tell What Notions of
God and Goodnefs can this afford nie ? What
Ideas of Religion ? What Hopes of a future
State ? For, if God's Aim in producing me be
entirely unknown ; if it be neither his Glory, (as fome will have it) wdiich my prefent State is far from
advancing; nor mine own Good^ which the
fame is equally inconfiilent with ; how know I v/hat T am to do here, and in what m.anner I mufl: endea- vour to pleafe him ? Or why fliould I endeavour it
at all ? For, if I mull be miferable in this
World, what Security have I that I fliall not be fo in another too; (if there be one) fince, if it were the Will of my Almighty Creator, I might (for ought I fee) have been happy in both ?
Such Thoughts as thefe muff needs difturb a Per-
o
fon that has any real Concern for his Maker's PIo- nour or his own Happinefs ; that delires to pay him a reafonable Service, and anfwer the End of his Creation : in fliort, that happens to think at all upon thefe things, and to think for himfelf. And there- fore
PREFACE. ix
fore an Endeavour to rid the Mind of fome of thefe Perplexities, cannot fnre be unacceptable, and a So- lution of any one of thefe Doubts, is doing a piece of Service to Mankind which can never be un- feafonable. But the Ufefulnefs, as well as Anti- quity, of the prefent Debate ; and the Abfurdity of the Manichcan Scheme of accounting for Evil, have been often explain'd, and need not here to be infifted on : all that ever feern'd wanting to an entire Con- quefl over thefe Heretics, and their abfurd Hypo- thefis, was only a tolerable Solution of the many Difficulties which drove them into it: and this our Author has etFeded, as I hope to make appear in the Sequel.
There are two general ways of Reafoning, called Arguments a Priori^ and a Pojleriori^ or according to what Logicians commonly flile the Synthetic and Analytic Method : The former lays down fome evi- dent Principles, and then deduces the feveral Conje^ q^ences neceilarily refulting from them : The latter begins with the Pkenomena themfelves, and traces 'em up to their Original^ and from the known Pro- perties of thefe Phenomena arrives at the Nature of their Caufe. Now the former of thefe is evidently preferable, where it can be had, fince the latter mufl depend upon a large Indudion of Particulars, any of which failing invalidates the whole Argument and fpoils a Demonftration.
An Attempt therefore to flxew that the Subjed be- fore us is capable of the former Method, mull be ve- ry delirablej and this our Author feems to have done, without any precarious Syftem, or illgrounded Hypothefis. His fuperior Excellence confills in ha- ving laid down, and previoufly eftablifh'd fuch folid,
A 4 fubftantial
% PREFACE,
fubftanr'ial Principles as may be drawn out /;/ infiui- turn. ?r>d eafily apply'd to all the Difficulties that at- tend t^e prefent Qticflion.
He firil of all enquires into the Nature and Per- fe<5lions of the Deity, and his Delign in the Creati- on j fettles the true Notion of a Creature, and exa- mines whether any could be perfecfl ; and if not, whether all fliould have been made equally imper- fect; or feveral in very different ClafTes and Degrees. Having proved the laft of thefe Opinions to be the true o\\^^ he proceeds to the lowed Clafs of Beings, mx. Material ones: He enquires into the Nature and effential Properties of Matter^ and the Laws of its Motio?!^ and thereby eftabliflies fuch Rules as di- rect us to the Solution of all the Difficulties attend- ing it as diftributed into various Maffes^ Syftems, and Animated Bodies He fliews the unavoidable- nefs, and abfolute neceffity oi contrary Motions in Matter, for the fame Reafons that it had any Motion at all and confequcntly ol Attrition^ Corruption and T)i[[olution, nnd all the Natural Evils that attend themx. In the next place, from the Nature of a SelfrJno'vi7ig Principle, and the manner of its Opera- tion, he deduces all the Irregularities incident to Vo- lition, and the Actions confequent thereupon. He flates at large the true Notion of Frcc-lVill^ and .demonftrates the abfolute Neceffity for ic in every Rational Being, in order to if^ Happinefs. Then accounts for the feveral Abufes of it, and the Moral Evils arifing from thence, and examines all the pof- fible Ways of preventing them ; and upon the whole makes it appear^that none or thefe could have been ori- ginally avoided, or can now be removed, without in- troducing greater 5 and confequently that the very Per-r
miffion
PREFACE. XI
nilffion of thefe Evils, and the Production and Pre- fervation of thefe Beings, in the prefent State, is the higheft Inftance of infinite Wifdom, Power and Goodnefs.
Now thefe arc not mere Arguments ad Ignoraiiti- am : This is not telling us that we muft believe fuch and fuch things to be the Effeds of an infinitely wife and good God, tho' no Marks of either Wifdom or Goodnefs appear in them j which tho' it may be true, and all that perhaps can be faid in feme particular Cafes, yet has, 1 think, but very little Tendency towards either the Convidlion of an Infidel, or the Satisfaction of a true Believer. When a Ferfon is ferioully contemplating any Parts of Nature, and fo- Hcitoufly enquiring into their feveral Ends and Ufes, no Pleafure furely can arife to himfelf, nor Devoti- on toward the Author of it, merely from the Per- plexity and Unaccountablenefs of thofe Parts. Nay every fuch Inftance, one would think, muft caft a damp upon his Spirits and prove an ungrateful Re- flediion on his Weaknefs, a mortifying Argument of his Imperfedion. Whereas one fingle Perplexity clear'd up, or Objed:ion anfwer'd, is a piece of real Knowledge gain'd, upon which he can congratulate himfelf, and glorify his Maker.
Our Author therefore was not content with mere lS[cgative Arguments, and barely avoiding Difficul- ties, by removing all Defeds from external things to ourfelves, and multiplying Inftances of the Nar- rownefs and Weaknefs of Human Underftandino-: (which any one that thinks at all will foon be con- vinced of, and heartily defirous of having it fome- what enlarged and improved, to which this manner of Argumentation, I fear, contributes very little.)
Buc
xli PREFACE.
Bat he attacks his Adverfaries in their flrongeft Holds, and plucks up the Manichean Herefy by the Roots : he ihews by certain pre-eflabliih'd Rules, and necellary Confeqnence, that we can eahly reduce all to one fupreme Head, and clearly comprehend how the prelcnt ftate of things is the very bell in all refpedts, and worthy of a mod wife, powerful, and beneficent Author : And why, taking the whole Sy- flem of Beings together, and every Clafs of them in its own Order, none could poilihiy have been made more perfed', or placed in a better. He proves, in the firft place (as we obferv'd) that no created Be- ings could be abfolutely periedt, and in the next, that no manner of Evil, or Imperfedion was tole- rated in them, but what was, either in their Clafs and manner of Exillence, abfolutely unavoidable, or elfe productive of feme Good more than equi- valent: In both which Cafes there will be the fame Reafons for the Creation of fuch Beings in fuch Circumftances, together with their concomitant E- vils, as there was for any Creation at all j For which the fole Reafon will appear to be an Intention in the Creator of communicating Happinefs to as many Be- ings as could be made capable of it, on the very beft Terms ; or a Refolution not to omit the leaft Degree Q^ pure Good on account of fuch Evils, as did not counterballance it : Or (which is the very fame, fince 'twill be evident that the Prevention of all the prefent Evils, in any conceivable Manner, would have been of worfe Confeqnence than the Permiliion of them) an Intention always to choofc the leaft of two Evils^ when both cannot be avoided.
This
PREFACE. :xiii
This muft be granted to come up to the Point ; and when it is once made apparent, will be a full and fufficient Anfwer to that old triumphant Quef- tion, rio gv tI Ka;cov; 'twill be an ample Vindication of the Divine Providence ; a Demonflration of the Power, andWildom, and Goodnefs of God in the Produd:ion, Prefervation, and Government of the Univerfe; and as much as a reafonable Man can ex- ped or defire. And I heartily wifli this Method had been taken by more of thole Authors that have wrote on the prefent Subjed, and the Argument purfued a' little farther by Natural Light ^ in order to give fome Light and Confirmation even to Re--cclation itfelf, in thefe inquifitive Days, wherein a great many feera unwilling to be determined by its fole Authority-; wherein Men are not a little inclined to call every- thing into queftion^ and a weak Argument, is fur e to be exploded. Even the moil: learned and in- genious Writer on this Subject often flies to Scrip- ture when a Difficulty begins to prefs him: which^ in my Opinion, is deferting the Argument, and owning, with Mr. Bayle (in his Explanation touch- ing the Manichees at the End of his Didf ionary) " that the Queftion cannot be defended on any other foot, "
Whereas, if the Difficulty be really unanfwerable
by Reafon, ora plain Contradidion to our natural No- tions of God; if (as the fore-mentioned Author often urges) '' we perceive by our clear and diftind: Ideas, " that fuch a thing is intirely repugnant to his Nature " and Attributes, "—referring us to Scripture, which declares that an infinitely perfed Being did conflitute it thus, will be no manner of Satisfadion, fince(upon
this
xiv P R E FA C E.
this Suppoiltionj we cannot have greater AfTurance that this Scripture comes from him, than we have that the Doctrine therein contain'd is abfurd and im- poflible. And what that ingenious Perfon's intent might be in reprefcnting the matter thus, and then re- ferring us to Scripture for an Anfvver, I cannot deter- mine. But lure I am, that his Account of it ferves rather to betray the Caufe, and undermine the Autho- rity of bodiReafon and Revelation and is enough (if no better could be gi/en) ro make a Perfon that argues confequentially reject all kinds of Religion.
Farther, every one muft have obfcrv'd, that mofl Authors upon this Subjc6t treat of Gods Dilpenfa- tions toward Man, as if they were fpeaking of one Man's Behaviour toward another. They think it fjfiicient to make the Almighty cboofe the moft pru- dent, likely Means of bringing Man to Happinefs ; and aCt upon the highell P?'obabilit\\ tho' (upon what account foevcr it matters not) he fail of his End. Now this may indeed be the bell manner of acting in all finite, ifnperfert Beings, and fufficient to acquit the Goodnt^is and Jiiltice of God, but 'tis very far from latisfying his IVifdom. To a perfect Being who fore- fees tjie Ette6ls of all poiTible Caufes and Means, as the fame Authors allow God to do, thefe only ap- pear fit and eligible for the effects and End> which they will certain^ produce. Nor is it any reafon why I fhould purfue a Method which is apt and wont to fucceed in moll Cafes, if I Jzno'-J) it will fail in this. To a Perfon therefore that takes all the Attributes of God toeether and confiders the whole Scheme of Providence from end to end, it will not appear a complete and facisfac^tory Vindication of them, to .aiierc that God either now makes Men, or fulfers
ihera
PREFACE. XV
them to make themlelves miferable, for rejeding that Happinefs which he at fir ft made them capable of, and endow 'd them with fuch Powers, and placed them in fuch Circum.ftances as render'd it naturally poffible and even eafy to be attain d by them : tho' this may indeed clear his Juftice and lay the Blame upon ourfelves: And yet thefe Writers generally con- tent themfelves with going thus far : They bring all our Sin and Mifery from the abufe of Free- Will, (/. e. a Power whereby a Man might poflibly have acted otherwife, and prevented it;) without ever ex- plaining the Nature of this Principle, or fhewing the Worth'and excellence of it, and proving that, asfar as we can apprehend, more Good in general arifes from the donation of fuch a Self-moving Power, together with all thefe forcfeen Abufes of it, than could poffibly have been produced without it. To demonftrate this was an Actempt worthy of our Au- thor, who has at leafl laid a noble Foundation for it, and feems to be the firft that has propofed the true Notion of Human Liberty^ and explained it con- fiftently : All the Doubts and Difficulties attending which intricate Queftion will, I hope, be tolerably cleared up ; or at leaft fuch Principles eftabliihed as may be fufficient for that Purpofe, by this Treatife of his, and the Notes upon it.
So much for the Subjed: and our Author's way of treating it. As for the T^ranjlatlon^ 'tis barely Lite- ral. 1 endeavoured to keep clofe to the Author's Senfe, and generally to his very Words. I once in- tended to have cut off every thing that I could not defend, efpecially about the Beginning (which ufed to difcourage mod Readers from perufmg the reft of his valuable Book, and might perhaps as well have
been
xvi PREFACE,
omitted -,) but confidering that he had involv'd it (o clofely ill the reil: of his Scheme, that the whole would feem confufed without it, and that others might perhaps have a different Opinion of it, I con- tented myfelf with omitting part of his Notes, and obviarino; the rell all alono-. both from other Authors, and fuch Obfervations of my own as occurr'd upon the Subjed. »
Some perhaps may thin^ the frequent and long Rotations tedious, and introduced only to ftuff up. . 1 can only anfwer that the Notes, and Refe- rences together, were intended to point out a fort of Compendium of Mctaphyjics or Speculative Divinity, bv direfting; the Reader to a Set of true Notions on the various Subjeds which our Author touch'd upon, and which could not be found in any one particular Book, nor' collected from feveral, without much Trouble, and Confufion, and unneceffary Reading. I chofe rather to quote the very Words of the Au- thors than either to uie worfe of my own, or pretend to difcover what had been often difcover'd before; or to repeat the fame things over and over again, which is endlefs. 'Tis hop'd the Reader will find that a citation of two or more Authors on the fame Point is not always Tautology: and I believe it will appear th.at in the multitude of References no more than one is ever made to the fame Place, except up- on a very different Occafion, or in feme different Lig;ht. A Writer often does more good by fhewing the Ufe of fome of thofe many Volumes which we have already, than by offcrmg new ones; tho' this be of much lefs Advantage to his own Charader. I ' determin'd therefore not to fay any thing myfelf where I could bring another conveniently to fay it for me ;
and
• P R E FA C E. xvli
and tranfcrlbed only fo much from others as was judg'd abfolutely neceiTary to give the Reader a fliort View of the Subjecin:, and by that Sketch to induce thofe who have leifure, opportunity and inclination, to go farther and confult the Originals ; and to afford fome prefent Satisfa<fi;ion to thofe who have not.
Since the publication of the former Edition, Arch- bhhop Kifigs Relations have obliged me with a large Colledion of his Papers on the fame Subjed: both in Lati?! and EfigUJh. They contain an Explication and Defence of the principal parts of his Scheme, and afford very good hints for improving it in feveral points; efpecially with regard to x\\^Union of the Soul and Body, and their mutual hifaience ; to Hu- man Liberty ; to the State of Adam in ParadiJ'e, and the Confequences of his Fall. The lafl of thefe is alfo fully difcufs'd in the Setmon annex'd, which the Author had order'd to be printed after his deceafe, and which cannot but be acceptable to the Public. Thefe advantaged' encourag'd me to review the whole and endeavour to complete the Author's defign. To make room for the neceffary Additions, I omitted all his Notes to the firft Chapter, as well as fome of my own which had no immediate relation to the main Subjedi. I have compared the Latin and Eng- liili Papers together on each head, and give the Ar- gument made up from them both. What is extradl- ed from them I have fet down by way of Note un- der thofe parts of the Book which treat on the fame things, with Capital Letters prefix'd to diftinguifh them from all the reft, which I am anfwerable for.
The great Value which the Author fet upon this Work appears from the pains he has taken to vindi- cate it from <ivery the leaft cavil j in which view tU
that
0^
Xviii PRE FA C E. *
that he has v.'roie would make a much larger Volume than his firfl. It was my intention to reduce it to as fmall a compaTs as poilible by infer ting no more than what feem'd to give light to his main Scope and was >^fufficiently clear. -/-He begins with an account of the prefenc liate of the Controverfy about the Origin of Evil, and offers many Arguments againil the fuppo- iition of an abfolutely Evil Principle, mofi: of which are omitted, fmce few, if any, thinking Perfons now-a-days can be imagin'd to embrace fo extrava- gant an Hypothefis, and therefore it requires but little confutation. In the next place he lays down a fummary of the chief Principles on which his Book is built, and then proceeds to rank his Adverfaries into their feveral Clailes, and confider the various Arguments which they have urg'd againft him. The fubftance of his Anfwers, efpecially to fuch Obje(5tions as have been either omitted, or but flightly touch'd upon in the former Edition, will be given in their proper Places. The general view bf his Scheme as laid down by himfelf, may perhaps be not difagree- able to the Reader before he enters on the Book, and is as follows,
I . Ali Creatures are necejfarily imperfeSi a?jd af
infinite dijhince from the Eerfe^ion of the Deity, and
if a negative Principle were to he admitted, fuch as
tlje P R i V A r I O N oftJje P E R I P AT E T I C S,
it might be fciid that every created Being confifts of
Exigence and Non-Exiflence j for it is nothing in re-
fpcFc' both of tJjofe perfections which it wants, and of
-t^thoje which ot/jers have. -^Ind tins D^feSt, or as we
may fay. Mixture of INJON-ENTITY in the
Confftution of created Beings is the necefjary Priij-^
cipU
PREFACE. xix
cipk of all Natural Evils, a?id of a pojjlbility of Mo- ral ones ; as, will appear in the fequel.
2. An Equality of PerfeBion in the Creatures is impofibky [as our AdverJ'aries alloiv) I add, neither ivou d it he fo convenient to place all in the fame fate of PerfeSfion.
3 . It is agreeable to Divine Wifdom and Goodiiefs to have created not only the more perfeB Beings, but alfo the moft imperfedt, fuch as Matter, fo long as they are better than nothings and no impediment to the more perfeSl ones.
4. Admitting Matter and Motion there necejfarily follows Compofition and Difolution of Bodies, that is
Generation and Corruption-, which fome may look up- on as defeBs in the Divine work ; and yet it is no ObjeBion to his Goodfiefs or Wifdom to create fuch thi?igs as are neceffarily attended with thefe Evils, blowing therefore God to be infinitely powerjul, good and wife, yet it is manifefi that fome Evils, vix. Ge~ ration and Corruption, and the necejfary Confluences of thefe, might have place in his Works ; a}id if even one Evil coud arife without the ill Principle, why not many ? And if we knew the nature and circmji- fiances of all things as well as we do thofe of Matter ftnd Motion, it may be prefunid that we coud account for them without any i?nputation of the Divine Attri- butes. For there' s the fame reafon for them all, and one Inftance to the contrary deflroys an univerfal Pro- poftion.
5. // is not inconfijlent with the Divine Attributes to have created fome Spirits or thinking Subfiances, which are dependant on Matter and Motio?i in their Operations, and being united to Matter may both move their Bodies and be affcBed with certain Pajjions and
b Senfations
^,
XX PREFACE,
Sen fat ion 5 by their Mot ion ^ and jl and in need of a certain dijpofition of Organs for the proper exercife of their thinking faculty j fuppofing the number of thofe that are quite fepar ate from Matter to be as comp/eat as the Syftejn of the whole Vniverfe laou'd admits and that the lower order is tw incowoenience to the higher.
6. It cannot be co?icei'v'd but that fome fe?ij'ations thus excited by Matter and Motion Jhoud be dif agree- able and tend to difohe the union between Soul and Body, as well as others agreeable. For 'tis impojjible as well as inconvenient that the Soul jlmid feel itfelf to be lofing its faculty of thinking, which alone can make it happy, and not be afeBed with it. Now di [agree able fenfation is to be reckon d atnong natural Evils, which yet cannot be avoided without removing fuch kind of Atiimals out of nature. If ajiy one ask why fuch a Law of Union was ejlablifjd ? Let this be his anfwer -, Becaufe there cotid be no better. For fuch a necejjity as this flows from the very nature of the uni- en of things, and confidering the circumftanccs and conditions imder which, and which only they coiid have exifence, they coiid neither be placed in a better State, nor govertid by more commodious Laws. Thefe Evils therefore are not inconfijient with the Divine Attributes, provided that the Creatures which are fubjeSl to them enjoy juch benefits ds over-ballance them, 'T^is to be obfervd alfo that thefe Evils do not properly arife from the Exiftence which God gave to the Crea- tures, but jrom hence that they had not more of Exif- tence given them, which neverthelefs their State and the place they fill in the great Machine of the World CQU d not ad?nit . This Mixture therefore of Non-ex- ijlencefupplies the place of an ill Frinciple in the Ori^ gin of Evil, as was f aid before^
y, The
PREFACE. xxi
7. ^be Happinefs and Perfetlion of every thing or Agent ar'ifes from the due Excrcfe of thofe Faculties which God has given it, and the more Faculties and PerfeBions any thing has, 'tis capable of the greater and more perfect Happinefs.
8. T'he lej's dependent on external things, the more felffuficient any Agent is, and the more it has the principle of its Anions in itfelf, 'tis fo fnuch the more perfect j Since therefore we may conceive two Sorts of Agents, one which do not ail, unlefs impell'd and det er mill d by external force the other which have the Principle of their Anions within themfelves and can determine themfelves to aBion by their own natural Power : 'tis plain that the latter are much more per-
feB than the former. Nor can it be denyd but that God may create an Agent with fuch a power as this, which can exert itfelf itito aBion, without either the concourfe of God or the determination oj external Cau-
fes, fo long as God by a general Concourfe preferves the Extflence, Powers and Faculties of that Agent,
9. Such an Agent may prejcribe to itfelf an End, and profectite it by proper Means and take delight in the profecution of it, thd that end might be perfeBly indifferent to it before it was propofed, and be no more agreeable than any other of the fame or a different kind woud be, if the Age?7t had once refolvd to profecute it, Forfince all the pleafure or happinefs which we receive, arifcs from the due exercife of our Faculties^ every thing which is equally commodious for the exer^ cife of our faculties, will give us the fame delight. 'The reafon therefore why one thing pleafes above another is
founded in the AB of the Agent himfelf, viz. his Elec* tion. This is largely explain d in the Book itfelf, to-
b 2 gether
xxii PREFACE.
gether with the limits within which it is conjinedy and Jhall be illiiflrated more fully her e aft e?-.
10. It is impojjible that all things Jljoii d agree to ally that is be good; for fine e the things are limited ^ diflincl and different one from another ^ and are en- dow d with finite y dijlinB and different appetites ^ it neceffarily follows that the relations of cont'efiieftt and inconvetiient mufi arife from this di've?fity. Since therefore every created being isjrom the imperfeBion of its nature neceffarily limit ed^ and from that limi- tation there neccfjarily follows diftin^ion and diver-
fity, 2t follows that a pojjibility at leafl of Evil is a ne- cejfary attendant on all Creatures, and cannot he fe- parated from them by any Power, JVifdom or Good- nefs whatfoever. For when a thing is applied to afi Appetite or Being to which it is not appropriated, as it is not agreeable to it, it necejfarily affeSis it with iineafinefs \ nor was it pofible that all things foud be appropriated to every Being, where the things them- felves and the appetites are various and different ^ as they 7nujl neceffarily be, if created, evefi in the mofl perfeB ?nanner.
1 1 . Si?ice fome Agents have a power over their Ac- tions, as above, and can pleafe the?nfelves in the choice offuch thi?igs as may exercife their faculties j and fine e there are fome ways of exercifing them which may be prejudicial to themf elves or others -, 'tis plain that front this power there arifes a poff.bility of choofuig amifsy and they ma\ exercife thcmfelves to their own preju-^ dice or that of others.
12. And fine e infuch a variety of things thofe that are beneficial or hurtful cannot be known by an intel- ligent Joeing which is in its own nature limited and imperjediy it was agreeable to the Divine JVifdom and
Goodnefs
PREFACE. xxlii
Goodnefs to prefcribe fome Rides and DireBiofis toftich aoents^ in order to inform them of what woii'd bene^ fit or incommode them and their Fellow Creatures^ i. e. what woud be good or evil ; that they might choofe the one and avoid the other.
13. Since therefore, as was faid before^ an Equa- lity of PerfeBions in the Creatures is impoffible^ nei- ther woud it be convenient for them to be placed in the fame State of PerfeSlion, it follows that there are ■ various Orders and Degrees even among intelligent Creatures ; and fine e fome of the inferior Orders and Degrees are capable ofthofe benefits which the fuperior ones enjov, and fine e there are as many placed in. thofe fuperior Orders as the Syjtem of the Univerfe allowed, itjollows that the inferior ones, as a more convenient place coud not be left for them, ought to be content with a lower portion of Happinefs, which their nature makes them capable of, and to a higher than which they coud not afpire without detriment to the fuperior which poffeffes that Station. For he mujl quit his place before another can afcendto it; and it jeems hard and ^ery inconfiftent with the nature of God to degrade a Superior as long as he has done nothing to deferve it. But if one of a fuperior Order fo all by his own aB, without any violence or compulfion, voluntarily quit his place, or freely choofe fuch things as deferve a De- gradation, God wou'd feem unjuft to thofe who are in an inferior Degree and by a good ufe of their Liberty become fit and qualify d for a fuperior State, if he jlmid refufe them the free ufe of their Choice. It feems unjuft for God to condemn or degrade any one ar- bitrarily, but he is not to be blamed for fuffering one to degrade himfelf by his own a£l and choice, ejpecially when the ufe of that eleBive power belongs to the na^
b 3 t^T^^
xxiv PREFACE.
titre of an intelligent Beings and coiid not in the prefent fiate be prohibited ivitkout detriment to fome ether.
Here the IViJdom ond Gccdnefs of God feem to haTe exerted thc?}ifelves in a mo ft glorious manner^ the contri- 'vance appears to be the effcdl of the highefl Policy and Pmidence. For by this means God has jl^ewn himfelj- mofi equitable to his Creatures ; fo that no one can com^ plain oj or glory in his lot. He that is in a lefs conve- nient Situation has no room for complaint , fince he is en- dow d with faculties and has power to ufe them in fuch a manner as to acquire a more commodious one ; and he mufi be forced to own himfelf only in the fault if he con- tinues deprived of it : and he that is now in a fuperior kit ate may learn to fear left he fall from it by an unlaw- ful ife of his faculties. 'The Superior therefore has a Dread that may in fome meafure dlminiftj his happinefsy and the inferior Hope that may increafe it-, by which means they are both brought nearer to an equality^ and in the mean time have the utmoft provocation and incite- ment to choofe the beft, and make the mo ft beneficial ufe of their faculties. This Cont eft ^ if I mi ft a ke not , makes for the good of the Univerf\ and much more than if all things were fixd by Fate and Ncceftit\\ and abjo- lutely confined to their prefent State. Either God muft have created no free Agents to be governed by the hope of rewards and fear of puiiifijments, or this will be the fit t eft means to that end, and worthy of a God. For what ground is there to complain of the Deity in this whole affair ; except that when an equal ftoare of happinefs coud not befal every one^ he beftows the beft on fuch as ife their faculties aright^ and takes away what he had given from thofe that ab ufe them": But more of this hereafter »
PREFACE. XXV
14. If what is laid down above be true^ from thence ^tismanifeji that all kinds of Evil ^ viz. that 0/" IM- PERFECTION, PAIN ana SIN may enter into a world made by the mojl wife good and powerful Author^ and that its Origin ?nay be accounted for with- out {falling in the ajjiftance of an Evil Principle .
15, ^'i is plain that we are tied down to this Earth and cojifined in it^ as in a Pj'ifon, and that our Know- ledge does not extend beyond the Ideas which we receive
from the Senfes ; and who knows not how fmall a part we underfland even of thofe Elements about which we are converfant ? But fince the whole Mafs of Elements is as a Point in regard to the whole Univerfe, is it any wonder if we mijiake when %ve are forming a judgment^ or rather a conjeBure^ concerning the beauty^ order and Goodnefs of the Whole fro?n this contemptible Particle f T^his Earth of ours may be the Du7igcon of the XJniverfe^ an Hofpital of Madmen or a Work-houfe of reprobates^ and yet fuch as it is, there is much ?nore both of natural and Moral Good than Evil to be found in it.
T'hus far has the Controverfy about the Origin of Evil proceed in the Author s Book. For all that has been faid above is either exprejly contaiiid in ity or may very eafly be deduced from the Principles there laid down,
P. S. The Perfons to whom I am more particu- larly obliged for the Papers abovemention'd, are the Reverend Mr Spence Redlor of Donnaghmore^ and the Reverend Mr. King Prebendary of St. Pat}'ick\ and Minifter of St. Brides Dublin : who are defired to accept of this Acknowledgement, and to excufe the Freedom I here take of informing the Public, to whom I eileem it as well a? myfelf indebted.
b 4 The
xxvi PREFACE,
The Author of the following DilTertatlon is well known, but I cannot have leave to mention him.
N, B In this third Edition the Errors of the Prefs, (which were very numerous) are carefully cor- redted, fome fmall alterations made in the Tranfla- tion and Notes, and a few additions in the Referen- ces to Authors, fuch more efpecially as have ap- pear'd fmce the former Edition,
PRELI.
XXVll
PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION.
Concerning the
Fundamental Principle
o F
VJR7VE or MORAllfr.
THO' all Writers of Morality have in the main agreed what particular Aaions are virtuous and what otherwife yet they have, or at lealt feem to have differ'd very much, both concerning the Criterion oi Virtue, viz. what it is which denonii- nates any Adion virtuous i or, to Ipeak more pro- perly, what it is by which we mull try any Adtion \Qknow whether it be virtuous or no ; and alio con- cerning the Principle or Motive by which Men are induced to purfue Virtue. .
As to the former, fome have placed it in aoting agreeably to Nature, or Reajon j others in the titnejs of things; others in a Conformity with ^^^^^-^^ ^^.^ in promoting the Conijnon Good; others in the ^ViU of God, &c. This Difagreement of Moralifts con- cernino; the Rule or Criterion of Virtue in general, and at the fame time their almoft perfect Agreement concerning the particular Branches of it, would be
xxvii Preliminary Dijferfahon,
jipt to make one fufped, either that they had a dif- ferent Criterion (the' they did not know or attend to it) from what they profefs'd ; or (which perhaps is the true as well as the more favourable Opinion) that they only talk a different Language, and that all of them have the fame Criterion in reality, only they have exprcfs'd it in different Words.
And there will appear the more room for this Conjediure, if we confider the Ideas themfelves about which Morality is chiefly convcrfant, viz. that they are all mixed Modes^ or compound Ideas arbitrarily put together, having at firft no Archetype or Origi- nal exifting, and afterwards no other than that which exifts in other Men's Minds. Now fince Men, un- lefs they have thefe their compound Ideas, which are fignify'd by the fame Name, made up precifely of the lame fimple ones, muft neceffarily talk a dif- ferent Language; and fince this difference is fo dif- ficult, and in fome Cafes impoffible to be avoided, it follows that greater Allowance and Indulgence ought to be given to thefe Writers than any other : and that (if we have a mind to underfland them) we fhould not always take their Words in the com- mon Acceptation, but in the Senfe in which we find that particular Author which we are reading ufed ^them. f And if a Man interpret the Writers of Mo- rality with this due Candor, I believe their feeming* Inconfiftcncies and Difagreements about the Crite- rion of Virtue, would in a great meafure vanifli ; ^and he would find that aBing agreeably to Nature, or ReaJo?7, (when rightly underllood) would perfectly coincide with the Fititefs of things -, the Fitnefs of things (as far as thefe Words have any meaning) with
Tirutb \
Treliminary Dijfertation, xxix
^ruth ; Truth with the Common Good-, and the Com- mon Good with the Will of God,
But whether this Difference be real, or only ver- bal, a Man can fcarce avoid obferving from it, that Mankind have the Ideas of moll particular Virtues, and alfo a confufed Notion of Virtue in general, be- fore they have any Notion of the Criterion of it, or ever did, neither perhaps can they, deduce all or any of thofe Virtues from their Idea of Virtue in general, or upon any rational Grounds ihew how thofe Actions (which the World call Moral, and moft, if not all Men evidently have Ideas of) are diftinguifh'd from other A(5tions, or why they approve of thofe Adtions call'd Moral ones, more than others.
But fince the Idea of Virtue among all Men (how- ever they differ in other refpedts) includes either ta- citly or exprefly, not only the Idea of Approbation as the Confeqi;ence of it ; but alfo that it is to every one, and in all Circumftances, an Objed: oi Choice ', it is incumbent on all Writers of Morality, to fhew that that in which they place Virtue, whatever it be, not only always will or ought to meet with Ap- probation, but alfo that it is always an Object of Choice ; which is the other great Difpute among Mo- ralifls, 'vix. What is the Principle or Motive by which Men are induced to purfue Virtue.
For fome have imagin'd that that is the only Ob- jedt of Choice to a rational Creature, which upon the whole will produce more Happinefs than Mifery to the Choofer ; and that Men are and ought to be guided wholly by this Principle ; and farther, that Virtue will produce more Happinefs than Mifery and therefore is always an Objed; of Choice: and what- ever is an Objed: of Choice, That we approve of.
But
XXX Preliminary DiJJeriation.
But this, however true in Theory, is Infufficient to account for Matter of Fa(5l, /". e. that the genera- lity of Mankind do approve of Virtue, or rather virtuous Actions, without being able to give any Reafon for their Approbation j and alfo, that fome purfue it without knowing that it tends to their own private Happinefs ; nay even when it appears to be inconfiftent with and def}:ru(5tive of their Happinefs.
And that this is matter of Facl, the ingenious Author of the Enquiry into the Original of our Idea of Virtue has fo evidently made appear by a great Variety of Inftances, that a Man mull be either very little acquainted with the World, or a mere Hobhifi in his Temper to deny it.
And therefore to folve thefe two Difficulties, this excellent Author has fuppofed (without proving^ unlefs by ihewing the infufficiency of all other Schemes) a Moral Senfe to account for the form.er, and a puhlick or bene"Jole}2t Affeciion for the latter : And thefe, viz. the Moral Senfe and Public AfFedi- on, he fuppofes to be implanted in us like Infti?i£ls^ independent of Reafon, and previous to any Inftruc- tion ; and therefore his Opinion is. that no account can be given, or ought to be expe<fted of them, any more than we pretend to account for the Pleafure or Pain which arifes from Senfation ; i. e. Why any particular Motion produced in our Bodies fhould be' accompany'd with Pain rather than Pleafure, and "uice ver/a. ^
But this Account feems ftill infufficient, rather cutting the Knot than untying it, and if it is not a- kin to the Dodrine of Innate Ideas, yet I think it reliffies too much of that of Occult ^lalities. This ingenious Author is certainly in the right in his Obr
fervations
Preliminary Dijfertation. xxxi
fervations upon the Infufficiency of the commoii Methods of accounting for both our Ekaion and Apprvbation of Moral Adions and rightly inters the Neceffity of fuppofing a Moral Senfe {i, e. a Power or Faculty whereby we may perceive any Adion to b- an Objed of Approbation, and the Agent of Love) and public Affedions, to account for the principal Anions of human Life. But then by calling thefe Inftinas, I think he ftops too foon, imagining him- felf at the Fountain-head, when he might have tra- ced them much higher, even to the true Principle of all our Anions, our own Happinejs,
And this will appear by fliewing that our Ap- probation of Morality, and all AfFedions whatlo- ever are finally refolvable into Reajon pointing out pri^^te Happitiefs, and are converiant only about things apprehended to be means tending to this end; and that whenever this end is not perceived, they are to be accounted for from the Affociation of Ideas, and may properly enough be call'd Habits.
For if this be clearly made out, the neceffity of fuppofing a Moral Senfe or public AfFedions to be implanted in us, fmce it arifeth only from the Infuf- ficiency of all other Schemes to account for human Aaions will immediately vanilh. But whether it he made out or no, we may obferve in general, that all Arguments ad Ig72orantiam, or that proceed a Remotione only (as this, by which the Moral Senfe and public Affedions are eftablifh'd to be Inilinds, evidently does) are fcarce ever perfedly fatisfadory, being for the moft part fubjed to this Doubt, 'viz. Whether there is a full Enumeration of all the Parts; and liable alfo to this Objedion, viz. That tho' I
cannot
xxxii Pf'eliminary Dijj'ertatiou.
cannot account for Phenomena other wile, yet pofii-
bly they may be otherwife accounted for.
But before we can determine this Point, it will be neceffary to fettle all the Terms : We fliall in the firft place therefore enquire what is meant by the Criterion of Virtue.
SECT. I.
Co?icer7ting the Criterion of Virtue.
TH E Criterion of any thing is a Rule or Mea- fure by a Conformity with which any thing is known to be of this or that fort, or of this or that desree. And in order to determine the Criterion of any thing, we mufl firft know the thing whofe Cri- terion we are feeking after. For a Meafure prefup- pofes the Idea of the thing to be meafured, otherwife it could not be known (fince what is the proper Mea- fure of one thing is not fo of another) whether it was fit to meafure it or no. Liquids, Cloth, and Flefh, have all different Meafuresj Gold and Silver different Touchfi:ones. This is very intelligible, and the Me- thod of doing it generally clear, when either the Quantity or Kind of any particular Subftance is thus to be afcertain'd.
But when we extend our Enquiries after a Criteri- on for abftra6t, mix'd Modes, which have no Exif- tence but in our Minds, and are fo very different in different Men j we are apt to be confounded, and
fearch
Prekminary Dijjerfation. xxxiii
fearch after a Meafiire for we know not what. For unlefs we are firft agreed concerning the thing to be meafur'd, we fliall in vain expert to agree in our Criterion of it, or even to underfland one another.
But it may be faid, if we are exadly agreed in any mix'd Mode, what need of any Criteriouy or what can we want farther ? What we want farther, and what we mean by the Criterion of it is thisj ^iz. to know whether any inferior or particular thing do be- long to this mix'd Mode or no. And this is a very proper Enquiry. For let a Man learn the Idea of Intemperance from you never fo clearly, and if you pleafe let this be the Idea, viz. the Eating or Drink- ing to that degree as to injure his Underftanding or Health ; and let him alfo be never fo much convinc'd of the Obligation to avoid it ; yet it is a very perti- nent Queflion in him to afk you, How fl:all I know when I am guilty of Intemperance ?
And if we examine this thoroughly, we fhall find that every little difterence in the Definition of a mix'd Mode will require a different Criterion, e.g. If Mur- der is defined the wilful taking away the Life of ano- ther, it is evident, that to enquire after the Criterion of Murder, is to enquire how we fliall know when the Life of another is taken away wilfully j i. e. when one who takes away the Life of another does it with that malicious Defign which is implied by Wilful- nefs. But if Murder be defined the Guilty taking away the Life of another, then to enquire after the Criterion of Murder, is to enquire how it fhall be known when Guilt is con traded in the taking away the Life of another. So that the Criterion of Mur- der, according to one or other of thefe Definitions, will be different. For Wilfulnefs perhaps will be
made
XXX iv Frcliminary Differtation.
made the Criterion of Guilt, but Wilfulnefs itfelf,
if it want any, mud have fome farther Criterion, it
being evident tliat nothing can be the Meafure of
itfelf.
If the Criterion is contain'd in the Idea itfelf, then it is merely nominal^ e. g. If Virtue is defined. The ai^ting agreeably to the Will of God: To fay the Will of God is the Criterion of Virtue, is only to lay, what is agreeable to the W^ill of God is called Virtue. But the real Criterion, which is of fome life, is this. How (hall I know what the Will of God is in this refpedl ?
From hence it is evident, that the Criterion of a mix'd Mode is neither the Definition of it, nor con- tain'd in it, For, as has been ihewn, the general Idea is neceflarily to be fix'd; and if the Particulars comprehended under it are fix'd or known alfo, there remains nothing to be meafured, becaufe we meafure only things unknown. The general Idea then being fix'd, the Criterion which is to meafure or determine Inferiors, rnuft be found out and proved to be a proper Rule or Meafure, by comparing it with the general Idea only, independent of the inferior things to which it is to be apply d. For the truth of the Meafure mufl be proved independently of the Parti- cular to be meafured, otherwife we Ihall prove in a Circle.
To apply what has been faid in general to the Cafe in liand. Great Enquiry is made after the Criterion oi Virtue J but it is to be fear'd that few know dif- tindly what it is they are enquiring after j and there- fore this mud be clearly ftattd. And in order to this, we mull (as lias been ihewn) firll fix our Idea of Virtue, and that exa(5tly,; and then our Enquiry
v/ill
Prelifhinary "Differfailon, xxxv.
will be, how we (liall know this or that lefs general or particular Action to be comprehended under Vir- tue. For unlets our Idea of \'irtue is fix'd, we en- quire after the Criterion of we know not what. And this our Idea of Virtue, to give any Satisfadion, ought to be fo general as to be conformable to that which all or mod Men are fuppoled to have. And this general Idea, I think, may be thus exprefs'd.
Virtue is the Conformity to a Ride of Lije^ diredl- ing the ABions of all rational Creatures with refpeSi to each other s Happinejs \ to which Conformity every one in all Cafes is obliged : and every one that does fo conform^ is or ought to be approved of, efteem'd and loved for fo doing. V/hat is here exprefs'd, I be- lieve every one, or moft, put into their Idea of Virtue.
For Virtue generally does imply fome relation to ethers: where Self is only concern'd, a Man is call'd prudent, (not virtuous) and an A6tion w^hich relates immediately to God, is ilil'd Religious.
I think alfo that all Men, whatever they make Virtue to confiflin, yet always make it to imply Obligation and Approbation.
The Idea of Virtue being thus fix'd, to enquire after the Criterion of it, is to enquire what that Rule of Life is to which we are ohlizd to conform, or how
o
that Rule is to be found out which is co diredl me in my Behaviour towards others, which ought aU ways to be purfued, and w^hich, if purfued, will or ought to procure me Approbation, Ejleem, and Love, But before I can anfwer this Enquiry: I mull: firil fee what I mean by Obligation.
c SECT.
XXXV i Preliminary Dijfertation.
SEC T. IL
Coitceritino; Oblisfation.
f\ BUgation is the necejfity ef doing or omitting any ^^ Adiion in order to be happy : i. e. when there is fuch a relation between an Agent and an Adtion that the Agent cannot be happy without doing or omitting that Adion, then the Agent is faid to be obliged to do or omit that A6lion. So that Obliga- tion is evidently founded upon the Profpe(ft of Hap- pinefSy and arifes from that'neceffary Influence which any AcJ^ion has upon prefcnt or future Happinefs or Mifery. And no greater Obligation can befuppofed to be laid upon a.ny Jree Agent without an exprefs Contradidion.
This Obligation may be confider'd four ways, according to the four different manners in which it is induced : Firft, that Obligation which arifeth from perceiving the natural Confequences of things, /. e. the Confequences of things ading according to the fix'd Laws of Nature, may be call'd Natural. Se- condly, that ariiing from Merit or Demerit, as pro- ducing the Efteem and Favour of our Fellow Crea- tures, or the contrary is ufually failed Virtuous. Thirdly, that arifing from the Authority of the Civil Magillrate, Civil. Fourthly, that from the Authority of God Religious.
Now from the Confideration of thefe four forts of Obligation (which are the only ones) ic is evident that
a full
Prelminariy Dijfertation. xxxvii
a full and complete Obligation which will extend to all Cafes, can only be that ariling from the Autho- rity oiGod', becaufe God only can in all Cafes make a Man happy or miferable: and therefore, fince we are ahvays obliged to that conformity call'd Virtue, it is evident that the immediate Rule or Criterion of it is the Will of God. But is the whole Will of God the Criterion of Virtue ? No. For tho' the whole Will of God is equally obligatory; yet, iince Virtue was defined to be the conformity to a Rule dired:ing m.y Behaviour with refpec^i to my Fellow- Creatures^ the Will of God can be no more farther concern'd about Virtue, than as it direds me in that Behaviour.
The next Enquiry therefore is, v/hat that Will of God in this particular is, or what it direds me to do ?
Now it is evident from the Nature of God, "oiz, his being infinitely happy in himfelf from all Eter- nity, and from his Goodnefs manifeiled in his Works, that he could have no other Defign in creating Man- kind than their Happinefs ; and therefore he wills their Happinefs ; therefore the means of their Hap- pinefs : therefore that my Behaviour, as far as it may be a means of the Happinefs of Mankind, fliould be fuch. Here then we are got one Step farther, or to a new Criterion : not to a new Criterion of Virtue immediately^ but to a Criterion of the Will of God, For it is an Anfwer to the Enquiry, How ihall I know what the W~ill of God in this particular is ? Thus the Will of God is the immediate Criterion of Virtue, and the FLippinefs of Mankind the Criteri- on of the Will of God -, and therefore the Happinefs
c 2 of
XXXV iii Preliminary Dijferfation.
of Mankind may be laid to be the Criterion of Vir- tue, but once remcoed.
And fmce I am to do whatever lies in my Powe-r towards promoting the Happinefs of Mankind, the next Enquiry is, what is the Criterion of this Hap- pinefs: 1. e. How fliall I know what in my Power is, or is not, for the Happioefs of Mankind ?
Now this is to be known only from the Relations of things, (which Relations, with Refpeft to our prefent Enquiry, fome have call'd their Fitncfs and Unfitnefs.) For fome Things and Adions are apt to produce Pleafure, others Pain j fome are conve- nient, others inconvenient for a Society ; fome are for the good of Mankind ; the others to be avoided.
Thus then we are got one flep farther, viz. to the Criterion of the Happinefs of Mankind. And from this Criterion we deduce all particular Virtues and Vices.
The next Enquiry is, How fliall I know that there is this Fitnefs and Unfitnefs in things ? or if there be, how fliall I difcover it in particular Cafes ? And the Anfwer is, either from Experience or Reafon. You either perceive the Inconveniencies of fome Things and Adions when they happen ; or you forefee them by contemplating the Nature of the Things and Ad:ions.
Thus the Criterion of the Fitnefs or Unfitnefs of things may in general be faid to be Reafon : which Reafon, when exadly conformable to the things ex- ifling, i. e. when it judges of things as they are, is called Right Reafon. And hence alfo we fometimes talk of ihe Reajb^t of thi'gs^ i. e properly fpeaking, that Relation which we fliould find out by our Rea- fon, if our Reafon was right.
The
preliminary Dijfertation. xxxlx
The expreffing by outward Signs the Relations of things as they really are, is called ^ruth, and hence by the fame kind of Metaphor, we are apt to talk of the T'ruth, as well as Reafin of things Both bx- preffions mean the fame : which has often made me wonder why fome Men who cry up Rea/hn as the Criterion of Virtue, fl.ould yet diflike Mr. WoUa^ lions Notion of rruth being its Criterion _
The Truth is, all thefe juft mentioned, ^oiz. the Happinefs of Mankinds the Relations, or titnels and Unfitnefs of things; Reafon and 1 ruth ; naay in fome fenfe be faid to be Criterions of \ irtue ; but it mult always be remember'd that they are only re^ mote Criterions of it, being gradually fubordinate to it's immediate Criterion, the Will of God,
And from hence we may perceive the Kealon ot what I fuggeiled in the beginning of this Treatile, ^iz That theDifpute between Moralifts about the Criterion of Virtue, is more in Words than Meaning ; and that this Diiference between them has been occa- fion'd by their dropping the immediate Criterion, and choofing fome a more remote, fome a leis re- mote one. And from hence we may fee alio the In- convenience of defining any mix'd Mode by its Cri- terion. For that in a great meafure has occafion d all this Confufion, as may eafily be made appear m all the pretended Criterions of Virtue above men- tioned. J , Thus thofe who either exprelly exclude, or don t mention the Will of God, making the immediate Criterion of Virtue to be the Good of Mankind ; muft either allow that Virtue is not in all Cafes obit- ^atorv (contrary to the Idea which all or molt Men ^ ^ ^ '' have
xl Treliminary Dijfertation.
have of it) or they muft fay that the Good of Man- kind is a lufficicnt Obligation. But how can the Good of Mankind be any Obligation to ?}it\ when perhaps in particular Cafes, fuch as laying down my Life, or the like, it is contrary to my Happinefs,
Thofe who drop the Flappinefs of Mankind, and talk of the Relations, the Fitnefs and Unfitnefs of Things, are ftill more remote from the true Crite- rion. For Fitnefs without relation to fomc Etid^ is fcarce intelligible.
Reafon and Truth come pretty near the Relations of things, becaufe they manifeflly prefuppofe them j but are ftill one flcp farther from the immediate Criterion of Virtue.
What has been faid concerning the Criterion of Virtue as including our Oblioation to it, may per- haps be allow'd to be true, but flill it will be urg'd, that 'tis infufficient to account for matter of Fad:, *viz. that moft Perfons, who are either ignorant of, or never confider'd thefe Deductions, do however purfue Virtue themfelves and approve of it in others. I fliall in the next place therefore give fome account of our Approbations and Affedions.
SECT. III.
Concerinnp' Anprobation a'/id Afteclion.
^
MAN is not only ^fcnfihlc Creature, not only capable of Pleafure and Pain, but capable al- fo Qi forcj'ecing this Pleafure and Pain in the future
confe-
Preliminary Dijferfafion. xli
confequences of Things and Actions; and as he is capable of knowing, fo alfo of governing or dire(5t- ing the Caufes of them, and thereby in a great mea- fure enabled to avoid the one and procure the other : whence the Principle of all Acflion. And therefore, as Pleafure and Pain are not indifferent to him, nor out of his Power, he purfues the former and avoids the latter ; and therefore alfo thofe things which are Caufes of them are not indifferent, but he purfues or avoids them alfo, according to their diffent Ten- dency. That which he purfues for his own fake, which is only Pleafure, is called an End; that which he apprehends to be apt to produce Pleafure, he calls Good, and approves of, i e. judges a proper means to attain his end, and therefore looks upon it as an Objedt of choice ; and that v/hich is pregnant with Mifery he difapproves of and fliles Evil. And this Good and Evil are not only barely approved of, or the contrary, but whenever view'd in Imagination (fmce Man confiders himfelf as exiding hereafter, and is concern'd for his Welfare then as well as now) they have 2iprejent Pleafure or Pain annex'd to them, proportionable to what is apprehended to follow them m real Exiftence ; v/hich Pleafure or Pain arifmg from the profpedl of future Pleafure or Pain is pro- perly call'd Paffion^ and the Defire confequent there- upon, ^ffeciion.
And as by refleding upon Pleafure there arifes in our minds a Defre of it ; and on Pain, an Averfon from it (which neceffarily follows from fuppoiing us to be fenfible Creatures, and is no more than faying, that all things are not indifferent to us) fo alfo by re- £c<^ing upon Good or Evil, the fame Defires and
c 4 Averlions
xlii Prelim'uiary Differtation.
Averlions are excited, and are didinguifhd into Lo've and Hatred. And from Love and Hatred va- rioufly modify'd, arife all thofe other Defires and Aversions which are promifcuouily fliled Paffions or Affections ; and are generally thought to he im- planted in our Nature originally^ like the Power of receiving Pleafure or Pain. And when placed on inanimate Objeds, are thefe following, Hope, Fear, Defpair and its oppofite, for which we want a Name.
SECT. IV.
Approbation and JifeBion co7ifiderd with regard to Merit, or the Law of Efteem.
IF a Man in the purfuit of Pleafure or Hnppinefb (by which is meant the Sum total of Pleafure) had to do only with inanimate Creatures, his Appro- bation and Affe<5lions would he as defcribed in the foregoing Section. But, fmce he is dependent with refped: to his Happinefs, not only in thefe but alfo on rational Agents, Creatures like himfclf, which have the Power of governing or directing Good and Evil, and of ad:ing for an End ; there will arife dif- ferent means of Happinefs, and confequently diffe- rent Purfuits, tho' tending to the fame End, Hap- pinefs ; and therefore different Approbations and Ai- fedions, and the contrary \ which deferve particu- larly to be confider'd.
That
Prdimijiary T)iJfertation. xliii
That there will arife diiferent means of Happinefs, is evident from hence, ^iz. that Rational Agents, in being fubfervient to our Happinefs, are not pailive but voluntary. And therefore fince we are in pur- fuit of that to obtain which we apprehend the con- currence of their Wills neceflary, v/e cannot but approve of whatever is apt to procure this Concur- rence. And that can be only the Pleafure or Pain expedled from it by them. And therefore, as I per- ceive that my Happinefs is dependent on others, I cannot but judge whatever I apprehend to be proper to excite them to endeavour to promote my Happi- nefs, to be a means of Happinefs, i. e. I cannot but approve it. And fince the annexing Pleafure to their Endeavours to promote my Happinefs is the only thing in my Power to this end, I cannot but approve of the annexing Pleafure to fuch Adions of theirs as are undertaken upon my account. Hence to ap- prove of a Rational Agent as a means of Happinefs is different from the Approbation of any other means, becaufe it implies an Approbation alfo of an Endea- vour to promote the Happinefs of that Agent, in or- der to excite him and others to the fame concern for my Happinefs for the future.
And becaufe what we approve of we alfo defire (as has been fliewn above) hence alfo we def.re the Happinefs of any Agent that has done us good. And therefore hove or Hatred, when plac'd on a rational Objed, has this difference from the Love or Hatred of other things, that it implies a defire of, and con- fequently a pleafure in the Happinefs of the Objed beloved 3 or if hated, the contrary.
The
xliv Preliminary Dijfertation.
The Foundation of this Approbation and Love (which, as we have feen, confifts in his voluntary contributing to our Happinefs) is called the Merit of the Agent fo contributing, /. e. that whereby he is entitled (upon fuppofition that we ad: like rational, fociable Creatures, like Creatures, whoTe Happinefs is dependent on each other's Behaviour) to our Ap- probation and Love : Demerit the contrary.
And this AfFedion or Qu_aliry of any Adion v/hich we call Merit is very confident with a Man's a6ling ultimately for his own private Happinefs. For any particular Action that is undertaken for the fake of another^ is meritorious, i. e. deferves Efteem, Favour, and Approbation from him for whofe fake it was undertaken, towards the Doer of it. For the Pre- fumption of fuch Efteem, ^c. was the only Motive to that Action j and if fuch Efteem, ^c. does not follow, or is prefum'd not to follow it, fuch a Per- fon is reckon'd unworthy of any favour, becaufe he fhews by his Actions that he is incapable of being obliged by Favours.
The Miftake which fome have run into, 'viz, that Merit is inconfiftent with a(fting upon private Happinefs, as an ultimate End, feems to have arifen from hence, viz. that they have not carefully enough diftinguifli'd between an inferior and ultimate End; the end of a particular A(5lion, and the end of Adlion in general: which m.ay be explained thus. Tho' Happinefs, private Happinefs, is the proper or ulti- inate End of all our Adions whatever, yet that par- ticular means of Happinefs which any particular Adlion is chiefly adapted to procure, or the thing chiefly aim'd at by that Aiftion ; the thing which, if
poflefs'd.
Preliminary Differ tation, xlv
poflefs'd, we would not undertake that Adlion, may and generally is call'd the End of that Adion. As therefore Happinefs is the general End of all Ani- ons, fo each particular Adion may be faid to have its proper and peculiar End : Thus the End of a Beau is to pleafe by his Drefs ; the End of Study, Know- ledge. But neither pleafing by Drefs, nor Know- ledge, are ultimate Ends, they ftill tend or ought to tend to fomething farther as is evident from hence, mz. that a Man may ask and exped: a Reafon why either of them are purfued : Now to afk the Reafon of any Adion or Purfuit, is only to enquire into the End of it : But to exped a Reafon, /. e. an End, to be afi^ign'd for an ultimate End, is abfur'd. To alTc why I purfue Happinefs, will admit of no other Anfwer than an Explanation of the Terms.
Why inferior E?2ds, which in reality are only Means, are too often look'd upon and acquiefc'd in as ultimate^ fliall be accounted for hereafter.
Whenever therefore the particular End of any Adion in the Happinefs of another (tho' the Agent defign'd thereby to procure to himfelf Efteem and Favour, and look'd upon that Efteem and Favour as a means of private Happinefs) that Adion is merito- rious. And the fame may be faid, tho' we defign to pleafe God by endeavouring to promote the Happi- nefs of others. But when an Agent has a view in any particular Adion diflind from my Happinefs, and that view is his only Motive to that Adion, tho* that Adion promote my Happinefs to never fo great a Degree, yet that Agent acquires no Merit ; /. e. he is not thereby entitled to any Favour and Efteem: Becaufe Favour and Efteem are due from me for any
Adion,
xlvi Preliminary Dijjertation.
no farther than that Adion was undertaken upon my account. If therefore my Happinefs is only the pre- tended End of that Adion, I am impofcd on if I believe it real, and thereby think myfelf indebted to the Agent; and I am difcharg'd from any Obligation as foon as I find out the Cheat.
But it is far othervvife when my Happinefs is the fole End of that particular Action, /. e. (as I have explain'd mylelf above) wlien the Agent endeavours to promote my Happinefs as a Means to procure my Favour, /. e. to make me fubfervient to his Happi- nefs as his ultimate End : Tho' I know he amis at my Happinefs only as a means of his own, yet this leifens not the Obligation.
There is one thing, I confefs, which makes a great alteration in this Cafe, and that is, whether he aims at my Favour in general, or only for fome particular End. Becaufe, if he aim at my Happi- nefs only to ferve himfelf in fome particular thing, the Value of my Favour will perhaps end with his obtaining that particular thing : And therefore I am under lefs Obligation {c ceteris paribus) the more/>^r- tiadar\\\^ Expectations from me are; but under Obligation I am.
!N'o\v from the various Combinations of this which "we call Merit, and its contrary, arife all thofe vari- ous Approbarions and Averfions ; all thofe Likings and Dillikings which we call Moral.
As therefore, from confidering thofe Beings which are iht ini:o!u?itary means of our Happinefs or Mife- ry, there were produced in us the Paflions or Aflec- tions of Love, Hatred, Hope, Fear, Defpalr, and its contrary : So from confidering thofe Beings v/hich
'■/oluntariy
P?'elimt72ary Dijj'^rtation. idvii
"voluntarily contribute to our Happinefs or Mifery, there arife the following. Love and Hatred, (which are different from that Love or Hatred placed on in- voluntary Beings ; that placed on involuntary Beings being only a Denre to poiTefs or avoid the thing be- loved or hated 5 but this on voluntary Agents being a Defire to give Pleafure or Pain to the Agent be- loved or hated) Gratitude, Anger, 'fometimes cali'd by one common Name, Refentment) Generofity, Ambition, Honour, Shame, Envy, Benevolence: and if there be any other they're only as thefe are, different Modifications of Love and Hatred.
Love and Hatred^ and the Foundation of them {^iz. the Agent beloved or hated being apprehended to be inflrumental to our Happinefs) I have expbin'd above. Gratitude is that Defire of promoting the Happinefs of another upon account of fome former Kindnefs received. Anger ^ that Deiire of thwarting the Happinefs of another, on account of fome for- mer Difkindnefs or Injury received. And both thefe take place, tho' we hope for, or fear nothing farther from the Objeds of either of them, and this is flill confident with adling upon a Principle of a private Happinefs.
P^or tho' we neither hope for, nor fear any thing farther from thefe particular Beings j yet the Difpo- lition fnewn upon thefe Occafions is apprehended to influence the Behaviour of other Beings towards us ; /. e. other Beings will be mov'd to promote our Hap- pinefs or otherwife, as they obferve how we refenc Favours or Injuries.
Ambition is a Defire of being efteem'd. Hence 2 Defire of B^nng thought an Objed: of Efteem ; hence
of
xlviii Preliminary Difjerfatiort.
of being an Object of Eileem, hence of doing lau- dabky i. e. ufeful Adions. Generofity^ and Benevo- lence are Species of it. Ambition in too great a De- gree is called Pride, of which there are feveral Spe- cies. The Title to the Efteem of others, which ari- feth from any meritorious Adion, is called Honour, ThePleafure arifmg from Honour being paid to us, /. e. from others acknov/ledging that we are entitled to their Efteem, is without a Name. Modefty is the fear of lofing Eileem. The Unealinefs or Paffion which arifeth from a Senfe that we have loll: it, is called Sha?ne. So that Ambition^ and all thofe other Paffions and Affedtions belonging to it. together with Shame^ arife from the Efteem of others: which is the Reafon why this Tribe of affedions operate more ftrongly on us than any other, 'viz. becaufe we per- ceive that as our Happinefs is dependent on the Beha- viour of others, fo we perceive alfo that that Beha-*- viour is dependent on the Efteem which others have conceived of US; and confequently that our acquir- ing or lofing Efteem, is in effect acquiring or lofing Happinefs, and in the higheft Degree. And the fame may be faid concerning all our other Aftedi- ons and Paffions, to enumerate which, what for want of Names to theni, and what by the confu- fion of Language about them, is almoft impof- fible.
Envy will be accounted for hereafter, for a Rea- fon which will then be obvious.
Thus having explain'd what I mean by Obligation and Approbation ; and fliewn that they are founded on and determinate in Happinefs : having alfo point- ed out the Difference between our Approbations and
Affcdions
Frehminary Differ tat ion. xlix
Affedlons as placed on involuntary and voluntary Means of Happinefs; and farther, that thefe Appro- bations and Affedlions are not innate or implanted in us by way of Injlindl, but are all acquired^ being fairly deducible from fuppoiing only fenlible and ra- tional Creatures dependent on each other for their Happinefsj as explain'd above: I fhall in the nexc place endeavour to anfwer a grand Objection to what has here been faid concerning Approbations and Af- fedions arifing from a profped: of private Happi- nefs.
T^he ObjeBion is this^
The Reafon or End of every Adion is always known to the Agent ; for nothing can move a Man but v/hat is perceived: but the generality of Man- kind love and hate, approve and difapprove, imme- diately, as foon as any moral Charader either occurs in Life, or is propofed to them, v>fithouc conlidering whether their private Happinefs is affeded with it, or no : or if they do confider any Moral Charader in relation to their own Happinefs, and find them- felves, as to their private Happinefs, unconcern'd in it, or even find their private Happinefs lefTen'd by it in fome particular Inftance, yet they ftill approve the Moral Charader, and love the Agent : nay they cannot do otherwife. "Whatever Reafon may be af- fign'd by fpeculative Men why we fliould be grateful to a Benefador, or pitty the Diflreffed; yet if the grateful or compaffionate Mind never thought of that Reafon, it is no Reafon to him. The Enquiry is not why he ought to be grateful, but why he is fo.
Thefe
I Treliminary D/jJl-rtafion,
Thefe after- reafons therefore rather fhew the Wif- dom and Providence of our Maker in implanting the immediate Powers of thefe Approbations (/. e, in Mr, Hiitchiiifou^ Language, a Moral Sefife) and thefe Pub- lic AfFeiftions in us, than give any fatisfacftory Ac- count of their Oriorin. And therefore thefe Public Affedions, and this Moral Senfe, are quite indepen- dent on private Happinefs, and in reality ad: upon us as mere Inflinds.
Anfwer^
The Matter of Fadl contain'd in this Argument, in my Opinion, is not to be contefted ; and therefore it remains either that we make the Matter of Fad: confident with what we have before laid down, or give up the Caufe.
Now, in oi-der to fiiew tliis Confiflency, I beg leave to obferve, that as in the purfuit of Truth we don't always trace every Propofition whofe Truth we are examining, to a firft Principle or Axiom, but acqui- efce, as foon as we perceive it deducible from fome known or prefumed Truth j fo in our Condud we do not always travel to the ultimate End of our Adi- eus, Ilappinejs : but reft contented, as foon as we perceive any Adion fubfervient to a known or pre- fumed Means of Happinefs. And thefe prefumed Truths and Means of Happinefs whether real or o- therwife, always influence us after the fame manner as if they were real. The undeniable Confequences of Prejudices are as firmly adhered \6 as the Confe- quences of real truths or arguments ; and what is fub- fervient to a falfe (but imagined) meails of Happinefs,
is
preliminary Differtation. li
is as induflriouily purfued as what is fubfervlent to a true one.
Now every Man, both in his Purfuic after Truth, and in his Condud has fettled and fixed a great ma- ny of thefe in his Mind, which he always ads upon, as upon Pr/;/a/>/^^, without examining. And this is occafion'd by the Narrownefs of our Underllandings : We can confider but a few things at once ; and there- fore, to run every thing to the Fountain-head would be tedious, thro' a long Series of Confequences ; to avoid this we choofe out certain Truths and Means of Happinefs, which we look upon as RESTING PLACES, which we may fafely acquiefce in in the Condud: both of our Underftanding and Pradice, in relation to the one, regarding them as Axio?ns ; in the other, as Ends. And we are more eafily inclined to this by imagining that we may fafely rely upon what we call Habitual Knowledge, thinking it need- lefs to examine what we are already fatisfy'd in. And hence it is that Prejudices, both Speculative and Pradical, are difficult to be rooted out, -viz. few will examine them.
And thefe RESTING PLACES are fo often ufed as Principles, that at laft, letting that flip out of our Minds which firft inclined us to embrace them, we are apt to imagine them not as they really are, the Siibftitiites of Principles, but Principles themfelves.
And from hence, as fome Men have imagin'd In- nate Ideas, becaufe forgetting how they came by them ; fo others have fet up almoft as many diftind InJiinBs as there are acqiiird Trinciples of ading. And I cannot but wonder why the Pecuniary Senfe, a
d Senfe
lii Freliminary Diff'erfafion.
Senfe of Power and Party, &c. were not mentlon'd, as well as the Moral, that of Honour, Order, and fome others.
The Cafe is really this. We firft perceive or ima- gine fome real Good, /. e. fitnefs to promote our Happinefs, in thofe things which we love and ap- prove of. Hence (as was above explain'd) we annex Pleafure to thofe things. Hence thofe things and Plea- fure are fo ty'd together and afTociated in our Minds, that one cannot prefent itfelf but the other will alfo occur. And the Ajfociation remains even after that which at firft gave them the Connexion is quite for- got, or perhaps does not exift, but the contrary. An Inflance or two may perhaps make this clear. How many Men are there in the World who have as flrong a talle for Money as others have for Virtue ; who count fo much Money, fo much Happinefs ; nay, even fell their Happinefs for Money j or to fpcak more properly, make the having Money, without any Deiign or Thought of ufing it, their ultimate End ? But was this Propenfity to Money born with them ? or rather, did not they at iirft perceive a great many Advantages from being poffefs'd of Money, and from thence conceive a Pleafure in having it, thence defire it, thence endeavour to obtain it, thence receive an acftual Pleafure in obtaining it, thence de- fire to prcferve the Poflellion of it ? Hence by drop- ping the intermediate Steps between Money and Hap- pinefs, they join Money and Happinefs immediately together, and content themfelves with the phantafli- cal Pleafure of having it, and make that which was- at firft purfued only as a Means, be to them a real Etidy and what their real Happinefs or Mifery con-
fifts
Freliminary Dijjerfatiojt, lili
iifts in. Thus the Connexion between Money and Happinefs remains in the Mind ; tho' it has long fince ceas'd between the things themfelves.
The fame might beobferv'd concerning the Thirfl after Knowledge, Fame, ^r. the delight in Reading, Building, Planting, and mod of the various Exerci- fcs and Entertainments of Life. Thefe were at firft *enter'd on with a view to fome farther End, but at length become habitual Amufements j the Idea of Pleafure is alTociated with them, and leads us on flill in the fame eager Purfuit of them, when the firll Reafon is quite vanifh'd, or at leaft out of our Minds. Nay, we find this Power of Affociation fo great as not only to tranfport our Paffions and Affecflions be- yond their proper bounds, both as to Intenfenefs and Duration ; as is evident from daily Inftances of Ava- rice, Ambition, Love, Revenge, ^c, but alfo, that it is able to transfer them to improper Objecfts, and fuch as are of a quite different Natufe from thofe to which our Reafon had at firfl diredled them. Thus being accuftom'd to refent an Injury done to our Bo- dy by a Retaliation of the like to him that oifer'd ir, we are apt to conceive the fame kind of Refentment, and often exprefs it in the fame manner, upon re- ceiving hurt from a Stock or a Stone, whereby the hatred which we are ufed to place on voluntary Be- ings, is fubftituted in the Room of that Averfion which belongs to involuntary ones. The like may be obferv'd in moft of the other Paffions above-men- tioned.
From hence alfo, 'viz. from the continuance of xk\\% Ajfociation of Ideas in our Minds, we may be en- abled to account for that (almoft Diabolical) Paffion called Rnv)\ which we promifed to confider.
d a Mr.
liv Preliminary Dijfertation.
Mr. Locke obferves, and I believe very juftly, that there are fome Men entirely unacquainted with this PafTion. For moil: Men that are ufed to Refledion, may remember the very time when they were firft under the dominion of it.
Envy is generally defined to be that Pain which arifes in the Mind from obferving the Profperity of others : not of all others indefinitely, but only of fome particular Perfons. Now the examining who thofe particular Perfons whom we are apt to envy are, will lead us to the true Origin of this Paffion. And if a Man will be at the Pains to confult his Mind, or to look into the World, he'll find that thefe par- ticular Perfons are always fuch as upon fome account or other he has had a Rival fiip with. For when two or more are Competitors for the fame thing, the Suc- cefs of the one miifl neceffarily tend to the Detriment of the other, or others : hence the Succefs of my Ri- val and Mifery or Pain are join'd together in my Mind ; and thiskonnediion or alfociation remaining in my Mind, even after the Rivalfhip ceafes, makes me alv^ays affecfled with Pain whenever I hear of his Succels, tho' in Affairs which have no manner of Relation to the Rivalfhip, much more in thofe that bring that to my Remembrance, and put me in mind of what I might have enjoy'd had it not been for him. This may poflibly caft fome Light upon the black Defigns and envious Purpofesof the fallen An- gels. For why might not they have formerly had fome Competition with their Fellows ? and why may not fuch Aifociations be as ilrong in them as us ?
Thus alfo we are apt to envy thofe Perfons that rcfufe to be guided by our Judgments and perfuaded by us. For thi§ is nothing elie than a Rivalihip about
the
Preliminary Dijferfation! Iv*
the Superiority of Judgment; and we take a fecret Pride both to let the World fee, and in imagining ourfelves, that we are in the right.
There is one thing more to be obferved in anfwer to this Objedion, and that is, that we do not always (and perhaps not for the moll: part) make this AlTo- ciation ourfelves, but learn it from others : i. e, that we annex Pleafure or Pain to certain Things or Adions becaufe we fee others do it, and acquire Prin- ciples of A(^ion by imitating thofe whom we admire, or whofe efteem we would procure : Hence the Son too often inherits both the Vices and the Party of his Father, as well as his Eftate : Hence National Vir- tues and Vices, Difpofitions and Opinions: And from hence we may obferve how eafy it is to account for what is generally call'd the Prejudice ofEduca- tion ; how foon we catch the Temper and Affedlions of thofe whom we daily converfe with ; how almoft infenfibly we are taught to love, admire or hate; to be grateful, generous, companionate or cruel, ^c.
What I fay then in anf jver to the Objection is this : " That it is neceflary in order to folve the principal " Adions of human Life to fuppofe a Moral Senfe " or what is fignify'd by that Name) and alfo/'wMc/^ " AffeBions ; but I deny that this Moral Senfe, or " thefe public Affeftiqns, are innate, or implanted " in us. They are acquired either from our own " Obfervation or the Imitation of others."
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E RRA ^~A
Pre/. Page i. 1. 13. r^^^ Divine Oeconomy.
Prelim. Diff. P. 37. 1. 12. dele more. p. 38. I. 1 3. add others tend
to the detriment of it, therefore thofe are to be chofen which
tend to the good of Mankind, p. 41. 1. 1 1. for his r. ///. p. 42.
1, 14. for in r. on. p. 45. 1. 2i. for in r. is. p. 47. 1. 23. dele «.
p 48. 1 3 I . r. terminate. Book. P. 21. 1 17. for necejfarily true r neceffary. p. 140. 1 i. for
admit X. omit. p. 1 1 5. 1. 8. for drank r. drink, tgo N. 1. 4.
for greater r. great p. 212.N.I. 4 for altogether x. all together >
p. 386. N 1 I. fox intended x. attended, p. 391- N. dele 1 6.-
ib. 1. 22. r. prefent. p. 435. N. 1. 8. for giving x. by giving, p.
439. N. 1. 19 for inJiiSl x. affliSl. p. 460. 1. 12. for natural r.
unnatural, p. 492. 1. 30. for are arifing r. there arifes. p 493,
1. 20. for affeSled r. effeSied. Serm. P. 21. 1. ult. dele to. p. 29. 1. 24. r. a Perception, p. 39. 1, 34. r. to be learned, p. 43, 1. 15. r. ingenuoujly* p. 53 I.
3 1 . for Now r. Nor. p. 60. 1. 24 for Men r. Man. p. 67, J.
26 r, /o ^^. p. 73,1. 6. for and r, «;<
Chap. 1=
Co7icerning the Origin of Evil.
CHAP. I.
Containing fomt Prificiptes prevtoujly necejj'a-^ ry to the Vnderjlanding and Solution of the difficulty about the Origin o/Evil.
SECT. I.
Of the Knowled<^e of External ObjeEisi
I
I. "^f T is allowed that external obje<S:s are made That fen- known to. us from without by the Senfes j Nations re- but we have entirely forgot how Lights Co- P^'^^ent lours, and other external Things at firfl af- thines^o, fefted our Senfes and enter'd the Mind j nor ys, or at can we eafily recoiled the rife and progrefs of our ^eait diT- Knowledge concerning thefe Things. cover tht
However it is. agreed that the Conceptions which of^j^",'^^ tve have of thefe either repiefent to us the Things themfelves, or at leaO: difcover the prcfcnce and cpc- rations of them : That the fenfation of Light, for inftance, arifes from its being prfclented to the Eye j and fo in all other Objeds of the Senfe-.
II. But rt is to be obferv'd that the reprcfenta- Thatrhefe tioiis of Things which we have from the Senfes, ^/J ^^^^'^■^ ar« bv no means fimple, but very much confufgd ^^ ^\ ' and complicated; lor Example? ths Eye reprefents ed, .but af-
B to tsm'ards
a Concerning the Ongm of "EvA. Chap. I.
fepanted to the Mind burning Wax^ i. e. a thing that is hard,
by the un- round, capable of being melted in the Fire, red, and
derftand- \y}^gj^ foftentd by heat changeable into any Figure^
ftanceof fufceptiblc alfo of various Colours ; and laftly, re*
this in Solvable into Smoke. The Eye exhibits all thefe
burning Properties in the burning Wax alftioft at one glance^
Wax, jjj^jf ^|-j£ Vnderflanding fcperates thofe things by
Refledion, which the Sight had convey'd to the
mind colledively. For it percieves that the Wax
preferves its ElTence and Denomination, though
from round it be turn'd into fquare, from hard and
red, into foft and black. Fiom whence it appears
that all thefe Properties are extrinjtcal to ifj- but that
which continues under all thefe Changes is call'd its
Nature and Subfliince.
Thefirfl HI. By SubfiaNce I here urrderftand a thing
dillindi- -^vhich the Mind can conceive by itfelf 23 dijlinll
^" ° J;'^ and feparate from all others : For that Thine, the
onsinto Conception of which does not ^f^w« upon another,
fenliblc nor incIudc or fuppofe any othe , is to us ^ Sub'
^<alitics fiance I and accordingly we diftinguifli it by that
MdSub- ]vT^j,^^. gyj jI^^j. v/^liich implies dependence in its
nance. . ,, ~ . r Vt • r r
■* conception we call a Aiode-i or Accident. For
inftance, we can conceive a certain portion of matter^ fuch as Wax, fetting afide all others, and alfo v/irhout any particular Figure: But we arc not in like manner able to conceive any parti- cular Figure without matter* Wax therefore is a Subjlance, for our conception rcprelents it as di- fiinth divided from, and independent of all other things: Nor is it neccflary to the knowledge thereof that we join the conceptions of other things when we think of it : for the conceptions of that and thefe contribute nothing (to, nor iland in need of each other in order to their being under- iiood. But Coiotir^ Ti'iiire-^ Softnefs and H-.^'dnefs are wodei or ^xcidcnts, fince thev cannot be conceiv'd ; Wiihout fomething that is colour d, fgur'd, fofr, or;
hiird; i
Bed. I . Concerning the Orig mofEvW, .%
hard; but they enter not into the Suhflance or na- tftre of Wax, for that remains, whatever may be- come of thefc,
IV* But when this is refolv'd into fmoke^ or How ue fiame, it has no longer the name of Wax given to '^"O"' that it. We call the thing Wax which is applicable to ^^^""^^s a certain peculiar ufe; but when it is once I'e^lv- thing^as €d into fmoke or flame, it becomes unfit for that matter. life to which Wax is fubfervient; and therefore changes its Ejfenccy and u^ppellation. What then does it carry along with it under all mutations? It is always extended, and capable of wo?;'£?« or rf/?j and has always parts which are feparable, and ex- clude orie another oiit of the fame place.; the Sub-. fiance therefore which is attended with thefe Qua- lities or I*roperties we call Matter. ( i . )
B 2 V. What
NOTES.
(i .) Our Author's Notion of SuhJIance, as including al! the conllituent Properties of any thing, fccms to be more plain and agreeable to nature, and therefore of greater ufc in Philo- fophy than that which is commonly received. We find by experience that a thing will always exhibit the fame appear- ances in fomc refpe£ts though it admit of Change in others ; or in Mr. Locke\ Language, tliat certain numbers of fimple Ideas go conftantly together, whereas feme others do not: The former of thefe we call the SubJJance, Thing or Being itfelf, tlie latter are term'd its Modes or Accidenti. Thus the fubftance o^ Body, as far as we know of it, confiib in Solidity and Extcnfion ; which being ncceflarily finite, it alfo be- comes capable of Divifion, Figure and Motion. Thefe are its original, infeparable Qualities which conflitute the thing, and feem not to depend on any thing clfc as a Suhjcil. But a particular Figure, Motion, i3c. are only Accidents or Modes of its Exiftcnce, which do not nccellarily attend it, though they themfelves cannot be fuppofed to exift wlthour it. The fubltance of Spirit confifts in the Powers of thinking and acting, which likewife admit of various Modifications. , This feems to be all that v/e can learn concerning the nature of things from obfervation and experience. . To enquire into the Mannc*- how thefe, which we call Properties,, exift together.
4 Concernittg the Origin ofEvW. Chap. I.
What it is. V. What is obfervable in Wax, niay alfo be obferv'd in any other Subftancej which we know
by NOTES,
or to attempt to explain the Caufe, Ground or Reafon of their Union is in vain ; to aflig;n the word Suhjlance for a rcpre- fentation of it is faying nothing; it is fetting a mere word for what v/e have neither any Idea of nor occafion for. In- deed if we confidcr thefc primary Quahtics as needing fome- thing to inhere in, we are obliged to feck for fomething to fupport them ; and bv the fame way of reafoning we may feek for fomething clfe to fupport that other fomething, and fo on; and at lad fliall find no other fupport for the whole but the Caufe which produced it. Mr, Locke though he gave into this way of talking yet he has fufficiently flicwn his diflike of it in B. i. C 4. §. iS. B. 2. C. 13 . §. 18, 19, 20. and C. 23. §. 23. andelfewhere*. Dr. M'atts is of opinion,
• that it is introducing a needlefs Scbolajlic Notion into the
• real nature of things and then fancying it to have a real ' Exillcncc'. Logic p. 14. The Author of the Procedure, Ex- tent ^'c- affirms, ' that as far qs we direftlv knov.- the effcntial
• Properties of any Subftance, fo far we have a direft know- ' Icd^e of the Subilancc it/e/f; and if \%e had a dircft Knoir-
• ledge of aU the elTential Properties of any Subftance, we ' fiioiild have an adeqnc.te knowledge of that Subihnce ; for
• iurely, if there be any meaning in words, the kniowing any ' of the effcntial Properties of a thing is knowing Jo Jtmch of 'its very Subilancc or Eflence ; f meaning the fame by thefc two laft words, though Mr. Locke ufcs them in a very difierent Signification ; the former being only that which iuakes any thing an Ens or Being ; the latter that which makes it a Being of this or that Sort : Of which belo\v.
In fliort, whatever is underftood by this word fubjiancc ; it cannot as Mr. Locke obferves ;{; be applied to God, Spirits and Body in the fame fenfe ; and therefore the application of this and the like doubtful Terms to Subjefls of a very dif- ferent nature (cfpccially that of S-.thjlraiutn, wliich more ap- parently confines our thoughts to Body) muft needs occafion Error and Coniiifion.
But though our Author's notion of Subftance be very de- fenfilile,. he has applied the word Matter to the Idea of Body,
whereof
* Comp. Mr. CoUihfr''?, Enquiry into the Exiftcnce and Na- ture of God. p. 227, 228. and Dr. S/:er/o:k^s Yiiidic. of the Trin. p. 69. &-c. and Dr. //W//s Philofophical EfHiys. Elf. 2. ■ t B. 1, C. iii. p. So, 81. X B. II. C. xiii. §; ^^^
S.edl. I. Concerning the Origin e/* Evil.
by the Senfcs. For all thing> that are perceived by the Senfes admit of the like changes, and the
above- N OT E S.
whereof Matter is only a partial Conception containing no- thing more than the Idea of a folid fubllance whicli is every- where the fame. Thefc two terms therefore cannot be put one for the other, as Mr. Locke obferves * though indeed they are often ufed promifcuoufly.
Upon this occafion it may not be improper to obferve tliat the various figniiications of thefe general Terms Matter, Sub- Jiance, Effence, &c. will ferve to convince U3 in the iirlt place, that thefe words don't denote the manner how things really exilt, but only our manner of conceiving them, and lecondly, that there are no real Exiftencies ftridlly conformable to this our manner of conceiving them, i.e. \i\ Generals. For if ei- ther thefe general Terms ilood for things really cxilting under fuch a Precifion, or this our way of conceiving things were fix'd by Nature, neither of them would be fo various and un- certain as we find they are. The End of making tnefe Gene- ral Conceptions is to range things into Sorts for the convenience of Language. The manner of acquiring them is as follows.
We arc at firft only acquainted with particular Subilanccs ; but obferving that as thefe particular Subllances differ in fome relpetts, fo they agree in others, [i.e. though this particular excites in the mind fome fimple Idea or Ideas, which another does not, yet there arc fome Ideas excited equally from both) we take no notice of thole Ideas in which two or more parti- cular fabllances differ, but feleft thofe only in which they tigree, and conned them into one complex Idea by giving them one Name. Which cornplex Idea becomes General, ;. e. it may be affirm'd of, or belongs to, or is found in more than one particular Subilance; and the fevera! Subftanccs of which it is aflirm'd, ^c. are faid to be contain'd under that General Idea. General Ideas of Subllances therefore ars not made by adding all or any of the particular Ideas found in each Subfunce, or by that retin'd method, which the Author of x\iZ Procedure imagines, of adding and omitting them at the fame time ; but only by leafing out all thofe Ideas in which two or more particular Subilauccs differ, and ret.uning thole in which they agree. And from general Ideas thus made we proceed to more general ones in the fame way, 'viz. by al- ways dropping the particulars wherein they differ. Thus ob- ' B 3 ferving
* B, in. C. X, §. i;..
Concerning the Origin (j/Evil. Chap. I.
abovemention'd properties continue both undert and after all the(e motions and mutations. Any
fen- NOTES,
feiving a certain agreement among Individuals and omitting the rcll, wc forni an Idea of the feveral Species. In like man- ner leaving out the diltinguifliing marks of each Species, we get an Idea of the Genus, fuch as Ma>t, Beaji, or of a higher Genus, fuch as Animal : and again by dropping that by which Animals are dillinguifhed from all other things we acquire the ftill more general or partial, Idea qI Behg or Suhjiance. When any one of thefe general Ideas is found in a particular thing it is call'd the Effence of that thing : EJJ'ence therefore is only that general abllra6l Idea in the Mind by which we determine any thing to be of this or that fort, which fort we ■fignify by fuch a general name as Animal, or Matter. So that the fame Quality may be eflential or not effential to any thing jiccording as that thing is ranked under a diiTerent_^r^*.
In the fa-me wa}^ that we make General Ideas ofSubftances we alfo c.>.Jider fingle Propeyties, Monies and Relations, -viz. by feparating them from a)i other Properties, i3'c. with which they are found in Nature, or from all particular Subjeds in which they inhere, and leaving only fo much as remains in common, and includes, or may be aflirm'd of eve- ry Property, ^V. of that kind; Thus obferving that all Bo- dies agree in being extended, as w'cU as folid, though they differ never fo much in magnitude and figure, we take the former of thefe Properties apart from the latter, as alfo from ajiy particular Magnitude or Shape, and call it Extevjlon in the abftradt ; which being thus made general it will compre- hend all particular Extenfions, and may be enlarged every way and amplified in infinitum: We can conceive it as exilling beyond the limits of Body, and by adding the coniufed Idea of a Subjiratum to it, it will become independent and ferve both as a common meafure and a common Receptacle for all Bodies, which probably conftitutes our Idea oi Space. See Notes 3 and 9. In the fame manner we form an Univerlal Mode^ I'.g. Obferving a train of Ideas fucceeding one another in our mijids at certain diitances, and being confcious that we our felves exift while we receive them, or that our own ^xiftenc* is commenfurate to this fucceffion, wc get the Idea of con- tinuing. Obferving alfo that leveral other things continue as well as ourfelves, we find that the fame affedtion belongs to
them ;
• See Loch ?. III. C. vi. §. 4, 5, ^c.
Std. I. Cone erni Jig the Origin o/'Evil.
ienfible Objeft, however chang'd, is always ex- tended^ movecible^ conjifting o£ Jolid, dijlin^ and di- yifibk parts,
VI. NOTES.
them ; but it being an endlcfs work to form as many diftinft Ideas of this kind as there are things that thus continue, we abftraft from particular Exiilences and make one general Idea of Continuance, which ferves for all, and this is Duration.
The Parts or Periods of this common Duration we call 7ime; and every thing which is commenfurate to them is mea- fured by it, and faid to exift in it, after the fame manner as was obferv'd before of Space.
Mix' J Moc^es und Relations are Combinations of Ideas of dif- ferent kinds voluntarily put together and conne<fled by their names. Such as G(7(7^;;(?/}, Gratitude; Identity, NeceJJjty, i3c, Thefe are apparently the work of the Mind, and though many of them have a real foundation in Nature, and may be found by obfervation in the concrete, yet they arc generally got be- fore from information or invention, abftrafted from particu- lar Sabje61s, and lodg'd in the mind with general names anr nex'd to them, according as the circumllances of perfons an4 conveniencies of Life require.. See Locke, B. III. C. iii.
I have been the longer on this fubjedl o^ AbjIraSl Ideas, iince notwithllanding what Mr. Locke has hinted, the nature of 'em feems to be but little underftood, otherwife we fhould never hear of our Ideas of Infinity, oi Space, Duration, "Nutnber, Sec. requiring an external Ideatum or objeSli-ve reality; — of their beiijg real Attributes and neceflarily inferring the Exiftence of ofiome immenfe and eternal Being ; — whereas all univerfals, or abftrad Ideas, fuch as thefe evidently are, (See Dr. Clarke''^ Anfvv'er to the 4th letter) exill under i\\3.l formality no where but in the Mind, neither have th^ any other foundation, nor can they be a proof of any thing, befidc that power which the mind has to form them.
If the nature of M;xV Modes and Relations were fufficiently attended to, I believe it would not be aflerted that our Ideas of perfeft Goodncfs, Wifdom, Power, ifjc. are all inadequate and only negative. — th,at all our knowledge of thefe Pei- fedtions is improper, indireft, and only analogical, — and that the whole kind, nature, Effence and Idea of them is (^n- tirely different v/hen applied to God from what it is when pre- dicated of his Creatures. Whereas thefe being arbitrary com- binations of Ideas made without regard to any patticular Sub- ject in which they may inhere, they are evidciuly their own
B'4 ' Arc he-
8 Concerning the Origin of EvIL Chap. I.
That this VI. Not that this is a Definition, or Idea (z.) Definition ^f Matter, any more than the former was of Suh^ *^°"hThe i^^»<^^> ^^^ ^^^^ hereby we arc acquainted with its 7dea of prefence, and diftinguilli it from every other thing; inatter,but as we know a Man by his Countenance, and other onlylhews circumftanccs ; Nor is it necelTary that thefe flioiUd ^^the ^g applicable to all SubjUnce^ at all times, and x6 flin^uifti^" that alone: For it is enough if for this particular jt hy. Time jind occafion we know tlie particular Sttbfiance
•' : ■ ■'. WQ
N OT E S^
Archetypes and therefore cannot but be adequate nnd pofiti've : Thev are what they are immutably and univerfally ; their A'a- iur es :ind EJ/ences niuft be the fame wherever they are found, or to whatfoever fubjec^ we apply them, fo long as the fame number of Ideas are included under the lame word ; and no- thing more is requifite than that the Ideas thus put together be confiftent to make all our knowledge concerning them, real, proper, direil, adequate and miinjerfal. See Locke, B. \Y. C. iv.
I fhall trouble the Reader no farther on this Head than only to obferve that the method of forming general Ideas (which our Author had advanced ill his firlt Note, and which is fincc ufed by the Author of Procedure, Sec ) by making the Idea of one Ir^dividual ftand for the whole Species, muft be wrong on this very account, f/s:. that according to the foremention'd fchemc Umver/ah, fuch as Animal or Matter would have a real Kxiltcnce in the fame prccife manner in which we confider them ; whereas under fuch Prccifions they are confefledly the creatures of our o^n Minds and exiftno where elle. Wc have nothing at all to do therefore with Analogy in forming Ahjlra^ Ideas, we can never come at them by fubitituting one particu- lar for the roll; hut on the contrary muft conceive them by re- moving all particularities of Exiftcncc and leaving only what lemams in com"mon, as explain'd above. See Locke, B. ill- C iii. ^. 7, 8, 9. or N'a^/s's Logic, Part. I. C. iii. §, 3. or ihe words Aijlra^ion :n\d Genera/ in Chambers's Dictionary. [z) Our Author confines this word Idea to the fenfc in \\ hich it was firft ufed by Plato, kj'tx. as an Image or Reprefen- tation of the fuppofed TJfence of things; in which \iih.iii. It was attributed peculiarly to God, A\ ho was faid to perceive things immediately by their EJ/ences, whereas we only know them by certain Marks cr Chara^ers, or by Anciloij;,
■* 'Our
Se(a. I. Concerning the Origin o/'Evil. |
we are talking of by them ; ^nd fiifficiently di- ftinguirh it from othei things.
" VII. It is to be obferved farther, that when a How we part of this matter is removed another fucceeds in- come to to its Place, but is not in the fame Place con- fj^^ know- fiftent with it. Vlace therefore feems to be fome- ^'^^^ ° thing beyofid, befidc and diftind: from the Mat^ ter which it receives. For as from hence that Wax was fuccedively capable of different forms, fi- gures, colours and chaiiges, it appears that fomething is init'befide, and difl^rent from all thefe, which we call the Matter of the Wax : So in like manner from hence that the fame Place or Space receives more and different Bodies and Particles of matter fucceffively, but cannot admit more than one ac the fame time, it will appear that Place or Space^ is as diflinft from Matter or Body as Wax is froni the Colours fucceffively receiv'd, and does not depend on them any more than Wax does on any particular Form,
VIII. If therefore we fet afide, or annihilate What it is. Matter i whatfoever flill remains will all belong to the nature of Spacer as in the former cafe when we had fet afide the Properties of IVax, that which belonged to the A4atter or fubflance of it remain- ed. If you ask what that is ? I anfwer, firfl Lo- cal Mobility is to be fet afide, for that feems pe- culiar to Matter. Secondly, an a(ftual feparation of Parts, for what is immov^eable cannot be divid-
^ or E s,
Our Autlior Tiad endeavoured to explain this in his Note upon the place; which is omitted as ^vc apprehend it to be much better explain'd and more conveniently applied by Mr. Locke, who makes the word Idea Hand for every thing about which the Mind is converfant, or which can be the ob- jeft of Perception, Thought or Underftanding; In which large fenfe we have an Idea of Matter ox Bod^, as well as of Suljia/ice, or of Space.
(3 ) Though
iqf\ Concerning the Origin ^Evil. Chap. I.
cd. Thirdly, JmpeyietrAbility, or Solidity ; for that fuppofes Motion and is neceflaiy to the Pro- dudion of it. It remains therefore that Sp.ice (as we conceive it) be fomething extended immovea- ble, capable of receiving or containing Matter, and penetrable by it. Though therefore we have not a Definition or Idea of Space, properly fo call'dj yet we can hereby fufiiciently diftinguifli it from every other thing, and may reafon about it as much as we have occafion. Thefe IX. Thefe three conception*?, namely, of fenfi-
threeCon- bie Quahties {viz.. Motion, dec.) of Matter and Sx.'of*' ^P^^^^ ^^^^ fo be the chief of thole which we fenfible hW^ from Without, and fo natural to us that there Qualities is uo reafonable Man but perceives them in him- (v. g. Mo- feif. There are fome who deny that Space is any ci^^Mat^ter ^^^^S difl:in6l from Matter, nor is it much to our and space, purpofe whether it be or no: Yet we csnnot with- feem to be out offering Violence to our Underftandings, deny the chief but that the Conception of Spacf is diftind from the ofthofe conception of -^^jir^f/-, (3.)
external. atv^l.
NOTES,
(3.) Though fo much noife has been made about Space, (which Leibnitz juftly calls an Idol of fome modern Englijh Men: ] and fo great ufe made of it in demonltrating the divine Attributes, in a way which fome ftile a Priori ; yet f am forc'd to confefs that I cannot poffibly frame any other Notion of it, than|cither, firft, as the mere jiegation or ahfcnce oi Matter, or fecondiy, as the extenlion o^ Body, confider'd abilradlly or fepa- fate from any particular Body ; or thirdly, as a SubjcSl or Suljlra- ium of that iivnc general extenjion, for which lall Notion fee N 9.
Now according to the firft Suppofition we may indeed have J pojiti've Idea of it, as well as oi Silence, Darknefs, and many other Privations ; as Mr, Locke has fully proved that wchave, andlhewnthe Reafon of it B III. C viii. §. 4. But to argue from fuch an Idea of Space, that Space itfelf is fomething ex- ternal, and has a real cxiftence, feems altogether as good Scnfe as to fay, that becaufe we have a different Idea of Darknefs from that of Light ; oi jilence from that oi found; of the abfence gfany thmg, from th«t of its Prefence ; therefore Darknefs, i^c.
mult
jSect. 2. Concerning the Ongm of Evi\, I.I
S E C T. II.
Of the Enquiry after the Tirf Caufe^ I. Suppoiinc thefe three, viz. Aiotion, Matter, An enqu'H
^ cerning
NOTE S. Motion,
jnufl befomething pofitive and different from Light, l^c. and Matter, have as real an Exitlence as Light has ; And to deny that we and Space | have any pofitive Idea, or, which is the very fame, any Idea whether at all, of the Privations above-mentionM (For every Idea, as ^''^^7 ^^"'" it is a perception of the Mind, mult neceffarily be pofitive, orthen^' though it arife from what Mr, Locke calls a privative Caufe ) felves. to deny, I lay, that we have thefe Ideas, will be to deny Ex- perience and contradift common Scnfe. There are therefore Ideas, andy?/;;/i/e ones too, which have nothing ad extra cor- refpondent to them, no proper Ideatum, Archetype, or ob- jeftive Reality, and I don't fee why that oi Space may not be reckon'd one of them. To fay that Space mull have exiflence, bccaufe it has fome Properties, for inllance. Penetrability, or a ffl/i^aVy of receiving Body, feems to me the fame as to urge that darknefs rriufl: ht fomething becaufe it has the power or pro- perty o'ireceiiitng Light ', Silence the property o^ admitting Sound i and Ahfence the property of being fupply'd by Prefence, i. e. to aifign abfolute Negations, and fuch as by the fame way ot realoning may be apply 'd to Nothing, and then call them po- fitive properties; and io infer that the Chimera thus cloathed with them mull needs be fomething. Setting afide the names of its other pretended properties (which names alfo are ab merely negative as the fuppofed properties to which they be- long) thofe that attribute extenfion to fpace feem not to attend to the true notion of that Property, which, as the Schoolmen define it (and let them who like not this definition try to give us a better) is to have partes extra partes, and as fuch, /. e. as including Parts (which parts, as they differ in fituation front each other, may have things piedicated of fome of them dif- ferent from thofe which can be predicated of others) it ap- pears plainly inconfiilcnt with their own Idea of whaC they call fimple, uniform, indivifible fpace, and is applicable to Body only. And to attribute Extenfion or Parts to fpace, ac- cording to the firll notion of it laid down by ns* will be the lame as to talk of the cxtenfipn or parts of Ahfence, q[ Pri'va' tion, or of mc7-e Noihing. L^ftly, to ask jf Space under the
fcronj
"jl^ Concerning the Origin ^'Evii. Chap. I.
and Space, wc arc in the next phccto examine whc- thcf they be of themrclves, or of fomething elfc?
if NOTES.
fccond Notion of that word, (/. e. as Extenfion in the Abftracl) be extended or have parts, is apparently abfurd ; it is the lame with that noted Qtiellion of the Man, who being told that to have Riches, was to be rich, ask'd if Riches then thcmfclves were Rich ?
Well then, according to the firft Suppofition, Space will be mere uon entity, or nothing, i. e. nothing can be aflirm'd, but every thing denied of it : According to the iecond, it will be only znabjiraS} Idea form'd in the mind from a property peculiar to matter, which property abflrafled in Idea cannot rtfelf admit of any other properties, nor be applicable to the Divine Nature, nor capable of pofitive Infinity jn any refped. As to the laft, ' If Space, fays Dr. Cud^vorth, be concluded
* to be nothing elfe but the extenfion and difiance oi Body, or
* ?natter con^x^cx'd. m general (without refpeft to this or that
* particular body) and abfiraBly in order tQ the Coi^ccption of
* Motion and the menfuration of things, then do we lay that
* there appeareth nQ fufficicnt grounds for this pofitive Infinity}
* of Space, we being certain of no more than this, that be the
* World, or any figuratt^ Body, never fo great, it is not im- « poflible but that it might rtill be greater and greater without
* end. Which iiidefinite increafahlenefs of Body and Sp.icc \ feems to be miltaken for a pofitive infinity thereof. Whcre-
* as for this very Reafon, becaufe it can never be fo great, but
* that more magnitude may ftill be added to it, therefore it can
* never be pofitively Infinite.
< To conclude therefore, by Spice without the finite World, *: is to be underilood nothing but the polfibility of Body farther f and farther without end, yet ib as never to reach to Infinity.*
Hence appears tlie weaknefs of that common Argumcnc nrg'd by Gajfendus, Dr. Clarke, and Raphfion, for the ahfiohite. infinity' ofi Space, viz. From the impoflibility of fetting bounds or limits to it : fincc that, {vj they, would be to fuppofe Sp^cs bounded bv yS/;/f/A/\^ which ///«■// occupies Space, or elfc by nothing, both which are contradidlions.
Which Argument either firft of all fuppofes that Space h really Ibme thing, Qr fome pofitive Quality ; which wants to be proved. Or elfe improperly applies bounds and bounders to mere non-entity, or bare poifibility ; which has nothing to 4o with the Idea of Bounds.
li * True Intel! , Syft. P. 644 & 766.
Sed:. 2. C^ncenii fig t/jeOtigm of Ev'ih ^3'
If they eyifl: of themfelves, the Enquiry is at an End. For thofe things that Exift by Nature are
caufes NOTES,
If therefore we take Space in the ficfl: Notion laid down, thi5u its unboundednefs will (as Dr. Cudvjorth fays) fignify nothing but the poffibility Of Body farther and farther without end ; according to which Senfe, let «s ftatc their ufual Quef- tion in other Words, and the great fallacy and impropriety of it will appear. What is there, fiy they, beyond this Space ? You muft imagine more fuch Space, or nothing. What is there fay we, beyond this pojjibiltty of Exijience? You muft either imagine more i'dc\). foJJibilUx o't Exijlende or mere notbing, i. e. Mn Exifience. What Coniequence can pofTibly be drawn from fuch an odd kind of Argumentfttion ?,
But if Space be taken in tfee fecond Senfe, /. e, as Exter>» fion in ^abJlra3o, then the meaning of o«r not being able to fet bonnds to it will only be, that wc have a power of enlarging our abftraft Idea in htfinittim, or that we always find in our felves the fame ability to add to, or repeat it; and if we always find that we can add, we Ihall never find that we canuot add, which (as a very eminent Writer on the Subjedl obierves) is all the Myftery of the Matter, and all that can be underftood by infinite Space.
But it is farther urg'd that there muft be fomething more in the prefcnt Gafc ; for luc _^7id not otily a Povjer of enlarging ihe Idea, but fi lid it i?npcijfib/e to fet bounds to the thing ; ivbcreait <ue can enlarge tht Idea of Matter to Infinity, and can alfo fet hounds to the thing itfclf. In anfwcr to the firft part of this Objection it is afk'd. What thing, I pnayyoii, but the thing in your own mind, that is, the Idea ? Prove it to be a thing and then we'll enquire whether it has bounds or not; but to fay the thing is infinite or boundlefs, before you have prov'dit to exift, orto be a Thing, is too large a ftcp to take. The abovc- mention'd excellent Writer folves the Difficulty arifmg from the fecond part o'i the Objedion by another parallel Cafe,
< Whenlconfider the number of the Stars, I can go numbering
* on in my thoughts ftill more and more Star^ in Infinitum, but
* I can fet bounds to them, can fuppofe their number finite,
* but to number itfelf I can fet no bounds. Yet what is Num-
* ber.? Nothing but an abftract Idea, nothing ^i ^A7r«, and to ' fay that number is infinite, comes only to this, that we can
< fet no bounds to our Faculty of Numbering, it being always ' as eafy to add to a thoufand, or a Million, one more, bV. as
* to One. Well then, to fet bounds to numl-^r in the atftrai^,
« i^
$4 Concerning tls Origin t^Evil. Chap. 1
t^aufes oi Exijlence to themfelves, i.e. do not ftand in need of any external caufe ; if they depend on
fome- NOTES.
' is to Tet bounds to the Faculty itfelf, and to deny that it is
* in my Power to add, when I plainly perceive that I can ; and ' fo is a direft Contradiftion. Eut as to the number of Stars,
* or Hairs, or Alen, or any thing, I can fet bounds to that,
* without any contradi6l;ion, becaufe it iHll leaves me in pofT-
* cflion of the power of numbering, which I find I have; and
* which does not require any fub'iedt ad extra, but may goon
* independent of any, and indifferent to all. Now to apply
* this to other cafes: The Mind finds in itfelf the faculty of en-
* larging and extending its Idea of cxtenfion. It can apply
* it to Matter, or can let it alone: Can fuppoie Matter infi-
* nitely expanded, or can fet bounds to it. But to fct bound?
* to all Extenfion, as well imaginary as real, is cramping the
* Faculty, is denying it the power of enlarging, which is al-
* Ways prefent to the mind, and which flie can never lofe;
* and, in a word, is a contradidlion. Any, either imagina-
* ry, or real Subject is fufficicnt for the mind to exercife its
* Faculties upon; and fo if you cither JuppolcGod or Matter,
* or Space to be infinitely extended, it is equally latiffied
* with any. All that fhe requires, is, that fhe may be able to-
* enlarge the Idea of Extenfion. But if you take from her Ex-
* tenfion itfelf, that is the Idea of it, and the Power of adding
* to it, you deprive her of her Faculty, and deny her a power
* which fhe finds fhe has. In a word, we can fet bounds to
* any thing that ftill leaves us the power of enlarging or ex-
* tending infinitely, as we find we always can: and if we ' \vould fpeak ftridtly, it is not jmmher that is infinite, nor cx-
* ttnfion infinite, which are nothing but iiotions abllrailcd from
* things: But the mind ofMan is able to proceed numbering
* or extending infinitely, that is, without ever coming to any
* Stop or Bounds. For to fet Bounds is to deny and dellroy the
* Faculty itfelf: If it could not always do it, it could not ' do it at all. He that can add one to one, as often as he will
* can never find an end of numbering, nor he that can double ' an Inch as often as he will, find an end of enlarging; it is
* all nothing more than repeating one of the caficll operations
* or exercifes of the Mind, and it will always be a contradic-
* tion for any rational Mind to v/ant it. The Cafe being ' plainly thus, 1 think it fliould not be afk'd, v;hy a Mancan-
* nor fet bounds to Number or F.xtcnfion, but how he comes ' to have the Faculty of counting and repeating, which is rcil'
Sedt. 2. Concerning the Origin of Evil. 15
fomething eUe, there will be a queflion about that alfo, what it is, and what are its properties.
II. Wt NOTES.
* \y tantamount to the other, and what it ultimately refolves
* into. And then, I fuppofe, the Anfvver is very eafy, and
* we need not go to the utmoft Limits of the World to enable
* us to rcfolve the Riddle.
' I cannot but fmile to oblerve how grofly we are often im-
* pofed upon by Words Handing for abllraft Ideas, for want ' of confidering how, and upon what Occafions, thefe abftrafl
* Ideas were invented for the help of weak and narrow Con-
* ceptions, and have been ufcd fo long till they are thought to
* ftand for real Things.
This, I think, is a folid and ample confutation of the Ar- gument drawn from the Idea of Space and its imaginary Infini- /)'. We fhall only add a Word or two to fhew that Duration., (as well as Space,) Number, and all ^avtity ; any thing which can be confidercd only by way of parts, or in Succeffion ; is abfolutely repugnant to, or incapable of true pofitive infini- ty in any refpeft. Now by a pofitive, or Metaphyfual Infi- nite we always mean that which is abfolutely PerfeB in its kind, which cannot admit of ^rt'<////ea, or Increafe. It is an Idea of a certain Quality in the Abjiraii, which has no jnix- iure of the contrary Quality in it, no failure or defied ; and which therefore is our Standard to which we always refer, and by which we try all imperfeftions, all mix'd or finite Quali* tics, which arc for this reafon calTd imperfeft, becaufe they fall fliortof our original Standard, and are properly negations iofit: Confequcntly our Idea oi Peifedion muft be a pofitive one, and prior to that of ImperfeiiiovL ; as will appear from Cudivorth cited in Remark 1. where the Reader may find a full, account of this pofitive Infinity, and how we get the Idea of it and arc able to diltinguifh it from that negative one explained by Mr Locke, which is frequently confounded with it. To return.
If then a Metaphyfical Infinite means perfect, or that ta luhich nothing can be added, it is plain that Diiraiion, Number, and all Quantity, the very Nature aud Idea of which includes perpetual Increafablenefs or Addibility muft be effentially inca- pable of this abfolute or pofitive Infinity, in like manner as Cudnxorth has Ihewn of Space and Body in the Paffage referr'd to above. Farther, if we attend to the Notion of an Infinite Series, and take a view of the manifold Abfurdities which accompany it in any manner of conception, (from which abfurditici vva draw our ©nlv proof of a /ry? Canfe, or
God)
l6 Conc'srning the Origin o/'EviL Chap. 1.
We arc \\, We muft prefumc that all our conceptions
to form of fimple Objeds without us are true, i. e. reprefent
'':Jif ^^ 'he
things NOTES.
they exill ^°^^ ^^^ ^'^^^ ^'^ neccflarily led to exclude from Infinity all
of them- ("-i^^h things as exifl Seriatim, or nuill be conceiv''d as confifl-
lelves Or "^^ iri and compofed ofyJ/(r<rf|/^w parts, i. e., fuch as Duration,
require a ^'^"^^^*'y Space, Motion, Mag7iitude, l£c. all which, when faid
Caufe ^*^ ^^ infinite, arc nothing but fo many infinite Series, and
from our ^^^''^^'^'^'^I'^ble to the fame abfurdities ; as the abovemention'd
fimple •Author has demonftrated of them all together, Intell. Syjl. p.
Conc-Dti- ^^^' ^'^'^^^^^ ^^''^'"'>' in particular, /». 843. The fame is
^^^^^ * fliewn cf Duration or Time, by Dr. Bently, Boyle's Lea.
. Serm. 7. or bySir.il/. Ha/e, Primitive Origination ofMan^
there IS no l- J r-* •' ^-n o ■;.. n ^ ■ • o r» TTr
, ' J- '• ^- *^- orBiniopiS/J^;«^;?ff/. Origines Sacrae, B. HI.
f r A> ^' '• prop- 7> 8. See alfo the confutation of an Infinite Series of p H r^ fucceflive Beings in the beginning of Note 10. and Rem. b. *" a a }. 'fj^g jj].^ j^ Ihewn of Number and all ^lantitv, by, the Au- thor of the Impartial Enquit'y into the nature ami exifience of God, p. z\,lf^c.
* If any Number be abfolutely or infinitely great, it can be
* for no other realon than becaule it is abfolutqly or in its very nature incapable ofincrcafe without an abfolute contradic- tion. But the very nature of all Quantity infers on the
* contrary a ncceflity of the encrcafe of its Greatnefs on the fuppofition of the leaft addition: For fmcc no Quantity is more or Xciz fuch, or poIlclTes more or lefs of the nature of Quantity, than another, it follows that all Quantities be- ing of the fime general Nature mull feverally bear a propor- tion to each other. For example, that can be no Unit which
.* by the addition of an Unit will not become two: and by
* parity of reafon, that is bo Alillion which by the addition of
* a fingle Unit will not incrc-afe to the greatnefs of a Million
* and an Unit. For if it b» but a Million after the Addition
* of an Unit, it is plain, it mull before that Addition have ' been Icfs than a Million by an Unit.— ———•The like may
* be faid of all other Quantities, p. 25.
The learned Dr. Clarke endeavours to evadelhefe Arguments about Parts, Sec. by denying that any Number of Years, Days, and Hours : or of Miles, Yards, or Feet, ' can be confidered ' as any aliquot, or (onfiitucnt parts of infinite 'lime or Space, or
* be
* How this is confillent with the Eternity of God, and what the true meaning of that Attribute is, See Note 10. Rem. c. or Dr. Bcntleys Bcj/c's Lect. Scrm. 3x1.
S^dt. 2. Cofkermng the Origin of E^W.
the things as God would have them known to us, except we elfewhere difcovcr lome Fallacy or
Pre-
JVOTE S,
^ be compsred at all with it, or bear any kind ofpropc'rtioR to
< it, or be the foundation ofany Argument in any Queftion *. concerning it ' Dcmonftr. ofDiv. Attr. p, 37, 38. Jth-Edit. But does not this look ibniething like avoiding one great difliculty by admitting a greater? For how do we come ^t out- confufid Idea of inf5nite Quantity but by firll: hav- ing a clear Idea of fome certain part of that Quantity ; in. Space, for inftance, of fuch a ftated Length as a Foot', in Time, of an Hour, and then by doubling, trebling, or any way multiplying chat fame Idea as long as we pleafe, and ftill finding as much room for or poflibility of multiplying it as we did when we began? See Lfjike B.II. c. xvii. ^..3. But does this Idea of Infinite (which fcems to be the only one the X)o£lor ever thought, of) n'hen applied to Time ov Space, al- ter the very nature, ejjence, and idea of that Time and Space? Do not we ftill confider it as an infinity of th.<i fame Time and Space ; or as confiiling in a continual addihility oi fuch por- tions of Time and Space; or as a Whole made upof numberleia- fuch parts of time and fpace as are of tiic fame kind wlththefe hours and feet ? To fay that infinite Space has no parts, is (as Leibnitz urges in his fourth Letter to Dr. Clarke, No. Xi. p. 99.) * to fay that it does not confift of finite Spaces; and,
* that infinite Space might fabfili:, though all finite fpaces fliould
* be reduced to nothing. It is as if one fnould fay, in the ' Cartefian fuppofition of a material, extended, unlimited ' World, that fuch a World might fubfift, though all the Bo-
< dies of] which it confills, fliould be reduced to nothing *'. Is is therefore impoffible to conceive that hours and feet, ^c, {hould not be aliquot parts of infinite 1'ime and Space, and. that thefe parts fhould not bear fome kii7d of Proportion to this Infinity. Thefe parts indeed will never reach o\xx po,:tii:e,, sbfolute Infinite (i. e, that to which nothing can poliibly be added) becai:fe they include a perpetual addibility, as we ob- fcrved, which is called their Infinity, and which is a direil contradidlion to what we call a pofitive Infinite: And there-, fore poiitive Infinity applied to them is filf.y .applied, and 2
C pofitive
* See th?s plea fully confuted by Mr. Co/Z/^fr,, Lpparcial Enquiry into the Exiikuce and Nature of God. B. II. C ii. $>. i57,«fc.
Concerning the Ox\gm of 'EwW, Chap. I.
Prejudice adhering to them. For we can judge of things no otherwife than from our Conceptions. Nor arc we to feck for any other Criterion of Trnth than that a Conception of any thing offer- ed to the Mind forcibly extorts A (lent; as there is no other Criterion of Objeds perceived by the Senfe?, than that an Objed, by its Prefence forces us to perceive it even againfl our Will?. If there- fore the Conceptions, which we have of thcfe three before mentioned, reprefent them to us as exit- ing tiecejfarilj, fo that they cannot be feparatcd
from
NOTES,
pofitive infinity of Matter, Number, Time, Sparc, or any quantity that confifts of parts, or muft be confidered in fiicceflion. i. e. to uhich this negative infinite, and this on- ly, is and muft be apply'd, are all contradidtions. Now inllead of anfvvering this Argument againft the abfolute In- finity of Time and Space, Dr. Clarke firft of z\\ ftifpofcs that 7im£ and Space are abfolutcly infinite, and then becaufe, according to this our way of conceiving Infinity (which yet is the only v/ay we have of concci\ing it in thefe things) they could not polTibiy be infinite, he argues that we mull not con- fider them in this way, namely as if their farts had any re- lation at all to their Infinity. But fliould not the Argument rather be rcvers'd, and the confequence of it ftand thus ? This is our only way of conceiving any infinite applicable to.thele Things, but this way we cannot conceive thefe to be pofitive- ly infinite (or pofitive Infinity cannot be apply'd to thek) without a contradiiltion ; therefore we cannot at all conceive thefe to bepofitivcly infinite without a contradiction, or there- fore thcfe are not politively infinite.
There is indeed a certain ufc of the term infitiite among Ma- thematicians, where this reafoning of Dr. Clarke^ might bo admitted, but that is only v.here they confider Quantities re- latively, and not abfolutely, and therefore that can have no place where we arc confidering real Exillences. Thus when Geometricians fay that one Quantity is infinitely lels than a- noiher, they mean that their infinitely fmall Quantity is no a!i<^.uot part of, bears no proportion to, or cannot be compared V, ith the other ; but proportion 'is'(not]iing real but) purely relative, and therefore the term infinite apply'd here mull be lb
too.
Se6t. 2 Concerning the Origin <?f E v iL from Exiftence even in Thought, we muft affirm that thefe exift of themfdves, and reqiure no C^«^ of their txtiienu. But if we can conceive thefe once not to have been, to have begtin to be, or to be capable of Annihilation, 'tis plain that ^^■" ce(^an Exificr^ce belongs not to them, nor are they of thcmfelves; they muft therefore have their Be- ing from fomething elfe. For, h nee they may eitlier exift or not exift, Exiftence is not of their Nature, and if it be not of their Nature, they mult have it from without; and there wants a Caufe by which this Indift^rence to or Poffibility of either Exiftence or Non-exiftcnee, may be dctermm d. Nor do we judge a Caufe in th.ngs to be other^. wife neceffary than as they are in their own Nature iKdiferersty that is, pajjivc in regard to Exiitence, for, if our Conceptions reprefent fomethmg to us as neceflary in its own Nature, we enquire no far-- ther about the Caufe whereby it exifts (4) ,
C 2, 11^'
NOTES.
too. Thus for mftance, the Angle of Contaa made by a Curve md its Tangent is inftnitely Icfs than any ledihnear Angle, "bears no Proportion to it, is no Meafure of it, or cannot any ways be compared with it. But this is nothing to Infi- nity in^he Senie in which Dr. Clarke has ufed it; fuice by that he muft mean fomc determinate thing fomethmg ot which real Exiftence may be predicated which is very difte- rcn from Infinity in a relative Senfe, as it is fometimes con^ MeredTy Mathematicians ; or in a progreiTive and ludefimtc one which is the Senfe in which it is app bed to Quant tie? inci'eafmg or decreafing without End; and therefore what re- lates to thefe Infinites cannot be the foundation of any Argu^ ment concerning the other. The equivocal Ufe of the Word Ste in thel different Senfes by P-bhng Ivlathe-a.atics and Metaphvfics together has, I believ^e, occafion d muft ot the Confufion attending Subjefts of this Kind. ^^ ^ ,
(4.) The Sum of what our Author is here endeavou ng to pviJe'is that neither Matter nor Motio. (and he will ftiew The lame by and by oi Space) cm be inde,pend.nt or feU-«c,
it.
20 Concerning the Origin c/Evil. Chap. I.
^Tis pro- in. If we apply this to our Conceptions of the
ved that xhings in Qiieftion, it will appear whether they ht
qidres'a fclf-exiftcnf, or require a Caule. In the firft Place
Caufe, let us examin Aiotion^ whicJi is really ^tiion, but in
tho' it be all Action it is neceffary, if we may truft our
fuppofcd Thoughts, that there be an Jlgent and a Patient,
„„j 1 \ without thefe we have no Notion of Acflion. In
anci that , . ^ .
Matter is A'lotion therefore, lince that is Action, there is re- rot the ciuircd an ^geyjt and a Patient, We have indeed Caufe of x\\Q Patient, namely Aiattcr i We muft in the next Place (ee what is the Agent : viz,. Whether Mat- ter produces IVIotion in itfelf ; or (to fpeak proper- ly) Whether Motion be coeval with it, natural, and nccelTarily adhering to its EfTencc, as Figure
is
NOTE S,
iftent, and confequently that they require feme caufe of their Exiftencc dillind from and antecedent to themfelves. And tho' lie fi-equenty makes ufe of that confufed equivocal Term, twcef- fary Exijunce, yet he feems to apply it only in a negative fenfe for Silf-Exijhnce or Exi[le7ice ivithout Caufe, wliich is as much as his Argument requires. For where any thing ap- pears to be an efieil, as Matter and Motion do, we muft re- quire a Caufe ; where no luch Caufednejs can be difcovered, we call the Thing Self-exijlent, tho' perhaps it really be not fo, but might proceed from foracthing elfe; and where an abfurdity would follow from fuppofing any Being not to have cxified once, or not to exift for the future, we fay there's a fieccffity for fuppofing that it did and will always exift ; or wc flilc that Being recejfarily Exijietit : which is perhaps as far as we can go. But as thefe Words, Neceffhry Exijience feem to have been taken to denote fome pofii've, extrinjic Principle of Exiftencc ; and which accordingly is often ftiled antecedent, ahfoh.te, original ISeceJJlty, a ISeccJJity ftinple, and uniform, and abfolutely fuch in its onxin nature, in itfelf, &c. It may be ot fome ule to confider the fevcral Things to which thefe Terms are apply'd, and what Ideas wc fix to them ; which will per- haps convince us that thcv are all merely relati've.
Ncccfiity is chiefly ana primarily apply'd to Means ; and when it is thus apply'd, it evidently has Relation to fome End t& be attaia'd by thole Means gf which its aihrm'd. Thus,
whwi
Sed. 2.^ Concerning tbe Ongm of Evil, 2 1
is to Body. But if we remember what was kid down above, and carefully examine the Sentiments and Conceptions of our Minds, it wiil appear that the Nature of Matter (as far as we know of it) is indifferent to Motion, or Refl, and moves not ex- cept it be moved. Motion therefore does not fol- low from its Nature, nor is it contained in its Ef-
C 3 fcence
NOTES,
when we fay fuch a thing is necefTary, we mean that fome Emf cannot be attained without the Exiftence of that thing. Thus Religion is, tiecejfar'^ to a Rational Creature, or more properly. to the Happinefs of a Rational Creature ; /, e, a Rational Crea- ture cannot attain Happinefs, its ultimate End, without Reli- gion. Farther, Means being a Relative Idei, whatever is afr iirm'd of Means as Means, muft be Relative alfo ; or which is much the fame, muft be an AfFe<9:ion of a Relative Idea, v g. When we fay, any Aflion is Good, Fit, Right, Reafonahle, &c. all thefe Ter^is are or fliould be apply'd to it, as it is con- ceiv'd to be a Means to fome End, and confequently are re« lative ; therefore to call any Adtionyf/, hz. in itfclf, will be the fame as to affirm any thing to be rdatlve in itfelf, which is nonfenfe.
Neceihty is alfo applied to Truth, and then it has relation 10 fome other Truths, either antecedent or confequential, ac- cording to the different manner in which that Truth is proved to be necejfaril)^ true, i.e. according as the Proof is dire<fl or indireft. When the Proof is diredl, /. e. when the truth of any Propofition is llaewn to follow by unavoidable Confequence from fome other truth before known; then the A^^r^^/jofthaE Truth arifes from the Relation which it has to fome antecedent ■Truth: When the Pfoof is indireft, /. e. when the Truth of any Propofition is flicwn, by {hewing that the Suppofition of the con;:rary to that Truth, /. e. the denying that, would imply the Negation of, or be incontillent with fome other known Truth; then the Neceflity of that Truth arifes from, the Relation which it has to fome confequential Truth- iV^ tejjity is alfo applied to Axioms; and then it has Relation to the Terms themfelves, /. e. ic arifes from the Relation which is between the terms, and means that fuppofing or laying down thofe Term?, that Relation or Connexion between thcnj cannot but be. Farther, the faniie may be fa^ oiTrnth, as of
^2i. Concerning the Ongin of Y^vW. Chap. I.'
fence, nor do we conceive it to arife from thence : Matter is therefore merely palTive in Regard to Motion, and an Agent muft be fought elfewhere. If you fay it has been in Motion from Eternity, you'll be never the nearer ; for Duration alters not the Nature of Things. If it has moved from E- ternity, it has had an eternal Caufe; and fince Matter is only paffive with refpect to the Motion which is in it, if it was from Eternity, it was ftill pajjlve onlj, and there wanted an eternal Agenf
to
NOTES.
Means, Truth being relative alfo ; confequently fuch Phrafes as thefe, true ox falfe in itfelf, a Contradi^ion in iifelf; ox abfo- lutel'yfuch, &c. are very abfurd ones,
Neceflity is alfo applied to Exigence, and then it arifes ei- ther from the relation which the Exiftence of" that thing of \vhich it is aflirmed has to the Exiifence of o/^^r things', or from the Relation which the Exiffence of that thing has to the Manner of its oivn Exiftence. In the former Signification, when Neccffity of Exiftence has Relation to the Exiftence of other things, it denotes that the Suppofition of the Non-exift- cnce of that thing of which Neceflity is afKrmed, implies the Non-exiftcnce of things which we know to exift. Thus fome independenc Being does necejjarily exiji. Becaufe to fuppofe no independent Being implies that there are no Dependent Be- ings, the contrary of which we knov/ to be true; lb that Ne- ceflity of Exiftence in this Senfe, is nothing elfe but Neceflity of Truth as related to Confequential Truth. And this fort of Froof is called Dctnonjlratio a Fojleriori.
When the NecefHty of Exiftence arifes from the Rekition which rhc Exiftence of any thing has to the Manner of its own Exiftence, then Neceflity means that that thing of which it is afiirm'd exifts after fuch a Manner that it never could have not exifted. ' Thus every Independent Being, or every Being ex- ifting without a Caufe, is neceffarily exifting. Becaufe fuch a Being from the <z'ery manner of its exifting, could not begin to cxift, therefore muft always have exifted, /. e. does ncccfl^arily exift. For to fuppofe a Being to begin to exift, is to fuppofe a Mutation, i>iz. from Non-entity to Entity; and to fuppofe a Mutation is to fuppofe a Caufe', For if there's no Caufe, every .hing muft continue as it was. Therefore every Being which
had
Secfl. 2^ Concermttg the OnginofEvW. 2j
xo produce eternal Motion (5) in it: For eter- nal Adion cannot be more eafily conceived, with- out an eternal Agent, than temporary, without 2 temporal one. But you'll fay, what is eternal, lince it was never made, requires no Caufe. Why fo? Suppofe the Sun to have fhined from Eternity,
C 4 and
N O T E S»
had no Caufe of Exiftence, /. e. wKich is independent, cannot begin to exift, confequently cannot be fuppofed not to exift, z. e. is necejfarily exiftent. This fome call Demonjiratio a Priori.
Neceffity as applied to Exiftence in thcfe two Ways, mull carefully be diftinguifhed. For tho' an independent Being can- not be neceflarily exiftent in the former Senfe, without being fo in the latter alfo ; yet it may be neceffarily exiftent in the latter Senfe without being fo in the former. There may be two or more neceflarily exiftent Beings in the latter Senfe, i. e. with regard to Independence, though in the former i. e. in Relation to this Svjiem, there can be but one neceflarily ex- iftent Being ; which may ferve to fliew us the inconclufivenefs of Dr. darkens feventh Propofition. And upon the whole, I think we may be convinced that no Ideas can poffibly be fixe4 £0 thefe terms, Neceffity abjblute in itfelj. See alfo the latter Part of N. 10. and R. e.
(5.) Eternal Motion feems to be a Contradi6tion, [See in- finite Series in N. 3. and Collibers Impartial Enquiry, c. 7. and Rem. b.j unlefs we could conceive two Eternals, one before the other ; as every mover muft, in the order of our Ideas, neceiTarily operate before they moved ; Thefe things there- fore which imply Beginning, Change, Sacceflion, or Increafe, are finite as well in Duration, as in any other refpecl, and confequently the Siippoiitions here and below are all impoflible ones.
Of how little Importance that old Controverfy is, whe- ther Matter be eternal, may .be gathered from Note i* which fliews that there is properly no fuch thing as Mat- ter, diftindl from Body, /. e. a folld Subjiance enjery ivhere the fame, whicli that Word denotes, and which is not to to be found in that prccife manner of Exiftence. But if with our Author we take Matter for Body only, this as it undergoes perpetual Changes is in its very Nature in- capable of Eternity by Remarks c and d.
(6.) Thefe
24- Concerning the Origin ofEsW, Chap. I,
and the Earth, nouriflied by its Hear, to have un-. dergone eternal Viciffitudes of Seafon^ ; had thofe VicifTitudes therefore no caufe? Would they be e- ver the kfs dependent on the Sun as their Source and Original? Hence it appears that Eternity of Aftion docs not exclude an aftive Caufe, and it is fo far from Truth that i'uch Adion was never pro- duced, bccaufe it is conceived to have been from Eternity, that we mull: rather fay it has always been produced. Tor in the Inftance given it ap- pears that the Sun did always, and from Eternity^ iCaufe the cjiangeof Seafons : Not that I think the Sun really was, or could be eternal ; but if Motion jfhould be fuppof^d eternal (which is the only Sub- terfuge left to them that deny the Neceffity of an Agent, in order to the Exiftence of Motion) the Sun might equally be eternal with its Light and their Effeds. And if this be granted, it will plainly appear, that Etermty of lAElion does not exclude an AcHve Caufe. If then we follow the i^uidance of our Thoughts, we muft acknowledge that there is fomerhing befide Matter and Motion., which muft be the Caufe of Motion. Tl1at^7^^ IV. Secondly, as to Matter itfelf, if we may /^; requires fuppofe it lo have had a Beginning, or to be anni- a Caufe of biiated, tjecejfary Exiftence will manifeftly not be jts Exift- jnipijj.j \^ its Nature, for that may be taken from ^ ''"' it, atlcaft in Thought; but a thing cannot be fe- paratcd from its Nature or Jiftence even by the. Mind: If therefore Exiftence v/eve ejjemial to Mat- ter, it could not be divided from it even in thought, that is, we could not conceive Matter not to exift'. But who doubts whether he can do that ? Is it not as eafy to conceive that Spiice which the Marerial World occupies to be empty^ that is Void of Matter, z% fulll Cannot the Underftand- ing aflign to the Material World a Beginning ahd In End? They who admit of S^ace, or a F^^
cmm
Sed. 2.' Concerning the Ong\n ofEvWo 11^.
CHum (6) cannot deny but Matter is at Icafl: mentally feparapl? from Exiftence, For Space
may
MOTES,
(6.) Thefe two Words Space and Vacuum, tho' they ouglil- perhaps to have both the lame meaning, i. e. neither of them to mean any real thing or Quality exifting in Nature, but on- ly a ISegation of Matter and its Qualities; yet as the former is more evidently a pofitive Term, it is apt to convey an Idea of fomething pofitive, and thereby lead us to frame fome imagina- tion of that lomething, and fo at length draw us into a Notion quite different from that, which the latter Word more natural- ly offers, and which comes nearer to the truth of the Cafe ; and therefore it feems not quite fo convenient to ufe tl\efe two Words promifcuoufly. It may be doubted whether our fubfti- tuting the former of thefe terms for the latter, when the Ideas ufu^Uy fixt to them have in reality little to do with one ano- ther, may not have given rife to moft of the Difputes againft a Vacuum, which have been carried on by many able Writers- Vacuum, in Natural Philofophy, is (according to the true irrr port of the Word) only Emptinefs, or abfence of Matter, /. e. a Term that implies mere Negation ; tho' when we come to prove that Matter exifts not every where, or that there is rgai- ly any fuch emptinefs or abfence of Matter, we are obliged^ thro' the Defecl of Language, to make ufe of pofitive Terms about it, -viz,, that there is a Vacuum in this or that Place, or that there is a real Foundation in ^]'ature for fuppofing it. Hence, probably, Metaphyficians, when they come to confider it, being ufed to the Contemplation of abftract EfTences, arc led to undcrfland it as fomething pofitive, which mighr properly be faid to be here and there. Sec. Their next Step IS to bring it under the Imaginatio)2, and fo finding the Iden ef Space or Extenfipn in fome Mcafure connefted with this Emptinefs, they eafily fubftitute one for the other, and often change the negative Idea into a pofitive one, and define Vacu- um to be Extcjijion 'void of Solidity, or Space ivithout Body *» whereas the Ideas of Vacuity and Extenfion have no real Conneclion with each other, as was faid before, tho' they be very apt to go together. Thefe two diftin£t Ideas then being both included under the Word Vacuum, it becomes equivocal, and confequently that may be affirm'd or d«;ny'd of it accord- mg to the one Idea, which cwnot according to the other, and
herc^a
f IfOcke^ B. 2, C. 13. f. 2^j
2h' Concerning the Origin ^Evil. Chap. IJ
may be conceived either full or empty ; that is, with Matter, or without it. The Notion there- fore
N O 'f E S.
here is room for endlefs Juggle, i;. o-. It may be faid that there is a rca! Foundation in Nature for fuppofing a Vacuum in the negative Senfe of the Word, i. e. as fignifying mere Emp- tinefs ; but the fame Thing may be denied of it in the pofitive i. e. as {landing for pure Extension, which is an ahjlraB Idea form'd by the Mind itlelf, and as fuch has no Foundation any where elfe. Again, Philofophers, who take a Vacuum for Space or Extenfion in the Abftradt, flifRy deny that there is a Vacuu?n in Nature, which is true indeed of ablolute Space, which exifts only in the Mind, but is not fo of Vacuity or ab fence of Matter, which has as real a Foundation in Nature as Matter itfelf has ; except we'll argue that 'it cannot be faid to be or to have Exiftevce predicated of it, becaufe it is only a Negation; which is playing upon and puzling one another with Words. To illuflrate what has been faid of the Difputes about a Vacuum, I fhall prefent the Reader with fome Argu- ments brought againft it by Mr. Green and Boyle ; which may be of ufe to us fo far as they overthrow the Reality of abfo- lute, fimple Space, which they do effedlually, tho' I take them to be mere Quibbles with regard to the End for which thefe Authors feem to have quoted them. They may ferve al- fo for another Inftance of the great Confufion caufed by a jum- ble of Mathematics and Metaph)Tics together : An Example of which was given before in the Word hjinite, N. 3.
<f Extenfion into Length, Breadth and Thicknefs, or what " is called mere Space, or Diltance, is a Quantity abftratlcd ,* by the Mind, as all other Mathematical f^H-'^iti'^i'-s are ; as " a Line, or Superficies; and can be no more imagin'd to <' exift in Nature alone, than Length or Breadth can. A " Line is produced from the flowing of a Point; a Surface " from the flowing of a Line; and a Space or Mathematical "' Solid from the flowing of a Surfice : But it is owned *' that there is no fuch real Point, and confequcntly no fucli, «' Line in being, therefore no fuch Surface. And what Rea- <' fon can there be afligned why we may not go on one Step <' farther, and from the flune Principles conclude thare is no *' fuch Solid. For how is it poflible for a Superficies which '< has not a Being, and is imaginary and abftradred, to produce S' an Effedi: which is not equally fo. js ^< We have faid, that Length, Breadth, and Thicknefs is I ■ t " the
Sed. 2. Coficer?img the Ongm of EwW, zf^
fore of the Creation of Matter, is no more repug- nant to our Conceptions, than the Creation of Space.
V,
NOTES,
«« the Definition of imaginary Space ; and it is likcwife the *« Notion we have of Vacuum, as to the Nature and Eflence " of it; for the foreign Properties of Light, or Heat, or «' Sound, ^c. are not inchided in the Conceptions our Minds " have formed of Room to move in, or fimple Space. If " therefore the Delinition of imaginary Space and a Vacuunty *' are the fame, and a Vacuum is real Space, it follows, that *' real Space and imaginary are the lame, which is a Contra- *' didlion. Since to abftraft any thing in the Mind from Be- *' ings as they really exift, is not to confider Beings as they « reallv exift.
" Fl-om this Idea o? Space, being only an abftraded one, it *' is eafy to give an Account of what Place is, namely, that it *' is only a Portion of this abftrafted Space, we have menti- *' oned, feparated from the reft, and applied to that Body *^' which it confiders as a Meafure of its Capacity. Therefore " primary or abfolute Place alfo, as well as Space is a Crea- •' tureofthe Mind, and nothing really exilling, as fome Phi- •' lofopher's imagine. Mr. Gr:e.(iXii Principles of Natural Phi- " lofophy, B. I.e. 4, 8, 18.
'"■ Let us rummage as much as we pleafe into all the Re- " cefles of our Mind, we fhall never find there an Idea of an " unmqveable, indivifible, and penetrable Extenfion. And «' yet if there is a Vacuum, there mull exift an Extenfion cf- *' fentially endued with thefe three Attributes. It is no fmall " Difficulty to be forced to admit the Exiiicnce of a Nature, " of which we have no Idea, and is befides repugnant to the «* clearejl Ideas of our Mind. But there arc a great many o- " ther Inconveniences which attend this. Is this Vacuum, or ♦' immoveable, indivifible, an4 penetrable Extenfion, a Sub- *' ftance or a Mode; Itmuft be one of the two, for the ade- ** quate Divifion of Being comprehends but thele two Mem- " bers. If it be a Mode, they muft then define its Subftance j " but that is what they can never do. If it be a Subftance, I " aflc whether it be created or uncreated ? If created, it may *' perifti without the Matter, from which it is diftinft, cea- " fing to be. But it is abfurd and contradidorv that a Va- y cuum> that is, a Space diftin£t from Bodies, ftiould be de-
" ftroycd
2S^ Concerning the Origin ofEvW. Chap. L'
That is is V. But whether there be any fuch Thing as
not necef- Spa^e or no, we are certain that we have an Idea of
farily exi- ^
ftent, as **•
appears • ^ ^ p
from the ISJ U I t. ^.
confeflion
of thofe " ftroyed, and yet that Bodies fliould be diflant from each o- Perfons " ther, as they maybe after the Deftruftion of the Vacuinn. 3ut who fup- " 5t"this Space diiiinft from Bodies is an uncreated Subftance, pofc Space " i^ will follow either that it is God, or that God is not the to be the " only Subftance which necefTarily exifts. Which Part fo- Image of " ever we take of this Alternarive, we fhall find our felves conr Bod^. " founded. The laft is a formal, and the other at leaft a
" material Impiety : For all Extenfion is compofed of di- " ftinft Parts, and confequently feparable from each other; " whence it refults, that if God was extended he would not " be a fimple, immutable, and properly infinite Being, but a " W^{=,Q'i^t\Xi%%, Ens per aggregationem, each of which would •' be finite, tho' all of them together would be unlimited. " He would be like the Material World, which in the Car- *' _/?^z« Hypothefis, is an infinite Extenfion. And as to thofe *' who fhould pretend that God may be extended without be- " ing material or corporeal, and alledge as an Argument, his <* Simplicity, you will find them folidly refuted in one of Mr. ** Arnatild's Books, from which I fhall cite only thel'e Words: " So far is the Simplicity of God frojn allon.ving lis Room to think *' that he mav be extended, that all Divines hanie acknoavledged, " after St. Thomas, that it is a neceffary Confequence of the " Simplicity of God, not to be extended. Will they fay, with <' the Schoolmen, that Space is no more than a Privation of «' of Body; that it hath no Reality, and that, properly fpeak- «' ing, a Vacuufh is nothing? But this is fuch an unreafon- •' able AfTertion, that all the modern Philofophcrs who de- " clare for a Vaanvn, have laid it afide, tho' never fo conve- *' nient in other Rcfpects. Gaffcndus carefully avoided any ** Reliance on fuch an abfurd Hypothefis ; but chofe rather «* to plunge himlelf into the moit hideous Abyfs ofconjeftur- »' ing, that all Beings are not either Subil;ances or Accidents, f and that all Subftances are not cither Spirits or Bodies, and " of placing the Extenfion of Space amongft the Beings, " which are neither Corporeal nor Spiritual, neither Sub- *' ftance nor Accidents.
" Mr. Locke, believing that he could not define \vhat a Va- *' citum is hath yet given us clearly to underlland, that he " took it for a pofitive Being. He had too clear a Head no: «• to difcerii, that nothingnflfs cannot h% extended in Lengthy
' ■ ^< Breadth,
Sed. ^. Cmcerning the Origin o/'Evil. 2^
it rho* whence we had it, Philofophers are not a- crreed. Thofe that deny any Diflindion between
it
NOTES.
'' Breadth, and Depth. Mr. Hartfcshr hath very clearly ap- " prehended this Truth. There is no Vacuity in 'Nature faith *' he, this OHght to be acknoivledged ivithout Difficulty., becaufe, '* it is utterly contradiSlory to concei've a mere l\lon-entity, ivith " all the Properties lubich can onl-j agree to a real Being. But if" ** it is contradidlory thatNothingncfs fhould be endued with " Extenfion or any other Quality, it is no lefs contradiiStory *' that Extenfion fhould be a Jimple Being, fmce it contains *' fome things of which we may truly deny what we may truly *' affirm of fome others, which it includes. The Space filTd *< up by the Sun is not the fame Space that is taken up by the " Moon; for if the Sun and the Moon filled the fame Space, ** thefe two Luminaries would be in the fame Place, and pe- *' netrated one with another, fince two Things cannot be pe- ** netrated with a third, without being penetrated betwixt *' themfclves. It is moll evident that the Sun and Moon are " not in the fame Place. It may then be faid truly of the *' Space of the Sun, that it is penetrated by the Sun; and it " may as truly be deny'd of the Space penetrated by the " Moon. There are then two Portions of Space, really di- ^' Ilinfl from one another, by reafon that they receive two *' contrary Denominations of being penetrated and not being ^' penetrated by the Sun. Which fully confutes thofe who " venture to alfert that Space is nothing but the Immenfity of " God ; And it is certain that the divine Immenfity could not *• be the Place of Bodies, v/ithout giving room to conclude " that it is compofed of as many real dillindt Parts as there *• are Bodies in the World.
" It will be in vain for you to alledge, that Infinity hath no «* Parts; this mull necefTarily be falfe in all infinite Number i^ *' fince Number ellentially includes feveral Units. Nor will " you have any more Reafon to tell us that incorporeal Ex* *' tendon* is wholly contain'd in its Space, and alfo wholly ■ " contained in each Part of its Space : For it is not only *' what we have no Idea of, and befides, thwarts our Ideas of *' Extenfion ; but alfo what will prove that all Bodies take
" up
* Tofa in toto, ^3° tota in ftngulis par tibia : that is what the Schoolmen fay of the Prefence of the Soul in a hu^r^'ah Body, and of the Prefence of An^el* in certain Place?,
2^ Concermng the Origin of Ewi\. Chap. T,
it and Body, bid us imagine Matter or the World to be annihilated ; and then, if we remember the Things that did exift, without confidering of what Kind they were, but only that they were withouu the Mind, we have what we call Space, If this be true, then it will be certain that Matter is not Self-cxiftent : For we may conhder it as annihi- lated, neither can we attribute any other Nature to it, than fuch as anfwers to our Conceptions of it. If Space therefore, according to them, be a Phantafm of Body, that is, an Idea of Body re- called to mind which formerly was, but now is nor, or is it not fuppofed tobe, 'tis certain that Bo- dy or Matter, fo far as we know any thing of its nature, is indifferent as to exiftence or non-exiflence. It has not therefore Exiftence of itfelf; for that which exifts by Neceffity of Nature, Exiftence
enters
'• NOTES.
^^ up the fame PIacc, fince each could not take up its owa," " if the Divine Extenfion was entirely penetrated by each " Body numerically the fame with the Sun and with the " Earth. You will find in Mr. ArnaiiW^, a folid Refutation *' of thofe who attribute to God the difFufmg 'himfelf through- " out infinite Space. Crtt. DiSf. p. 3083, 3084. He con- cludes p. 308:; " If the Nature of penetrable or impenetrable " Extenfion draws along with it fuch a large Train of Incon- *' veniencies, the fliortelt Way is to affcrt that it hath no other " Exillence than in our Mind." If any Perfon want any- more Arguments againft the Exiflencc of fimple Extenfionj or the Application of it to a Spirit, he may find enow ia Bayle, p. 2790, 3077,^5'^. See alfo Efifcopitis. Inji, 7heol. p. 294.
* Arnauld, Letter 8 and 9 to Father Malebranchc See al- fo a Book of Peter Petit., de cxtenfione Anims. i^ reruni incorpo- rearum natura. Aud M. de la Chamhrih Aufwer to it, which' he publifhed at Paris, Anno 1666. \to with this Title, Defe?tce de r Extenj'.on 13 de partes libres de Vajne.
All the Rcafons he alledges to fltew that Extenfion ancJ Spirituality may be together are {o weak, that they arc only good to fiiew the F.vlfity of his A'ficrtion.
Se£t. 2. Concerning the Origin of Evil. gl
enters into its Uea, nor can it be conceived other- wife than as exifting.
VI. Others deny that Space is diftinguifhable And of from Matter, any other way thart as a genericd thofc wha Oumtity is from a particular one ; For as when In- f^^jj^^^?^* divldftals are changed^ the Nature of Man or Animal fti,-,gu;f}i, remains unchanged: So when Body is changed or able from iranjlated into another Place, the Extenjion of the Matter, Place 7vhich it occupied remains unchanged, namely ^'V o'^er- /-,» ; . r ; -n / T iJ - Wife then
entpty, or filled with another Bodj. JL would not -^sExtenfi-
fpend a Cenfure on this reafoning ; but granting it on in gc- To be true, it would follow that Body or Matter neral is contains nothing in the idea of it, which might in- f''°^^ ^ duce us to believe that it is of itfelf, or cxifts by ^f^Son. the NeceOTity of its Nature: but on the contrary, that it may be annihilated at leaft in Conception. If therefore we confult our Ideas, we mull con- fefs that Matter does not exift neceffarily, but is as indifferent to Exiftence or Ncn-exiftence, as to Motion or Reji':, i. c. is in that rcfped merely paffivc. It requires a Caufe then which may determine it to Exifience no lefs than to Motion, For that whicli is not of itfelf mull: necellarily be of another, nor can we know that any thing is of itfelf, otheiwife tl¥in from the Ideas whfch.we have of its nature ; if thefe r:prefent the nature of any thing as necejfarily exifting, fo that we cannot conceive it not to be, we enquire no farther about its caufe; if not, we fly to a Caufe ; nor is the Underftanding farisfied till it has found one. Why are we inquifitive about the Original of Man, or any thing elfe? but only becaufe our Conceptions reprefent thefe as indiffer- ent in themfelves to Being, and therefore a; requi" ring fome Caufe of their Exifience diflind from themfelves. From the nature then of Matter as well as Alotiony we are forc'd to admit of mother Principle to be the Caufe of both.
vir.
•St
TkitSpace ieems at ftrft Sight infepara- ble from tLxiltencc.
ihcwn that this may a rife from Pre- judice.
■fiippofes S/>Jtfe i while therefore we con- ceive fome thing to ex ill vvi th- ou t us, \vc cannot annihilate Space in Thought,
Concerning the Origin of Evil, Chap. f.
VII. Thirdly. As to Space^ many doubt whe- ther its nature be diilinguilliable from exiftence. Whether it can be annihilated even in thought, or conceived not to have been. For when the whol6 material World is annihilated in the Mind, the Idea of Space remains, as of a thing yetexifting; it ob- trudes itfelf upon the Underftanding, and lufFers us not to aflign any beginning or end of its Bxiftence, It forces us therefore to confefs, whether we will or no, that it exifts ; nor doesitfeem to require a Caufe whyitexifts fince it is of fuch a Nature as being felt fufficient, muft have exiftence of itfelf. For what v.'ill be felf-e:^i(knr, if that be nor, which cannot even be conceived not to exifl: ?
Villi This feems to argue flrongly for the Self- exijience of Space. Yet a Doubt may arife v/he- th'er this Inability of our Underftanding to fepa- rate the Nature of Space from Exiftence, proceed from that fame Nature of Space, or rather from the ImperfeElion of our Rcafon. For tho' all our fimple Conceptions mufi: for the mo ft part be look'd upon as true, as we faid before ^, yet thefe are to be excepted from this Rule in which we find any Grounds of Fallacy or Prejudice. And in this reafoning about Space, it is to be fufpeQed that we conned Exiftence with ics Nature merely out of Frejudice,
IX We may underftand how this comes to paf?, if we confider ifi- That our Conceptions come for the moft part from 7i'ithouty when therefore fomething is prefented to our Mind>, we always conceive it as without us : This Notion therefore of external and internal adheres to all our Concep- tions, and we continually alhgn a P/ace to every thing which we happen lo think of; but that there Ihould be any thing externa), or which ha? a Place
and"
* § II. Parag. 11.'
Stdi 2 . Colic ti 'nhig the Orig i n ^ E v il,
and no SpAce^ is inconceivable. As long then as we think of any thing external, we cannot but at the fame time believe that Space exifls, in which Space we conceive that thing to exift. For while we fuppofe any thing exifling b:fide ourfelves, that Jieceflarily feerns to be without us; but imagine all- Externals removed, and turn the Mind upon it/'elf, and that without will be taken away, and together with it the neceffity o^ Space or Place. For while we con* ceive nothing to exifl befide ourfelves, i.e. our Minds, we don't think of this u-ithout, that is, of Space ) nor fee any necefliry for its Exigence, (j.)
x;
AT 0 T E S,
. (7.) From hence, I think, it appears fufficiently that Space. Were itr granted to have any real Exiltcnce at all, I mean to be any thing more than an Idea in our Minds, (which fome per- haps will not be very ready to grant, from an attentive Confi- cjeration o^ the Notes 3. and 6.) yet it cannot be fuppoied to exift ncceflarily, in Dr, C/arh's lenlc o^ necejary Exijrence,. For according to him, ' * Whatever is nccefliirily exiiling,
* there is need of its Exigence, in order to the Suppofal of the
* Exigence of any other Thing; fo that nothing can pofTibly
* be fuppofed to exift, without prefuppofing and including' « antecedently the Exiftence of that which is ncccfiary, , There-^
* fore, the fuppofing of any thing poffibly to exiil alone, fo 33-
* not neceffarily to include the prefuppoial of fome other
* thing, proves demonftrably that that oth?r thing is not ne-
* cellarily exifting ; becaufe, whatfoever has necelTary Exi-
* ftence cannot pojhbly, in any Conception whatfoever, be.
* flippofed away. There cannot poffibly be any Notion of th«,
* Exiftence of any thing, there cannot poffibly beany Notion "* of Exiftence at all, but what fliall neceffiirily prcinclude the ' Notion of that which is necefiarily exiilent.
Now if we can confidc.r our own Souls as exifting alone and without this iS/rtc^?, without confidering it as a caufa Jitu qua non, or in any other refpeft; \w\x\\o\xt prefuppojing, or unv Vfs.y5 inciudingii: This (according to the Dr. himfelfj vvijl -prove demonftrably that Space is not necefTariiy exiftent. But let any one flicw us what neceffi.ty there is fur the Exiftence of
D' Space.
* JiifiK-er to the ftrji tetter p 10,
34 Co7iccrni?ig the Ox\gmof'Ev\\. Chap. I.
That X. It is to be obfervcd farther, that when we
things p.re Q^nihilatc any thine in our Mind, we confider it as
conceived jo
to be an- lOme-'
nihilated a7 n -r r c
by fubRi- N U I h b.
tuting
fomething Space, in order to the fuppofal of the Exiftence of a Spirit . elfe in the Let him try whether he cannot conceive an imjuaterial think- Room of ing Subftance, without the Idea of Space or Exte7ij,on; nay, them J but whether he can poffibly conceive it with them; whether thefe we have Ideas are at all applicable to an immaterial Being, and not ra- nothirg ther repugnant and contr.:diclory to the very Notion of it ; to fublli- whether they belong not iolcly to Matter, and if that were an- tutc for nihilated, might not eafily be fuppofed away. Few, I believe. Space. befide Dr. Clarke, can apprehend liow Space is (as he calls it
in his 4th Reply to Leibnitz*) the Place of all Ideas. Vm. fure Space and Spirit, and the diftincT: Properties of each, appear to me as diftant and incompatible, as the moll remote and incondilent things in nature; and an extended Soul icems juii: fucli another Phrafc as tl green Sound, an Ell of Coiifciouf- nefs or Cube of Virtue. Dr. Clarke grants \ that Extenjwn does not beloiig to "Thought, (as our Author has indeed proved in many of its Modes, in Pnrag. XIV. and XV.) and at the fame time endeavours to fliift off the Confequencc by anfwer- ing, that Thought is not a Being. But where's the Diffe- rence in this Rei'pect ? Don't we frame our Idea of the Bei7ig from its conftituent Properties ? And if thefe have no manner of relation to Extenfion, why fliould the fuppofed Being to which they belong have any ? \ Wliich Being is indeed no- thing but the Aggregate of thele Properties. See Note i. I'm apt to think that our conceiving Subjiance by way oi Suh- f.ratum, lias led us into the Notion that all kind of Subftances mull be extended; and 'tis perhaps impoffible for us to imagine any fuch thing as an U next ended Suljiance ; but yet Reafon con- vinces us that there are many veal things of which we can form no Imagination. And that there are Beings in Nature to which no manner of Extenfion can poflibly be apply'd, wc find fufficiently prov'd by Cied--u'orth |(. Among the various Arguments there produced this is the Subilance of one. ' If ' the Soul be an extended Suhjiance, then it mufl of neceffity * be either a Phyjical Point (for a Mathematical Poi-nt has no
' ExtenJiOTi)
* N. 29. p. 144.
f Anf^Mcr to the fecond Letter, p. 1 6. % See R. h. at the end of this Chapter, i Imcll. Syil- p. 82} — 832.
Sedt. 2 Co?icernirigtIjeOx\^\nof)^\'\\. 3^
fomething evanefcenr, and removed out of Sight; but yet \ve look upon fome other thing as fublh-
D 2 tuted
N 0 T E S>
* Exten/ion) or minimiiin, the leaft Extcnfion that can pofiiblf
* be ; — or ehe it nuift confift of more inch. P hyfecal Points. "■ joined together. As for the former of thcfe, it is impoflibl^ « that one fmgle Atom, or fmallcjl Point of extcnfion ihould
* be able to perceive diitindly all the ijaricty of things, /. e.
* take notice of all the diJlinSl and different Parts of an extend-
* cd Objed, and have a Defcription ov Deiifuafirjn oi thcwholc ' of them at once upon itfclf: (for that would be to make ic
* di-viftbie and indi'vifible at the ilime time) As for the l?.trer, if *. the Soul be an extended Subftance conlilHng o^ tr.ore Points,.
* one without another, all concurring in every Seufatioiu therjf
* mull every one of thefe Points cither perceive a Poijit and ' Part of the Object only, or elfe the au/'o/V Objed : Now if
* every Point of the extended Soul perceives only a Point of
* the Objed, then is there no one thing in us that perceives the
* ^vhole ; or which can compare one Part with another. But
* if every Point of the extended Soul perceives the ivho/e Oh- ' jedl at once confifting of many Parts , then will the former
* Abfurdity return. And alfo there would be innumerable P^rr- '. cipients of the fame Obje£i in every Senfation, as many as
* tliere are Points in the extended Soul : And from both thefe ' Suppofitions it would alike foUov/ that no Alan is one fingle *. Percipie?it, or Perfon, but that there are innumerable diftindt ^ Percipients, or Perfons in every Man. Neither can there be ' any other Suppofuion made befides thofe three foremea-
* tion'd: As that the whole ^•.Y/fWfr/5'5«/fliould perceive both ' the nvhole fenjible object, and all its fcveral Parts, no part of
* this Soul in the mean tinje having any Perception at all by ' itfelf; becaufe the whole of an extended Being is nothing but ' all the Parts taken together; and if none of thofe P^v;/j hxvz.
* any Life, Senfe, or Perception in them, it is impofhble there ' fhould be any in the nvhole. But in very truth, to iay that ^ the whole Soul percciveth all, and no Part of it any thing, ' is to acknowledge ic not to be extended, but to be indivifeble,
* which is the thing we contend for.
From hence alfo, that an indi'vifible Being or Subftance is not capable of receiving a Di'uijible <^iality, nor a Di-vijillc Sub-, llance an itidi-i.>ifibie one, he makes it tally appear that neither Matter can pofliblv think, nor Spirit be extended, ibid. p. 827, 828, 829. ' ,
D 3' Where
36 Concernifig the Origin ofEw'il. Chap. I.
tilted in the room of that which difappeared; thus when jiccidcnts are removed, we conceive the Sub- fiance
NOTES.
Where Mr. Collihcr might have found a fufficient Anfvvef to his Argument for the Soul's Extenfion from its recei'ving Ideas of extended Things*. And to his Maxim, that like is kvov.-n bv like, and by Confcquencc a Subjeft abfolutely void of extenfion could have no Ideas of extended things -f.
' Nay the Soul (fays Cud-Tvorth) conceives extended things ' themfclves /iWA7f;;^;'i?(7'/y and ifidi^jijihly, for as the difierenci
* of the whole Hetnifphere is contrac^ted into a narrow Compafs
* in the Pupil of the Eye, fo are all diftances yet more con-
* tra6tcd in the Soul itfelf, and there underilood indijlantly :
* for t.}\Q thought of a Mile difiance, or 10,000 Miles, or femi-
* diameters of the Earth, takes up no more room in the
* Soul nor Jirctches it any more than does the thought of a ' foot or i}2ch, or indeed of a Mathematical Point X-''^
The foregoing Arguments againft the fimplicity of exten' fion, as well as thofc in Notes tj. and 6. conclude equally a- gainfc Vix. ColUbers Amplitude or Expanfton j| . Since, if it hz any thing real, it mufl: have parts reallv diilinft from one ano- ther; which diftinct parts can never be the fubjeftof an undi- vided Quality, nor any addition of them ever reach a pofitive Infinity. But in truth, thcfc V.''ords Expanfion, Amplitude, &c. don't feem to imply any f ofitive thing or quality diftindt from material Extenfion, or indeed to have any determinate mean- ing at all; like the Vii cf the School-men, which was not place but fomething elfe, they did not know v.h.it, and mull belong to Spirits, tho' how or why they could not tell.
The lalt mention'd Writer has a lecond Argnment for the Amplitude or Expavfton of the Dii'ive Natttre, grounded on a- nother Maxim, viz. Nothing can hejlo^v nvhat is has tiot in it- felf: but God has created material expanfion, therefore he mull be expanded himfelf, p. 223. Which Argument is anlwefd by our Author in the 1 8 th Paragr who_fliews that fuch Expaii- fion is a mere imperfedion, as well as materiality, and confe- qucntly is equally inconfillent with the perfcdion of the Di- vine Being. See alfo Rem. h.
That
* Impartial Enquiry p. 222. -j- Ibid. p. 223.
X hitell. Syfi. p 827, 829. ^c. 11 Impartial Enquiry
SevSt. 2. Concerning the Origin ofEvW, 37
fiance remaining; fetting afide Matter, we fubfti- ture Space ; but when Space is removed, we have nothing to fubftitute in its (lead, except material or external Things j but all thcfe fuppofe Space, and cannot be conceiv'd without it; no wonder then that we cannot annihilate Space, while we conceive thefe as exifting. If therefore we would come at a. right Underihnding of the Nature of Space, we muft not apply our Minds to any thing material or external, but attend to our own Thoughts and Senfations, which have no rcla'^ion to external Things or to Qiiantity : And when our Minds are thus employed, there will appear to be no more Neceffity for the Exiftence of Space than of Matter.
Xr. It proceeds therefore (vomPrejudiccy and an We at unwary way of thinking, that we couple nccefTity of ^"^\P ^,^
r -a • L r • L J \ f \ \. annihilate
txijtence with Space; neither do we obferve that ^^,}^j|g
for this very Reafon we cannot conceive Space not thofe to exif}, becaufe we imagine thofe things ftill exi- things iting, which cannot exift without Space; which is continue no greater a Wonder than if any one intent upon l"" \ ■ the Mobility of the Heavenly Bodies, fhould cona- and there- plain that he could not annihilate the Matter of foreitcan- thera, while the -^or/o'? continued; for material "pt be an- and extern?.! things have no lefs Dependance on nihilated. and Conneiflion with Space, than Mobility has with Matter; if then we con:eive God only to ejfift, -vyhile he contemplates himfelf as exifting
D 5 alon^
NOTES.
That no CoUcfljon or Combination of Atoms can think^ (and the fame reafon holds againft any thing which can be con- ceiv'd by way oi parts) fee proved at large in Bayle's Dift. p. 1924. under the Aricle Leucippia, Remark E. See alfo Dr. Ciarke''& Letters to Z)ui/--zw/ Concerning the Immortality of the Soul, if^c. or Religio)! of Nature Deli?:, p. i86, ^c. or H. Ditionh Appendix to his Djfcouxft contcrni;ig the R.efL|r- tet^ion.
38 Concerning the Origin o/'Evil. Chap. I,
alone, he cnn no more be judged to ftand in need of Space, or be confcious of it as aclually exiting, than we are while we contemplate only the reflex Ad-s of the Mind. But when he willed external Things, he made Flace or Space for them to exifl- in. God can- XII. It may be objecled that we can fep.ar.ue 'not be Extfteme from God after the fame manner as we conceived endeavour to nmo/e it fiom Space. For the ?xiV° Mind being reflected on itfelf, and folely intent v.V upon contemphting i^s Operations, may deny
God to exift as well as Space. If therefore we de- ny Space to be felf-exittent, becauf? we can confi- der our Mind as exifling alone in Nature, and confequently Space as not cxifling; why may not we, by the fame way of reafoning, deny that God h Jclf-exifientt I anlwer, we are confcious that we do not exift of ourf'elves, while therefore we con- template ourfelves and our intelledual Operations, we are ncceflarily carried to fome Caufe ; being certain that we have Exiflence from another, and not of (burfelves; we cannot therefore exert even one ad of the Underfl:anding but it mufl: have a neceflary Connexion with fome Cmfc diflind from u«. Bccaufe XIII. We cannot therefore conceive ourfelves
Weave as the only Beings in nature, for v/e mufl: admit, confcious along with us, the Caufe from which we derive that we £xiftence, which is a confufcd Conception of God. exift°of ^^^ ^^'^ ^^^^^ cannot be faid of Space; for the Ope- curfclvEs. rations of our Mind aie fo intimately perceived by ' us as to have no neceffary Connexion with Space,
and we underfland clearly eaough that thefe may be, tho' there were no Space, and do not fland in need of it for their Exiftence. If we conceive our- felves as confifting of both Body and Adind^ 'tis certain we fland in need of Space for our Exiftence, and during that Conception, 'tis impoflible for us ' ■ ■ . '■■ '■ ■ ■ ■ to
Sed. 2. Concerning the Origin of RwW, 39
to conceive Space to be annihilated; viz,. h<^- caufe fuch a Conception has a necelTary Conneftion with Space. After the fame manner, if we con- ceive ourfelves to be Mind only, yet we muft own the Exigence of God. For a finite Mind requires a Caufe from which it may receive Exigence, no lefs than a Body does a Place tn which it may exift; and from hence, in reality, it is that we attribute Self-exijience to Space, becaufe whenever we think of ourfelves, we imagine ourfelves to confift of both Body and Mind. While therefore we are con- fcious of our own Exigence, we form our Belief of Space alfo as neceffarily exifling, fince it is conneiSed with the Conception of Bodp i. e. of Qtirftlves,
XIV. Secondly, It is remarkable that the Con- Smell, ceptions which we have from hearings fmclUngt or Talk, tafting, tho' they be produced in us by external Hearing, Objects, yet they have no Connexion with the aive us Conceptions o^ Space -^ for who can imagine the any notice Longitude, Latitude, orProfundity of 5'i??i«i, Smelly of the ovTaJie^ If then we had only thefe three Senfes, we ^^ift^''''^^ fhould not fo much as imagine that there was any ^ Space. Our Conceptions therefore abftraft from all Extenfion, nor do the Notion-; of external and internal adhere fo clo'ely to our Thoughts bnt we may lay them allde ', and if we fet thefe afide, the Sclf-exiftence of Space doe? not neceffaily ohiruds itfelf upom u% Now as the common People at- tribute Smells, Tajles, Colours, and other fenjib'e Qualities to the Objeds themfelves, and believe that they exift in them; while they who attend better to their Thoughts, know that they exift on- ly in the Mind, and are nothing in the things by which they are produced, befide the peculiar Mo- tion and Texture of their Parts; after the fame manner, 'tis probable, we are impofed upon in attributing necelTary Exiftcnce to Space, becaufe
P 4 we
40 Concerning tbe Origin ofEvW. Chap. I.
we obfcrve that alinofl; all our Thoughts are pro- cluced in us from withour, and thereby accuftom- ing ourfclves to join Space with them, while we arc confcious that we think, we conceive alfo that Space exirts; Whereas, if \vt remember that aH our Senfation?, even thofe produced by exfernal Things;, fuch as Smells, c^c, do not bring along with them the Notion of Space, we may eafily lay alide this Prejudice , and withdrawing our Thoughts fiom the Contemplation of Space, ma^ conceive it not ro^f.
The XV. And this will appear Thirdly, if by a
il^'-ic/^ reflex A(5b we view the Aiind itfelf and its Opem-. u nor it- '^''^^'O'^^s \ for nothing of Extenfion or Space offer's felt has no itfelf in thefe ; nor does the Mind, when employ- relation to ed about them, think at all of Space, nor is it Space, nor confcious tliat it occupies Space: It withdraws '.(.y ^^j.|^' therefore from the Conceptions of internal and i* " externd, and may conceive nothing to be in the
World befides hfc]j\ and its Cauje ; i. e. can imia- gine Space to be non-exiflent. Thinking Beings then may exift without Space ; It proceeds there- fore from Prejudice that we join Necejfary Exijlenc^ with it.
We may XVI. Fourthly, It is to be remarked that
conceive Space, fo far as appears to our Conceptions, is
Space to ^jf fm-h a Nature as cannot be annihilated by
L-fteTall ^' ^^^^^i Toi' ^hey are in (uch a manner united t6
together, ^nd dependent upon one another, that if we fup-
butnotbypofe one Part, it will imply a Contradidion
5*arts. for the others not to exifl. We can in Thought
* ' remove all W-ater put of -a VefTel, or Chamber,
and the Space interjacent between the Walls
remains extended in Length, Breadth, and Depth':
put the Space caniioc be removedj lince it is of its
Sedt. 2. Cojic erni rig the Ongm of 'EvW. 41
own Nature immmovable, (8.) nor can it be an- vihilatcd; for Diftance would ftill remain between the Bounds, which cannot be without Extenlion, nor Extenlion without a Subjed ; but Space, as fa}' as we can conceive itj is the primary Suhjd^ (c?.)
■ ■■ pf
NOTES,
(8.) That is, as I have often hinted, if we fuppofe it tq have any real Nature or to exijl at all, it mufi:, as our Author fays, exill: every where, and cannot be removed by parts. And in this Senfe fli'ould the Words of Sir I/aec NeivtoJi be under- ftood *. " The order of the parts of Space is immutable > re- ** mo've thefe from their places^ and you nvill remo-ve them, as / *' may fay, from themfel'ves." For to fuppofe it all at once a- v/ay, feems fo far from amounting to that ahfw-d Suppofition xnerLtion'd by Dr. Clarke f , that it is i)o more than what mufi: be conceiv'd in every Annihilation of any thing, which is the total deftrutlion or taking a^vay of Exiflcnce, the removal oF it, as we may {^j, from itfclf, or from Being: Which is ^ Suppofition that is generally thought to carry no abfurdity along with it.
(9 ) Dr. Clarke affirms;]: that ^pace is not a Suhfance ; and yet declares that it has real ^alities Ij. Is not this either to fuppofe ^/alities or Properties inherent in one another? Or clfe, with Gnffendus, to imagine fome middle thing betwecii Subfance and Accident, which is neither ofthem^ but partakes of both ?
The learned Writer referred to in Note 3. is of the fame Opinion \vith our Author in this Place, viz. that we are apt to conceive Space to be a fort of Subllancc or Subfratum 0/ Exteitfon, and fo are ufed to attribute that and other imagi- nary Qualities to it. * The Idea of Space is not the Idea qF ' Extenfion, but of fomething extended, it is the Subfratum of
* Extenfion, and not Extenfion itfelf. But when I fay it is
* the Subjlratum, do not imagine I make it to be any thing ' nvithout; it is an Ideal St,ifratum, and nothing more. When
* the Mind has been confidering the Idea of Extenfion at)- < ftraded from the extended Bodies, from ^vhcnce it firft re-
* ceived
* Princ. Schol. ad dcf 8.
■|- Anfn.ver to the 6th Letter, p. 39,
X Anfwer to the ^d Lett. p. 2"?.. and to the ^th p. zS,
L An^iAjer to the 6th Letter, p- 30,
42 Concerning the Origin of Evil. Chap. I.
of Extenfion ; therefore it neceflarily continues with Diftance, nor can it be annihilated, unlefs
we
NOTES,
* ccived the Idea, (whether as they were Caufes or Occafions « of it I confider not now) it is a very eafy Step for the Mind
* to make farther, to frame an imaginary Subjiralum to fupport
* an imaginary Extenfion. And this is the more eafy becaufe the
* Idea we have of a real Suhjlratum or Subflance, the Support ' of real Qualities is dark and confufed, an Idea o'i fomenjjhat, ' and that's all. Now it is but joyning the Idea o^fomen.vhat ' with the Idea of one Quality only, namely Extenfion, and
* we have an imaginary Subjiratum prefently formed, that is, ' an Idea o^ Space, or an /^t'a/ extended fomething. Whether
* this be not the very Cafe, I mail leave to any Man to judgq
* by reflefting on his own Ideas.
Again ; To this Quellion, Why may jiot Space he rather de- fined Extenfon in the AbJlraSl, or imaginary Extenfion rather than the imagijiary Subjiratum of imaginary Extenfion ? He an- fwers, ' Extenfion in the general or in the abftraft, is an Idea
* of pure hitelle^ly i.e. is to be underftood, but cannot be
* imagind, any more than Whitenefs in the general, or a « thoufand other the like abftrafl Ideas. But as foon as Ima-
* gination comes to deal with this general abllrad Idea (or « Ideas) it fupplies it with an imaginary Subflratum, and fo
* makes the general which was invifble, be conceived as a
* particular, for the help of the Underftanding. So if the
* Imagination comes to conceive any certain Degree of White-
* nefs, it fupplies the Mind with fome imaginary white Sur- « face, and brings down the general Idea to a particular Ob-
* jedh In like manner, when it comes to conceive a Lengthy
< a Breadth, a Thicknefs, it fapplies the Mind with a Sabftra-
* turn pro hac 'vice, fuch as may ferve the Purpofe, otherwife « the Mind mull reil in pure intcllcd only, as in Numbers ;
< and there is nothing more tedious or uneafy to the Mind
* generally than to be wholly abjlrafted; which is the Reafon, ' by the way, that Arithmetical Demonftrations, tho' as clear
* and certain as any, are lefs delightful than Geometrical, and ' nothing more irkfome than abftraft Numbers. Now Space. « being the Obje£t of the Imagination, and not of pure Intcl-
* leSi, as are all general, abllra£t Ideas, it is properly the
* imaginary Subjiratum of an imaginary Extenfion, or the gene- '■ ral Idea of Extenfion particularized in an imaginary SubjeSii « and hence it is that Space is faid to bo extended, which
« would
Sea. 2. Concerfiiftg the Ongm of Evil. 4J
we would have Extenfion without a Subjefl, |:hat is imo Length, Breadth, md Depth ^'nhom^ny Thing Lo-ag, Broad and Deep. Hence it appears that Space cannot be partially annihilated, and from hence the Opinion of its Jelf-exijieuce might mk.
XVIT. For fince it is of fuch a Nature as muft jJ^^^^J^^' be annihilated either alltogetherj or not at all, they Prejudice that attempted to annihilare it only by Parts, faw for its felt that it was impoflible to de done, the Nature of the cxiftencc^ Thing remonftratedagainft a partial Annihilation, and if one Part be fuppofed, all others might be demonftrat- cd to exifl: by neceffary Connexion, But if any one ihould fuppofe all extended things to be removed to- gether at iOnce, he would find nothing impoffiblein that Suppofition: For one may imagine nothing to exift in Nature befidehis own Soul, and the Caufe on which it depends ; v/hich, as a thinking Being, includes nothing of Extenfion in it: Every thing that is ex- tended may therefore be feparated from Exiftence. But they that attempted this by Parts, when they found it impoflfible, did not fcruple to refol ve the Caufe into the Self-exiftence of Space j tho' in reality it did
noe
NOTES,
' would be Nonfenfe to (ay of Extenfion Itfelf : And Bodici; « are faid to be in Space, which would likewife be Nonfenfe
* to fay of Extenfion. And fo it is conceived as immoveable^
* indivifible, infinite. Immoveable, ^c. all Properties ofSiib
* fiances ; which makes it plain that it is conceived after the
* manner of Sabftance, and therefore is, becaufe it can be no-
* thing elfe, an imaginary Subfiratum, which the Mind takes;
* to particularize, and thereby render conceivable its general
* Idea of Extenfion ; which could not otherwife fall within
* the Imagination, nor be ellimated any way but by abftraft
* numbers, fo many Yards, or fo many Miles, lo, 20, 30 j
* without attending to any thing but the numbers, and the
* meaning of the Words, Yards, Miles, ^c. as it is when we
* reckon Ounces, Pounds, Iffc. of Weight. — Thus then you
* fee how we come by the Notion otSpace^ ^nd wh^t it i\»\ §ee alfo Note 3. .:...«
4,4- Concerning the Ongm of ¥^\i\. Chap. I,
not arife from thence, but from this, that they at- tempted to fepaiMte things naturally infeperable, name- ly, the Parts of Space one from another. We are XVIII. But whether there be any fuch Thing
rifwi""^ as Space, or no; whether its Extenfion be diftin- ^laufe in g^i'^i^d from the Extenfion of Body, or not : Be Whatman- it nothing at ail; Be it mere privation of ComaFty Tier focver as fome are pleafed to term it ; be it mere PoJJibi' tl^e Dif- lity or Capacity of exiRin?, as others; be it, laftly,
pute about -li r /■ J^ r ■ r,r j rr"^
Space be ^^^"^r lometliing credited, or or itfelf and necejjar-
determin- ^^ cxijJing ; yet ftill, as far as we know any thing of cd. the Nature of it, 'tis an indolent thing, it neither
ii^Sy nor is in the leail: aBcd upon', it cannot there- fore, as mere Extenfion, under which Notion only n appears to us, be the Caufe o^ Matter, or imprels Amotion on it. There muft then neceflarily be a- mother Canfe o£ Alatter and Motion, that is a5iive, Jelf-exifient, and the Caufe of all Things and Atiions, which, fince they are not of themfelves, require a Caufe.
SECT. III.
Of the Tirjl Caufe,
Our Rea- \'\7'^'^^'^ '■^^'^ active Principle is we cannot fpniiv^s a- ' ' apprclund otherwife than by Reafon, for ;c bout the occurs not to the Senfes, unlcfs by its EffeEis ', firft Caufe nor is it perceived by them any more than Light ^^}^^%. is by the; Ears: Our Reafonin^s therefore about blhidMan ^^"'''^ Principle will be like thofe of a i?Iind Mm about about Light, A blind Man may be aflured that there is a light, certain thing called Light, which the Eye can per- fince It IS ceive, as the Nofe can Smell ; he may be taught fea of° * ?^^° ^y t\\^m who fee, to underftand many Acf- "Senfc. vantages of Light, namely that it can dirc^^ the
■ ■ ^teps.
Sed. 3. Concerning the Origin ^EviL' 4^
Steps, that it can ivarmi that it derives its Origin from a large remote Body, i.e. the Sun; that by the help of it very difiant Bodie^ may be perceived, with their Forw J and other Qualities unknown tohim ; and that Fire which affords only heat to him, can give Light alfo to them who fee: LaRly, that it arifes from fome Motion in the minutefl Partifles of a Fluid.
II. From thefe ^.v/crWProperti s h£ might dif- Yet wc courfe of L'ght, and in fome Mcalure underfland know a the reafonings of other Men upon itj he would g'^'^^^'na- believe it to bediftind from Heat; he would ea- "-^ J"^' gerly defire, and willingly undergo many Hard- j^g {^^ ihips, to enjoy the Benefit of it ; yet would he never have any fuch Senfe of it as thofe who fee. After the fame manner we may know many things about this adive Principb, which we are compel- led, by the force of Rsafons, to believe certainly to exiff, tho' we are no lefs ignorant of what it is in itfelf, than the blind Man is of the Senfation which Light produces in thofe v;lio fee *.
III, For Inftance; In the firft Plice we are certain Tlut aU that all other things come from this aElive Principle: och^^r For nothing elfe as v/e h:ve Ihewn before t. con- '^^'"S^ . tains in irfelf Necejfary Exifisnce or aftive Poii-eri f^Q^^^], entirely independent of any other; as therefore
itfelf is from none, fo all others are from it. For from hence we conclude that tliis Principle does exiff, becaufe after confjdering the refl of the things which do exifl, we perceive that they could neither i;e nor a5}, if that had not exiflcd, and ex- cited Motion in their.
IV. Secondly, we are certain that this Principle That it is is One, Similar and uniform : For Aiatter is as to <>»«'
* This Compart [on ii farther ilUijirated h^ thi Author of the Procedure of Huiii^n Underltanding, in hn Int>odu^io»,^Con-. cerning the ufc n-vhich is wade of it. See. Rem. \.
f §. 2. Paragr. 3, 4, 5, ^c. and Rcmarfc C.
its
46 Concernmg the Origin o/'Evil. Chap. f.
its EJfence, every where One and alike; the fame muft be faid of Space, if we grant it to be any thing diftind from Matter : much more muft the Caule which fills Space with Matter be One^ Jimplc md uniform, (lo.)
V. Thirdly
NOTE S,
fio j This Argument (as well as Come cidicri.- hereafter men-- ilon'd) were the Foundatioa of it true, can but be call'd a pre fumptive one at beil : nay, in truth the contrary will rather follow from the multiplicity and di-verfty of created Suhjiances. We fhall therefore endeavour to give a dilHnfl proof of the 5m/g- and Attributes oC God, fo hx at lead as the knowledge of them may aficd: our prefent Subiect.
Now thefe feem capable of a clear deduction from this one felf-e'videntVnnc\Y>\c* I exijl. I myfelf exifl: therefore _/cw^- thing exifts. ICfomethlng exiits /'M-zf, then fomething has exirted altuays. Otherwife that fomething wliich now cxiils, mult once cither have been made by nothing, i. e. beep caufed by no Cau/et which is abfurd ; or elfe have tnade itfelf, i. e. have a£led be- fore it exifted, or been at once both Effe£l and Caufe ; which is alfo abfurd ; or, laftly, (which is the only fuppolition leftV it muft have been produced by fomething, which had its Ex- iltence from fomething elfe, which alfo depended on fome other Caufe, and fo on in an infinite Series of Caus'd or Succcifn^e .Beings, without any eternal or firll Caufe ; which is alfo ab- furd. For either fome one Part of this infinite Series has not heew fuccejji've to any other, or elfe all the fevcral Parts of it have been fucceflivc: iC fo?ne one part of it has not, then there \va.s afrf, v/hich deftroys the Suppofition ; if all the feverai Parts of it have been iucceflive to each other, then they have all once hetw future, and if they have been all once future, then there was a time when jione of them exiited ; and if there was a time when «5«f of them exilled, then either all the Parts of this infinite Series, and confequently the ^jhole^ muit have arifen from nothing, which is abiurd; or elfe there mult be fomething in the mchole befidc what is contained in all the parts ; which is alfo abfurd. Or thus : Since all the Parts of this infinite Series ^rz fucceffive ov future to one another,' they muit once either ha\c been all future, i.e. non exifient, (and then the fecoiid abfurdity will follow, /. e. that this ,
t<jhole
f See Kcmarli a. (it thi aid of Ghap. V.
Sed. 3. Cojicernmg the Origin o/'Evil. 47
V. Thirdly^ that it is Infinite both in Nature and Infinite in Fewer : For Unce it exifts of it/elf^ there is nothing ^^i"''^
that JSrOTE Si
whole Series arofe from nothing) or elfe all but fome o«f, (snd then the firft will follow, /. e. that it had a Beginning) which one added to the reft either makes them infinite, which is ab- furd ; or they are infinite without that one, and then that one added to them, either makes one more than infimte, or adds nothing at all ; both which are Absurdities.
Ifitbefaid that an Infinite Series is fuppofed to have no' <vjhole', I grant it, and on that very Account the Suppofition i^ abfurd, fmce whatfoever has Parti muft have a whole, whiclx whole is nothing but a certain number or aggregate of thele Parts. But as no number can be fo great but that we may affign a greater, it follows that neither Number itfelf, nor any thing to which number can be applied, i. e. which confifts of Parts, is capable of real abfolute Infinity *.
From the ImpofTibility of an Infinite Series we gather the Eternityf oC fame one Thing or Being [That every one is not in like manner eternal a parte ante, or ne~oer had a Begin- ing ; particularly that no Body or malerial Syfie?n can be fo (and the fome Reafons hold equally againft any ifnperfeSl im- tnaterial Subfiance) is fufiiciently prov'd in the Enquiry into the Evidence of the Chrifiian Religion'^..'\
From Eternity comes Independence or Selfexifience. For that which never had a Beginning of Exillence, could not poffibly have any Caufe of that Exiftence (for then it would not be th.QfirJi Caufe, contrary to what we have proved above) or could depend w^on no other thing for it, /. e. muit be in^ dependent of all others; or, which is the fame thing, mull ex- ill of itfelf, i. e. he fiif cxifienl.
Eternity a parte pofi, or neccjjary Exifience; or an impofTibi- ty of every ccafing to be, follows from Independence ||. For what depends upon no Caule can never be alter'd or deftroy'd by any, (as is fhewn in Note 4. and Remark e.) and theretorc muil continue as it is.
From Independence comes alfo Omnipotence. For a Being that depends upon no external Caufe for his Exiftence, and has aSiive Po^.ver, (as was fhewn at the fmie time that we proved his Exiftence, and by the fame Medium) cannot de- pend upon any for the exertion of tliat Power, ai\d confequent-
ly
* Rem. b. t R. c. I R. d. ]j, R. c..
and P<nu- er.
48 COnc'^rntng the Origin bf^v'A, Chap. I.
that can bound its Nature or Power. *Tis to be obferved farther, that the number of poJJJhle thing-*^
IS
NOTES,
I7 no /i mi fs Clin be applied to either liis Exitlence or Power<j i'or Limitation is an e^u7 of lome fnperior cau/e, whicJi in tiie prcftiit Cufe there c.innot be: confequently to liippoic Limits wlicre there c;ui be no Limitcv-, is to fuppofe an EffeSi <v:ithout a Caufe *.
To fuppofe this being limited inov by its own 'Nature, is to fuppofe fome Nature antecedent., or limiting S^tality fuperior \o that Being, to the Exillence of whom no Thing, no Quality is in any xQ{y^Q.&. antecedent ox fuperior : And to fuppole that there is no fuch thing as ABion or Po^er in a Being which appears, to be the Fountain of all Aftion and Power, is (if poi- fible) the woril: Suppofition of all. . Liberty is alio included in the Idea of Omnipotence: /Icli-ve Po^..ver implies Freedom; Infinite Ponxcr is abfolute Freedom. What therefore has no Bounds fetto its Po^ver, what can have t\o oppofition made to its WJl, nor Rellraintlaid on its Adi- ons, mull: both will and ^A/ree/y. This Attribute is alfo prov- ed from the Beginning of Alotiun, and the Creation and Dif- pofition o^ indifferent things f.
But tho' this Being hfree, and as fuch the Author of Change in other Beings, yet he mull himfelf be Unchangeable. For all Changes have a Beginning, and confequently are Effects of fome prior Caufes: But there can be nothing />w;- to the Ex- igence of this Being, ^sXit'isEtertial, neither any C^z^ofit, as he is independent; nor confequently any change in it: ex- cept we could fuppofe him to change himfelf, which is the fame Abfurdity as to produce hirafelf, i. e. to be at the fimc time both Fffea. and Caufe.
Thus we come to the Knowledge of an Eternal, Independent y Omnipotent, Free, and Vtuhangeable Being.
Qmnifcience, as well fome of the foregoing Attributes, may be jnore eafily deduced thus. We find in ourfelves fuch Qualir ties as T^hought and Intelligence, Po-ixer, Freedom, ijfc. of w hich we have intniti-ve Kno^ijledge, as much as of our own Exijlence; and that to have thcfe is ^ perfection, or better than to be-with- out them : We find alfo th.u thefe have not been in us froni Eternity, confequently ihcy mull ha\c had a Beginning, -mA'
ton-
* Rom. r. f See Mute E, and |hc' Rofcrenecsl
•Sed. 3. Concur ?ii?tg the Origin of TLwW. ^c^
is conceived by us to be infinite, at lealt in Pffiuert but nothing can be foffibl&, to wiiich there is nuc
fomc
NOTES.
^oitfc^quently {ome Cau/e, (for the fame realbn that :i Ba'Kg, beginning to exifl in time, requires a Caufe) which Caufe, as it mull htfiiperior to its EffeB, has them in zfupcrtor Degree*j and if it be the JirJI Caufe, as itfelf can depend upon no other, muft have them in perfeSiioti, or in an infinite or ujiUmttcd Degree (if thefe Words can properly be here apply 'df.) Since Bounds or Limitation would be without a Limiter (as has been fliewn) /. e. an Effeft without a Caule.
The Pheno?nena of Nature alfo lead us up to One fuch firft Caufe, which is fufficient for their Produdlion, and therefore none ellc are necejfary ; and tho' fe-veral more independent Be- ings might pofhbly exifl, yet would they be no Gods to us ; for they would have no manner of Relation to us, nor we any thing to do with them :{;. Since therefore the iame Rcafoii -holds for no more than One fuch, to fuppofe more than one is. at lead unreafonable.
Thefe feem to be all the fitnple Attributes obfervable in the. Divine Nature, which, as they are differently combined by us, come under different Nam^s. Thus the unlimited Exer- cife of God's Kno-Miedge and Ponver demonllrates him Omni- prefent, i. e. at all times and in all places fo prefeat with every Creature as to have an abfolute Knoixledge of and Paov^r ovei: it ; always to fupervife and govern it||.
His enioying all conceivable Perfedions in an entire abfo- lute manner, denotes him